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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to examine the precise 
nature of the relationship between ecology and class 
structure and to see how and to what extent the ecological 
setting affects the class relations of a rural community.
It is both an empirical and a theoretical study. The 
theoretical analysis covers the question of the influence 
of the environment in the development of human society 
and the circumstances under which ecology may play a 
role in production relations. This analysis also 
involves an investigation of the relations of production 
themselves in trying to identify the various classes 
in a Bangladesh social formation. The empirical study, 
on the other hand, carried out in three ecologically 
different areas of southern Bangladesh, was designed to 
test relevant hypotheses.
It is a two fold study. First, to analyse the extent 
to which the relations of production in the three villages 
differ and to establish whether this difference could be 
construed as evidence of different modes of production 
in the villages. Secondly, to ascertain to what extent 
these differences are due to the ecological settings of 
the three villages.
The findings are positive in that it is possible to 
establish direct relationships between two ecological 
variables and individual class relation variables and 
to predict modes of production corresponding to these 
ecological variables. However, when indirect relationships 
between variables as well as direct relationships are 
taken into account, the complexity of the relations between 
ecology and class structure does not allow simple gener­
alizations to emerge.
« 3
Physical necessity brought man to a 
stage of development at which he began, 
little by little, to separate himself 
from the remaining animal world. He 
became a tool-making animal. The 
tool is an organ with the help of 
which man acts on nature to achieve 
his ends. It is an organ which 
subjects necessity to the human 
consciousness, although at first only 
to a very weak degree, by fits and 
starts, if one can put that way.
The degree of development of the 
productive forces determines the 
measure of the authority of man over 
nature.
The development of the productive 
forces is itself determined by the 
qualities of the geographical environ­
ment surrounding man. In this way 
nature itself gives man the means 
for its own subjection.
G.V. Plekhanov, 1895
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INTRODUCTION
It has become common practice for social science scholars 
particularly in the Less Developed Countries to take 
sample villages from different ecological regions of a 
country in rural study programmes in order to see regional 
variations. Such variations are seen for example, in 
the fragmentation and dispersion of land, land holding 
patterns, cropping patterns, forms of tenancy and rent 
relations, usury and market relations. While these 
variations are recognised and are thought to be generally 
due to either ecological differences between regions or 
to accidental factors, neither a firm theoretical found­
ation nor detailed empirical studies exist on the precise 
nature of the relationship between ecology and class 
structure.
My objective here is to try to examine whether, and to 
what extent the ecological setting of a rural community 
has an influence on its class structure. It is, in a 
way, a formulation of the broader question of the infl­
uence of environment on the development of human society. 
However, my investigation is more restricted in scope 
and ultimately comes down to an examination of the 
relationship between a set of ecological variables on the 
one hand and certain properties of the forms of the 
labour process and the structure of production on the 
other.
Clearly, ecology and class structure are two separate and 
distinct areas of study and therefore, it Is necessary 
to examine them individually and also to explain the 
context in which they are interlinked. Ecology has
n
Ibeen defined by social scientists of different disciplines 
in various ways but in this study it is taken to mean 
the immediate environment in relation to man's natural 
habitat. Thus, it is a study within the broader frame­
work of human geography.
With regard to class structure, here the concept has been 
used in the Marxist sense which will be elaborated later. 
However, the real contribution in this sense must be 
seen in a different context. That class structure varies 
from place to place and that this is due to differences 
in the relations of production corresponding to different 
modes of production is well established. The reason for 
these differences is sought in the historical processes 
of production relations. This study submits ecology 
as one of the possible factors that might explain some 
of the differences in the relations of production between 
regions. It may be argued that there is an inverse 
relationship between the level of the forces of production 
and the effect of ecology on relations of production.
In other words, depending on the level of the forces of 
production, ecology has a determining or a mediating effect.
Thus on the one hand this is a study in human geography, 
and on the other it is an enquiry into class analysis; in 
this sense it may be regarded as interdisciplinary.
One further question may be asked. Why an analysis of 
class structure ? The reason is that class structure 
may be said to explain the structure and the causes of 
poverty in a given social formation. The logical conne­
ction between class structure and poverty may be demon­
strated in three ways. First, in terms of direct land 
ownership, since in a rural society who is poor and who
1. See.chapter iv, section 1
71 & 0
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is not, how many people are poor and how poor they are 
depends to a very large extent on who has access to land 
and who does not. In other words, the extent and level 
of poverty depends on the relation of these people to the 
means of production in a direct way. Secondly, and this 
is a little more indirect, in that the existing structure 
of land ownership, which is at least a proxy for the 
existing class structure, inhibits the development of the 
forces of production. This means low output and in turn 
a lower level of division of labour. Thirdly, in a larger 
context, the existing relations of production not only 
in the villages but also in the country as a whole and 
indeed to a significant extent, the world capitalist 
system, determines the set of policies that are available 
and adopted. These policies include price policies, 
procurement policies vis-a-vis imports, exports, foreign 
exchange, subsidies of certain exports, and import 
taxes that may make certain inputs in agriculture more 
expensive than need be. This entire set of policies 
itself depends on the national power structure which is 
determined in a large sense, by the relations of production 
for the nation as a whole. This plays a major and perhaps 
determining role in keeping the forces of production 
depressed both in the cities and in the villages.
The first chapter Introduces the empirical background in 
which the subject of this study is set. It discusses, 
on the one hand, the geographical background and on the 
other, the level of poverty and inequality.
In the former it highlights a combination of agro-ecological 
determinants which interact to determine, for example, 
the number of rice crops and the kind of associated crops 
which can be grown; whether they are broadcast or trans­
planted, deep-water or intermixed. These in turn 
affect labour especially wage labour use, wage-rate 
and therefore production cost, employment and the income 
of the labouring class. This forms the basis of the 
analysis linking ecology and class relations.
In this chapter I also examine the causes of the level 
of poverty and inequality both historically and in the 
context of contemporary Bangladesh social formation.
It brings out not only the changing class structure 
and modes of appropriation of surplus but also the 
nature of the interrelations between class structure 
and poverty.
Ecological changes in the southern coastal district of 
Bangladesh in which the three selected villages are 
situated are discussed in Chapter 2, This focuses on 
the history of land reclamation and early settlement 
in the Sundarbans which form a large part of the district 
in the south. This analysis is important in order to 
answer some of the key questions which underlie some
of the hypotheses. In order to establish some sort of
a relationship between ecology and the structure of
differentiation in the villages it was necessary to know,
for instance, whether the original settlement was 
characterized by inequality or whether inequality 
accelerated over the years. The historical analysis 
of settlement helped to see hox^ r the ecological factors 
such as jungle clearance, salinity and the inaccessibility 
of the region affected the development of the forces of 
production and the formation of changing relations of 
production in the region.
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The three selected villages are discussed in Chapter 3.
Here I have outlined the ecological differences between 
the villages, their demographic and agrarian structure, 
the various occupations of the villagers, the market and 
finally the structure of power and politics focusing on 
how all these structures have been affected by the 
ecology of the villages or of their immediate region.
These structures outline the various relations different 
people enter into in the process of production. Two 
broad forms emerge clearly from this. These are the 
relations of ’possession5 and the relations of ’separation1 
from the means of production, with those separated being 
critically dependent on those who are not, for the 
reproduction of their labour. Thus, this chapter forms 
the basis for an analysis of class structure at the 
village level.
However, although it shows the broader relationships 
between the various socio-economic structures and their 
ecological surrounding it does not explain the precise 
nature of the relationship between a selected ecological 
variable and the relations of production.
In order to do this, it is necessary to introduce the 
ecological variables and explain what these relations of 
possession and separation from the means of production 
are.
In the last section of Chapter 3t the ecological variables 
have been elaborated. Unlike ecological variables which 
are quantifiable, relations of production are the 
conceptual issues in which class concepts are set.
Therefore, it is important to explain these issues 
before it is possible to identify the relations and the 
classes at the village level.
n ^ 3
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This sets the ground for the theoretical chapter (Chapter 4-)* 
As this study is a limited formulation of the broader 
question of the raan-nature relationship, some of the major 
contributions to this field are reviewed at the outset.
The existing approach - which is, broadly, a social 
anthropology approach - is one in which civilisation 
is explained in terms of the cumulative and progressive 
adaptive ability of man to nature embodied in the concept 
of culture. It is not so much the term 1 culture1 nor 
the adaptive nature of man, but the isolated and yet all 
embracing nature of the concept of 'culture* that I 
find a weakness in the traditional anthropological 
approach to studies in cultural ecology.
The Marxist method of analysis provides a more rigorous 
approach in which 'culture* is replaced by the concept 
of 'forces of production* in explaining man's adaptability 
to nature. 'Forces of production' unlike 'culture' is 
not an independent concept, but part of a system of 
inter-linking concepts which help explain not only the 
different stages of civilization but also their transition. 
The concepts embody the process of production, distribution 
and circulation but are articulated in the conflicting 
nature of the relations these processes presuppose.
Classes are set in these conflicting relations of produc­
tion and therefore can only be understood in the context 
of these relations. However, rural people enter into 
various forms of relations and do not fall neatly into 
class categories. A poor household, for instance, may 
share-crop out his land and also do wage labour and 
therefore it may be difficult to determine whether this 
makes him a landlord or a wage labourer. The answer to 
this is sought in the theoretical position of the concept 
of relations of production which stipulates that all
* 2 4
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relations are not necessarily relations of production and 
that to make a difference in the relations of production 
there must be a difference at the level of the market, 
forces of production, ideology or at the level of politics. 
Without a clear understanding of these differences in the 
relations of production it is almost impossible to locate 
the classes which must be a pre-condition to an analysis 
of theprecise nature of the relationship between ecology 
and the way rural societies are structured.
Thus, tSae Marxist method of analysis in a single theoretical 
system explains on the one hand the man-nature relation­
ship and on the other, the unequal relationship of men in 
society. The descriptive-analytical approach of social 
anthropologists to ecological studies, valuable though 
they undoubtedly are, does not offer any theory as such, 
(Steward:195506) and thus makes it almost impossible to 
form any generalisation on the basis of specific observations.
These, basically are the reasons for adopting a Marxist 
approach. Different aspects of this have been highlighted 
in the theoretical chapter in order to identify the 
relations of production and on the basis of these relations 
the classes one would expect to find in Bangladesh villages 
have been identified *
Chapter 5 uses this analytical format and with the help 
of the household data examines class structure in the 
selected villages. As a result, the preliminary categories 
are re-structured to formulate a comparative class 
structure of the villages based on the relations of 
production.
In Chapter 6 the precise nature of the relationship 
between the ecological variables and the relations of 
production is examined. This is done in three stages.
In the first stage, a series of predictions is made on 
the basis of a set of hypotheses linking the indicators 
of class relations and the ecological variables, In the 
second stage these predictions are tested against the 
findings in the empirical study of the villages. In the 
final stage, on the basis of these tests a framework 
identifying the possible linkages between some of the 
ecological variables and the class relation variables 
is offered.
In the concluding chapter, the empirical evidence demon­
strating a positive correlation between ecology and class 
relation variables is summed up and the theoretical frame­
work explaining the precise nature of the relationship 
between the selected ecological variables and the social 
variables is reviewed.
METHODOLOGY
The present research is primarily an empirical study 
based on field work in three villages in Khulna, one 
of the southern most districts of Bangladesh. The 
proposed theoretical construct has been tested against 
the findings in these villages.
Ideally and in principle, for a thorough investigation 
micro-regions should have been selected in the different 
ecological zones of Bangladesh; so that the regional 
variations could be readily seen and the study would be 
more representative of the country as a whole. In 
addition, and itfhat is perhaps more important, instead 
of an original study of villages selected at random, a 
re-study of villages on which some work had been done 
earlier would be more useful so that as Shanin puts it 
1 a line could be drawn between two points1."*' While 
the latter process would certainly have made this research less 
tedious, the selection of the villages itself would 
have been more time consuming since it would have invol­
ved going through different District Office Records at 
District Headquarters and sieving out villages not only 
on which previous data existed but also which were 
representative of the region in whieh they were located.
This would have doubled the time needed for 
the process of selection and therefore, although the 
advantages of such a process were appreciated, it was 
felt that without the benefit of lengthy previous 
research, its adoption was impossible.
Originally it was intended to select villages from the 
various ecological zones of Bangladesh, but having 
visited several villages in Dinajpur and Rangpur districts
1. This was suggested by Professor Teodor Shanin of 
Manchester University when I visited him following 
my return from field studies in Bangladesh.
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in northern Bangladesh, some villages in the Sylhet 
Hills in the north-east and several more villages in the 
districts of Barisal and Khulna in the deltaic southern 
part of the Bengal Basin, I was convinced that given the 
constraints of time, manpower and logistic support and 
with the approach of the long monsoon, it was not 
feasible to undertake such a project. Instead, after 
extensive travel, three villages were selected in three 
ecologically distinct regions of one district, ensuring 
that each village was typical of the region in which 
it was located.
Data collection was carried out using a combination of 
household surveys and participant“observation techniques.
In the first category, an intensive preliminary quest­
ionnaire'*' was framed in order to obtain information on 
the village-level class structure and household data on 
access to the means of production and production relations, 
i.e. landholding, tenancy pattern, family or wage labour 
use, production and marketing, income and expenditure, 
and usury. The questionnaire was tested in the field 
during my tour of the villages in different parts of 
the country and finally necessary alterations were made 
to meet the specific needs of the villages I selected.
However, to ensure proportional representation of different 
classes (for the moment defined in terms of landholding)
It was necessary to undertake, as a first stage, a one 
hundred per cent census of the villages. This was done 
and information was obtained on landholding, family
size, age distribution of family members and principal
3
occupation for all three villages.
1. The Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies Village 
Study questionnaire was consulted as a guideline.
2. In terms of food consumption, children under 3 years 
of age were regarded as normally breast-fed, between 
3 and 10 years were considered as consuming half the 
adult food-intake and above 10 as adults in terms of 
food intake.
3. For questionnaires in Bengali and translation see Appendix V.
It is important to note here that, due to differences in 
soil fertility and other ecological characteristics* 
crop yields vary significantly between the three villages 
so that access to means of production does not reflect 
the same class category in all three villages. In order 
to eliminate this difficulty and to establish a uniform 
class category across the three villages, the households 
in all three villages were stratified not according 
to land ownership but to per capita crop production, taking 
the subsistence requirement as the guideline. After 
discussion with the villagers, a figure of 8 maunds of 
paddy per adult member of a family was arrived at as 
being the minimum amount necessary for survival. This 
per capita subsistence paddy requirement was then 
translated into land and the households having this 
subsistence level of landholding were, by this definition, 
•subsistence households’. In other words, the initial 
class differentiation is production based rather than 
landholding based since a fixed landholding category 
cannot be valid for describing class strata in areas 
having varying crop yields per unit of land. In this 
production based classification per capita landholding 
for the same class category varies in the three villages.
Households were thus categorized by landholding (controlled 
for normal village crop yield as explained above) into the 
a priori strata % landless, poor, subsistence, self- 
sufficient, surplus and rich. In this way, the categories 
are based on reality rather than being purely subjective 
and descriptive. Alternatively stratification could be 
based on distinctions such as whether rich peasants 
were landlords, capitalists etc. In this instance,
however, it would not be a distinction between rich 
peasants and middle peasants but between peasant and non­
peasant. This is in fact, how the rural population 
should be classified for class analysis but which itself 
can only be arrived at when different relations of 
production have been analysed.
Admittedly, the subsistence level is more of a consumption 
and poverty oriented line and not related to the production 
process as such. Ideally it would have been best to 
have been able to stipulate a farm size that would enable 
a man not to be exploited in the labour market then 
that would be a determining criterion which would have 
some relevance for the analysis of the production 
process. But in order to find this point one would 
have to try and locate the household against its means 
of production and this would naturally involve further 
stratification of this a priori category into poor, 
self-sufficient, surplus and so on. Obviously, the 
determining point between two categories are arbitrary.
These arbitrary divisions between categories may, 
perhaps, be avoided by taking categories that are more 
directly related to relations of production. Instead 
of taking, rich peasants and middle peasants for instance, 
one could take landlords, share-croppers, primarily 
wage-based enterprises, family-based enterprises, 
and so on. On the other hand, it is in fact the means 
of production that largely locates a household's 
position in the relations of production. By and large 
the two things correspond to a large extent. Very large 
landowners, for instance, rent their land out, middle 
order landlowners are more likely to use wage labour'*'
1. Such large landowners as referred to are almost non­
existent in Bangladesh, the middle order farmers as 
mentioned here are what have been called in this study 
the surplus and the rich peasants.
smaller owners are more likely to be family operated 
enterprises and the smallest landowners are likely to be 
peasants cum proletariat.
Thus stratifying a given population by its relative 
access to means of production is not only a convenient 
way but also a productive way of locating households 
in the labour process of production.
Given the intensive household questionnaires, each 
containing approximately 300 questions, and the large 
sample size it was thought necessary to hire interviewers. 
Thus, four local graduates and an undergraduate for the 
two villages in the south and two graduates for the 
village in the north were trained to interview the sample 
households. Ten per cent of the households were inter­
viewed by me Initially of which some were done in two 
instalments depending on the size of the households, 
with the trainees observing the interviews. It took 
just over two hours to interview an average household 
% and the whole operation took approximately nine months.
After completion of the interviews by the assistants,
15 per cent were checked at random. Rate of error or 
wilful skipping of questions on the part of the inter­
viewers was found to be negligible except for one 
interviewer who was dropped altogether and his households 
re-interviewed.
Referring to the second category of data-collection, 
participation and observation techniques were adopted 
in four forms: to obtain macro-level information on
the ecology of the villages; talking to the villagers 
and having selected interviews with different profess­
ional and social groups^" and surveying the peak-season 
labour market, sale of principal crops and other indust­
rial consumer goods in the village haat; intensive
2
community questionnaires were used to obtain macro­
level socio-economic information on the core and peri­
pheral community; and lastly, Thana Tehsil Offices and 
District Settlement Offices were used to check land 
records. At the District level, the Records Office 
was found to be useful for historical documents.
1. Bank manager, fish factory manager, Circle Officers, 
village council officials, Tehsildars, Dafadars, 
labour leaders, coir manufacturers, shop-keepers 
and the oldest men in the villages were interviewed.
2. The Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies 
kindly permitted use of their community questionnaire.
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CHAPTER 1
ECOLOGY, POVERTY AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN BANGLADESH: 
AH OVERVIEW
This chapter introduces the empirical background against 
which the subject of the study must be seen. It has four 
sections: (I) Agro-ecological structure, (II) Politics 
of Poverty and backwardness: the British and Pakistan 
connection, (III) Scale of poverty and inequality and 
(IV) Policy analysis. The first analyses the whole 
range of agro-ecological determinants. The last three 
sections are self-explanatory. The need to examine the 
level of poverty and inequality over time is due to its 
logical connection with production relations and in 
order to help see the changing structure of class in 
rural Bangladesh.
1. See Introduction.
Section 1
Agro-Ecological Structure
A combination of agro-ecological factors interact to 
determine the types of crops and cropping pattern 
and cycle which inevitably affects labour use especially 
wage labour demand, and influences the use of other 
inputs. These in turn determine employment, production 
costs and income especially of the labouring class.
Thus ecology is interlinked with social relations in 
the very nature of agricultural production. Here, 
however only the ecological determinants, in other 
words how the various ecological factors affect 
agricultural production in different parts of Bangladesh 
are highlighted,
Brammer'*' illustrates how climatic, soil and hydrological 
factors interact to determine (a) length of the rice 
growing season; (b) time of sowing (land preparation);
(c) rice cultivation practices (broadcast, transplanted, 
deepwater, intermixed and irrigated); (d) the kind of 
associate crop, in any, which is grown either intermixed 
sequentially or as an alternate with rice,
Braramer states that whether rice, together with associated 
crops, can be successfully grown or not, is not determined 
by any one factor but by a combination of physical factors
1. Brammer, H,, Incorporation of Physical Determinants in 
Cropping Pattern Design; presented at Cropping System 
Symposium IRRI, Los Banos, Philippines, September, 1976. 
In the absence of any similar study, this part has been 
drawn almost in its entirety from Brammerfs article.
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which determine the length of the growing season(s) and 
whether the crops can obtain adequate nutritive support 
during this period without undue risk of destruction by 
meteorological, hydrological or other non-physical elements.
Length of the rice growing season : The length of the rice 
growing season is determined by day length, temperature 
regime, rainfall regime, soil moisture holding capacity, 
hydrological regime and sometimes soil chemical conditions. 
In Bangladesh, however, rainfall regime, temperature and 
day length can be regarded as primary determinants of rice 
sowing and harvesting dates. However, the influence of 
rainfall regime is widely modified by soils and hydrological 
factors.
Climatic determinants : In irrigated areas the effective 
beginning of the rice growing season is determined by winter 
temperatures. Hight temperatures in December, January and 
part of February fall below 13°C, which severely retards 
the growth of rice during the winter. Brammer suggests 
that for those who sow boro during this time, in order 
not to expose the crop to pest and disease attack and waste 
irrigation water and labour, probably the optimum date for 
sowing is one which allows the seedlings to be transplanted 
in time to become established just as night temperatures 
begin to stay above 13°C; early February near the coast, 
mid to late February inland.
In rainfed areas, the beginning of the rice growing season 
is normally determined by the date of onset of the pre­
monsoon rains. This date varies from early April in the 
north east and near part of the coast, to late May in the 
extreme west when the farmer prepares and sows his land 
after the first heavy pre-monsoon rainfall which saturates 
the top soil.
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The end of the rice growing season, in both rainfed and 
irrigated areas, is determined partly by day length and 
partly by the date on which night temperatures begin to 
fall below 20°G. Both traditional aman varieties, which 
are photosensitive and other varieties (including HIV) 
which are photo-insensitive, must be sown and transplanted 
by a date which will ensure that the plants will have grown 
beyond the flowering stage before night temperatures are 
liable to fall below this critical level (which interferes 
with fertilization).
Soil and hydrological determinants : As I have said earlier, 
soil and hydrological conditions modify the 'normal1, 
climatically determined length of the rice growing season 
in certain seasons in certain areas. For example :
(a) Some silty Tista floodplain soils retain moisture 
throughout the dry season. This is partly due to a high 
water-table, and partly to their unusually high moisture 
holding capacity. Sowing of the upland rice crop, aus, 
commences in February-March on these soils before the pre­
monsoon rains begin.
(b) Sowing is delayed on soils which are of low-moisture 
holding capacity throughout the dry season. These include 
pervious light-textured floodplain ridge soils and permeable 
Red-Brown Terrace Soils on the Madhupur and Barind Tracts. 
These soils do not have enough moisture storage capacity
to carry rice seedlings through between pre-monsoon showers 
so that sowing of aus may not be safe until the end of May.
(c) The puddled silty or clay topsoils of Grey Terrace 
soils on the Barind Tract in the west of the country also 
do not have enough moisture holding capacity for aus to be 
safely sown on pre-monsoon showers. On these soils aus
is usually omitted and a single crop of transplanted aman 
is grown, which is planted in June-July after there has 
been enough rainfall to flood the puddled fields. Where 
aus is sown late, it unduly delays transplanting of the 
main aman crop, with consequent reduction in yields,
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Thus within the same rainfall zone, soil and hydrological 
conditions may vary the sowing date of rainfed aus between 
late February and late May, or prevent it from being 
grown at all.
Number of rice crops : The length of the rice growing season 
partly determines whether one or two rain-fed rice crops 
can be grown. For example :
(a) traditionally quick maturing upland* aus is followed 
by transplanted, photosensitive aman on soils which hold 
moisture satisfactorily during both cropping seasons and 
where deep flooding or salinity is not limiting. Such 
soils occur most extensively in the east and north*
(b) a single crop of ’upland1 aus is typically grown on 
permeable floodplain ridge soils which cannot be puddled 
for transplanted rice or the growing season is too short 
for aman. Such soils and conditions occur most extensively 
in the west. An early aus crop is also grown on some 
low-lying soils where the rapid rise of flood water later, 
prevents deepwater aman from being grown.
(c) a single crop of transplanted aman is grown on soils 
that can be puddled or are shallowly flooded at the end 
of the monsoon season, but where the growing season is 
restricted by dry season salinity or the short duration of 
the rainy season. Extensive areas of such land occur in 
the west and the south.
(d) a single deepwater aman crop is transplanted in some 
north western areas especially on basin clays which stay 
too dry and hard for the land to be prepared before the 
pre-monsoon rains but which are liable to flood early and 
rapidly after heavy pre-monsoon showers, thus preventing 
normal broadcast sowing.
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In addition to the above patterns determined mainly by- 
climate and soil conditions, there are patterns determined 
mainly by hydrological conditions,, For example :-
(a) the probable date of onset of flash floods in foothill 
areas, or of deep flooding in depression sites, may set a 
limit to the safe harvesting period of boro or aus .
(b) mixed aus and deepwater aman grown mainly on relatively 
permeable floodplain ridge soils which are not flooded 
deeper than 60-90 cm by July (when the aus is harvested 
leaving the aman to continue growing with the rising 
floodwater until it is harvested, on the recession of
the floodwater, in October-December).
(c) deepwater aman alone, grown mainly on deeply flooded basin 
and valley sites in areas where the risk of loss by rapidly 
rising floodwater is not too great,
(d) boro grown on basin and valley sites which remain wet 
throughout the dry season (or where irrigation can be 
provided) and where the risk of early flooding (in March- 
April) is not too severe.
Some deeply flooded land is not used for rice at all. This 
may be due to lack of irrigation water for boro; too great 
a depth of water in the dry season for transplanting boro; 
risk of early floods; mucky soils with too low bearing 
capacity; salinity; or acid sulphate conditions.
Concerning non-rice associate crops, it would be adequate 
to point out, since we are not focusing on this, that they 
are grown both sequentially and inter-sown with rice.
Their cultivation depends more on hydrological conditions 
and soil moisture properties than on climatic or other 
soil factors. They can be divided into three broad groups - 
early, middle and late - according to their time of sowing.
Almost all are dryland crops but some (jute, sesamum, 
millets and chillies, for example) apparently tolerate 
flooding at mature stages of growth. The dry season crops 
where they are not irrigated, are dependent on residual 
soil moisture.
The most important of these non-rice crops particularly 
in economic terms, is jute. It is a normal rotation crop 
with aus and aman in many parts of the country. Jute is 
substituted for aus or deepwater aman every three or four 
years usually on loamy soils. It is followed by transplant 
aman on relatively higher land in areas where early rains 
or moisture retentive soils allow jute to be sown early 
enough for harvesting in July-August, and where the soils 
can later be puddled for transplanted rice. Elsewhere jute 
is usually followed by rabi crops.
Dryland Fallow ; Much rice land remains fallow in the dry 
season because of the adverse physical or chemical soil 
conditions. Most of this is in fact transplanted aman 
land. Puddled silty or clay top soils often with a 
strong ploughpan, commonly stay wet early in the dry
season, then quickly become dry and hard, providing both
a poor seed-bed and very little moisture for dryland crops 
that might be sown. Extensive areas of transplanted aman 
land in coastal areas also become saline during the dry 
season. Much of the broadcast aman land, mainly where 
basin soils stay wet late into the dry season and/or have 
a clay topsoil which becomes very hard when dry, remains 
fallow during this period. Most hill soils and some sandy 
floodplain ridge soils used for aus remain fallow in the
dry season due to poor moisture retention capacity.
1. Based on the characteristic determinants in different 
areas of Bangladesh, the cropping pattern that has 
evolved can be seen in Appendix II,
Before leaving this discussion of the physiographic and 
economic determinants and moving on to the second section 
of this chapter dealing with the politics of poverty 
within the broader framework of class structure, let us 
combine the above determinants in the context of 2 regions 
in order to demonstrate their role in restricting some areas 
to mono-cropping and their interaction in others to produce 
diverse cropping patterns.
Level Barind Tract
climate
hydrology
drainage
soil
condition
crop
rotation
high rainfall from mid-July to October; 
practically no rainfall from November to May 
very little rainfall from June to mid-July.
above flood level.
poorly drained (water remains stagnant along 
field bunds for a considerable period).
silt loams to clay loams over compact clay; 
low moisture retentive capacity during dry 
season; becomes extremely droughty from 
end of December.
transplanted aman followed by fallow.
2. Old Brahmaputra Floodplain
climate ; high rainfall from May to October; slight
rain from November to mid-March; moderate
rain from mid-March to April.
hydrology ; medium highland (flooded up to 3 feet).
drainage ; moderately permeable; floodwater receded
by end of October,
soil
condition silt loams to silty clay loams throughout; 
high moisture retension capacity during dry 
season; do not become droughty until March,
crop
rotation aus - transplanted aman - rabi crops
1
1. See Rahman, M.R. On the Influence of Soil Characteristics 
on Cropping Pattern in Bangladesh - some notes. 1977. 
Department of Soil Survey, Dacca.
Section II
The Politics of Poverty and Backwardness : the British, 
and Pakistan Connection
1. Some Theoretical Arguments
In a predominantly rice producing economy, poverty basically 
means low productivity in agriculture. The argument is 
that an increase in agricultural output and more particularly 
an increase in production per head of population engaged 
in agriculture, is a necessary precondition - or at least 
concomitant, of development (see Southworth and Johnston,
1967, ch.l; Jones and Woolf 19&9> Introduction). Thus 
development involves the increase in volume of goods and 
services for human consumption.
Agricultural backwardness has been explained by two 
opposite views. There are those who believe that the 
problem lies not in whether or not farms are under resident 
or absentee ownership, small or large, private or public 
enterprises and whether the production is for home consumption 
or for sale (Schultz:1964:29) but the main reason for low 
average incomes in the so called overpopulated areas, is 
the abundance of unskilled or semi-skilled labour relative 
to the available land and capital (Bauer and Yamey:1957:210). 
It is also argued that poverty is caused by the relative 
failure of a market economy to penetrate very far into 
the countryside and to put the peasants into a new situation 
to which they would seem to be quite capable of responding 
with a sharp rise in output (Barrington Moore, Jr : 1969 :4.06). 
There are others in the same school who equally find the 
institutional frame work of village structure of secondary 
importance and emphasize the need for the introduction of 
new technology (Lewis:1970:136).
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On the other hand the second group, within which there 
are in fact, two sub-groups, emphasizes that 'from the 
very beginning of sedentary agriculture, rights in land 
have determined who has authority, influence and wealth, 
and formed the different agrarian structures and institutions 
that decide the productivity of land and labour. In 
developed and underdeveloped coutries alike, productivity 
of land and labour is fundamentally a function of the 
incentives and protection, offered to the tiller of the 
soil by the agrarian structure.' (Jacoby:1971:72-73)
Thus'fundamental changes in the traditional agrarian 
structure and in the attitudes of those living and working 
within it are crucial to a solution of this problem.' 
(Myrdal:1968:Vol 11:1366). The other view in the same 
school is that the existing structure in many areas may be 
perfectly compatible with growth and productivity but 
the high social costs associated with such a growth process, 
growing inequalities, proletarization of the peasantry 
and social tension for example, are unacceptable. In 
practice these two views are combined and the argument 
follows that the existing agrarian structure not only does 
not permit growth with equity but in fact inhibits growth 
precisely by perpetuating inequities. (Abdullah:1978:6)
Broadly, the second school argues that agrarian structures 
are frequently characterized by a highly skewed distribution 
of land whose possession tends to be highly correlated 
with command over other resources.
It is also argued that the existing inequitable structure 
subverts policy measures and public works programmes may 
be opposed or diverted from more socially profitable areas 
to the services of the rural elite.
Finally, the maldistribution of income associated with 
existing structures impairs the internal market demand 
for consumer goods, thus frustrating industrial growth.
It also leads to conspicuous consumption rather than 
savings on the part of the rich, malnutrition and the 
consequent waste of human resources and inhibition of social 
mobility. (Carroll:1967:318-319i Myrdal:1970:51)
Abdullah points out the weaknesses inherent in the implicit
ad hoc, empiricist approach in which various disconnected
elements - holding size, share cropping, money lending
and attitudes for example - are picked up and examined
for their possible effects on growth. This approach is
shared by both parties to the debate. To him the question
of the interaction of technological and institutional
factors is inadequately and simplistically posed.
One result of this is that implicit attitudes on this 
question range from a mechanical determinism according 
to which reforms in the agrarian structure are seen as 
simple responses to new technical or market opportunities 
to a naive and somewhat moralizing voluntarism passionately 
urging regimes to commit suicide by undercutting their 
own class base, (Abdullah:1978:8)
Abdullah points out that it is meaningless to ask whether 
or not a particular agrarian structure is a barrier to 
growth.
One must ask rather whether, and how, the social formation 
of which the agrarian structure is a part is prejudicial 
to the development of capitalism, whether, and why, the 
growth potential of capitalism is exhausted for this 
social formation what the tendencies of development - 
’the laws of motion'- of this social formation are, and 
whether and in what areas the social formation allows 
autonomy to the political level, so that purposeful 
interventions ahead of technical change are nossible.
(Ibids9) -----
He suggests that to clear the ground for a meaningful 
analysis what is needed is
a set of concepts that will enable us to grasp theoretically
the essential relationships that characterize the organi­
sation of agriculture and its dialectical interaction 
with the total social reality. The concept of the agrar­
ian structure must be anchored in such an analysis. 
(Ibidsll) .
2. Poverty and Stagnation in Bengal ; the British Connection
The culture of poverty is both an adaptation and a reaction 
of the poor to their marginal position in a class strati­
fied, high individuated, capitalistic society. It represent 
an effort to cope with feelings of hopelessness and despair. 
Most frequently the culture of poverty develops when a 
stratified social and economic system is breaking down 
or is being replaced by another ... Often it results from 
imperial conquest in which the native social and economic 
structure is smashed and the natives are maintained in 
a servile colonial status, sometimes for many generations. 
(Oscar Lewis:1963:p.xli)
The purpose of the analysis of the historic process is to 
explain that the descent of today’s poor countries into 
underdevelopment did not occur independently of what was 
happening in the rest of the world.
The expansion of Europe throughout the world was an outcome 
of the competition among mercantilist-capitalist states for 
trading advantages. Its object was to obtain monopoly 
control of the most lucrative trading areas. Europe's 
tendency to run a substantial balance of payments deficit 
in its trade with Asia was met either by forcing down the 
price of Asian products or increasing the demand for goods 
which Europe could supply. (Griffin:1969) In the context 
of India, the English destroyed the Indian textile industry 
and then proceeded to supply India with cotton goods from
i
Great Britain.
But the principal features of colonial development were
1. For a discussion on the domination of the rest of the 
world as the vital ingredient in Europe's recipe for 
rapid economic growth, see Hobsbawm:1968; Nurkse:1953j 
Bagchi:1972:34-67i 219-253).
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characterised by the impact of the British Land Settlements 
on the agrarian structure, combined with the integration 
of India into the world capitalist system.
The British Raj, in order to meet the twin purposes of
securing the maximum amount of revenue from the land
and retaining power and authority in India by creating a
class of collaborators who would give them their support,
in 1793 under Lord Cornwallis, settled with the tax-gatherers
in Mughul India under the established landed families of
Bengal (Abdullah:1976;91-93) This collaborator class
or the aamindars were for the first time given proprietary
rights in land and in return they paid revenue, fixed in
perpetuity, to the Government,
But they never realized that, in depriving the peasant 
of his traditional and permanent right to occupy the 
land, they were making him, (throughout the greatest 
part of India) a slave of new owners; and that exploi­
tation of the peasant now took the place of exploitation 
of resources. (Dumont:1973:135)
Since the zamindars were left free to exact as much as 
possible from the tenants, provided that the annual fixed 
assessment was paid to the State, the system resulted in 
unprecedented sub-infeudation and rack-renting. The Simon 
Commission pointed out in 1930 that in some cases there were 
as many as fifty intermediary rent-receiving interests 
between the primary producer and the State. This indicates 
that the Government’s revenue demands absorbed only a fraction 
of the peasants’ surplus produce, the bulk being appropriated 
by a hierarchy of parasitic intermediaries. In 1900, for 
example the revenue demanded by the Government was Tk 3.90 
crores but according to the Cess Report of the Revenue 
Board, the zamindars obtained Tk 16.50 crores. The peasants 
were thus paying four times more to the zamindars than was 
due for collection as revenue. For a century and a half, 
the zamindars appropriated a massive total of approximately 
Tk, 1800 crores.(Mukeriee R,:1958:3l)
In addition there were illegal exactions or abwabs which 
alone in some cases were more than the entire Government 
revenue for a given area. (Ibid:31; also Siddiqui K 1978:31-33)
In fact
rural societies were not only compelled to pay taxes, 
but also rents which demographic developments soon made 
outrageous; some peasants took to running away. A 
new law gave the zamindars the right to catch them, 
and this completed the dismemberment of traditional 
rural society. (Dumont s 1965 :135 )■*■
Within such a structure, only the zamindars, the talukdars 
the small landlords and the rich peasants had some investible 
surplus. The primary producers, the middle peasants and 
the poor peasants who mostly used family labour, (Agricultural 
Labour Enquiry, Vol.1:1955)» had no such surplus. In fact 
they became increasingly dependant. While the zamindars 
expended their wealth in conspicuous consumption, the small 
landlords extracted their surplus from land-rent and used 
it in comfortable living. The rich peasants cultivated 
using labour paid only subsistence wages (Patnaik:1972b: 24-) 
and inevitably put their investible funds into traditional 
areas; land purchase, trade and money lending. As long as 
the mass of destitute peasants and labourers existed, they 
became increasingly dependent on the rich peasants. For 
the latter, money lending was perhaps the most lucrative 
and secure form of investment for their capital giving them 
in addition to prospects of exorbitant economic gains, 
promises of extra-economic power. The security for loans 
was land, crops, or failing all else, the peasant’s labour.
Land purchase increased their status and strengthened 
their power base. The growth of commerce and exchange merely
1. For an elaborate discussion of the Permanent Settlement 
and its impact on the Bengal agrarian structure, the 
interested reader may be referred to Abdullah:1976, and 
Siddiqui;1978. For differentiation of the peasantry and 
marketed surplus, see Byres:1974; Narain and Joshi:1969; 
for market participation see Narain:196l,
increased the profitability of investing along traditional
lines. In short* all the evidence indicates, that
the rate of surplus extraction was so high that there 
existed no incentive on the part of any rural class 
without investible funds, to change the organisational 
basis of agricultural production or to undertake pro­
ductive investment in the land. (Ibid:2l)
Commercialization of agriculture had already caused some 
differentiation among the peasantry during Mughul India 
(Habib:1963:39-52, 61-81). The British expedited this 
process by giving momentum to commercialization and commodity 
production by increasing monetization, profit possibilities 
and legalising the transferability of land. Within the 
’context of a private property structure of landholding1 
(Thorner :1956:124-), land became a commodity and could be 
transferred within the framework of colonial law. (Jahangir: 
1976:19) The result was increased polarization within the 
peasantry.
The imposition by the British of the free trade doctrine 
under unequal conditions accelerated the process of de­
industrialization of the mode of localised production 
and tied the Indian economy to the metropolitan economy 
of Britain. In Bengal, emphasis was placed on developing 
cash crop agriculture and railways and steamships were
introduced in the nineteenth century in order to carry
1
raw materials such as jute, cotton, indigo and opium 
which were produced by the Bengali peasants to help meet 
the increasing burden of rents in addition to taxes. Thus 
the agricultural produce was tied to British Industry and 
this prevented local exchange between Bengali artisans 
and peasants. Bengal became the market for imported 
British manufactured goods, artisans were pauperised and
1, See Kuchhal, S.G. The Industrial Economy of India: 1965164-
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industrial decay was complete in Bengal by the 1880s, 
(Griffin:1969i36-37; Jahangir:1976:19-20).
In view of this imposed stagnation in non-agricultural 
production it is not surprising that agricultural organi­
sation and techniques should have remained virtually 
static in the colonial period. There were, of course, other 
factors in addition to the penetration of money and exchange 
which, interacting in a complex manner, were responsible 
for this stagnation. But
most related in one way or another, to the especial 
position of India as a colony, the development of 
which was necessarily geared to the interests of 
the metropolis, Great Britain. The one-sided, distorted 
development which leads to a penetration of exchange 
and growth of commerce, to the pauperisation of large 
sections of the peasantry, without the parallel expansion 
of industry, and without the total breaking up of pre­
capitalist organisation and primitive techniques, 
constitutes the essence of underdevelopment. (Patnaiks1972b 
23-21)
Thus,
the conversion of tax collectors into landlords, the 
emphasis of production of cash crops for export and the 
population explosion which began at the end of the nine­
teenth century were jointly responsible for the final 
disaster. The mass of the people were reduced to a 
subsistence income which hovered precariously above 
the famine level. (Griffin:1969:38).
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3. Poverty and Stagnation : the Pakistan connection and 
emergence of Bangladesh
The uneven development of the Hindu and Muslim bourgeoisie 
led to the partition of India . In what is now Bangladesh, 
this meant the substitution of dominance by British mercantile 
capital and Marwari interests in various commodity trades, 
and Bengali Hindus and their intermediaries on the land, 
by that of Pakistani 'colonial' rule. In West Pakistan 
the Muslim commercial class, in an environment free of 
competition from non-Muslims, continued their alliance with 
the landlords and formed the ruling elite of the country.
No such strong landed aristocracy, nor a commercial class 
existed among the Bengalis. The Bengali Muslim bourgeoisie 
were largely restricted to the ranks of an incipient class 
of rich peasants with those who were ambitious going into 
government service or the professions. They had neither 
the funds nor the experience to fill the breach left by 
the departing Hindus and the Marwari business men.
Understandably, therefore, the political scene in Pakistan 
came to be dominated by the ever-widening economic disparity 
between the two wings, suspension of parliamentary democracy 
since 1958, domination by the West Pakistan ruling military- 
bureaucratic elite and the commercial-industrial bourgeoisie 
in which the latter saw East Pakistan both as a market for 
its exportable surplus and as a source of resources to fund 
their capitalist accumulation. The ruling elite aided this 
process through the state machinery, by directly attracting 
surplus through the development budget and the expropriation 
of external resource inflows. Thus, by 1958, control and 
domination of industry, trade and finance within the East
1. Abdullah, A:1972:The Class Basis of Nationalism : Pakistan 
and Bangladesh (mimeo).
2. See Sayeed, K, bin:1968:Pakistan, The Formative Phase. 
1857-1918, Oxford University Press, London:7-ll.
Pakistan economy by the West Pakistani industrial bourgeoisie 
was complete. The result was that by the end of the 1960s 
twenty-two West Pakistani families owned 66 per cent of 
Pakistani industry, 79 per cent of its insurance and 80 
per cent of its banking. (Alavi:1973:157)
Thus for the West Pakistani elite their power derived from 
a solid economic base and ’parliamentary processes would be 
at best a superfluous frill to adorn their dominance, 
and at worst a possible threat to that dominance’. For 
the Bengali middle class, on the other hand, mass politics 
offered the one possible avenue to power and influence.
Thus the stage was set for a fundamental conflict of interests. 
(Abdullah:1972:13-15)
In East Pakistan, with the abolition of landlordism in 
1951t in the absence of a strong commercial capitalist 
group, power cam©:into the hands of the middle class and 
the power struggle, accordingly took place between the 
alliance of the military-bureaucracy-industrial bourgeoisie 
of the West and the professional middle class in the East, 
(Maniruazaman:1966:84-) ’The rise of Bengali nationalism 
was an ideological reflection of this ’’class struggle”, 
just as the rise of Muslim nationalism was an ideological 
reflection of the struggle for survival of the Muslim 
elite.’ (Abdullah:1972:17)
Although the Awami League dominated United Front routed the 
Muslim League as a political force from East Pakistan as 
early as 195A» the Bengali middle class was still not strong 
enough for the final confrontation. They had to wait until 
they acquired the ’economic muscle’ through Ayub Khan's so 
called 'decade of development* when a conscious attempt was 
made to build up a Bengali capitalist class from within
the Bengali petty bourgeoisie to assure and strengthen 
Ayubfs political hegemony.
Their last decisive struggle consisted of three rallying 
points in three fields : 1 In politics, regional autonomy; 
in economics, economic disparity; and in the cultural 
field; the language issue.1 (Ibid:2l) The language issue 
was an ideal adjunct to the political and economic struggle 
of the Bengali middle class, and served the same integrative 
and tension reducing function that Islam did for the Pakistan 
movement. Regional autonomy, on the other hand, as formulated 
in the six point programme of the Awami League, promised 
something to everyone but was clearly and essentially bour­
geois-nationalist in character and obviously had little 
relevance to their common welfare. j(Ibid:26)
In the rural areas Ayub*s strategy was to seek the support 
of the surplus farmers through the medium of the Basic 
Democracy system and the institution of public works 
especially the Rural Works Programme to build up support.
The government emerged as a modernising agent through the 
supply of credit, fertilizer, seeds, irrigation technology 
and funds for rural public works and this provided scope 
for surplus extraction for the rich peasants. The rich 
peasant in turn used his political domination of the rural 
areas to control state resources as an instrument of 
patronage or to obtain them at subsidized prices so that he 
could extract the surplus by marketing to the poor at scarcity 
pglcego- The growth and prosperity of this class accelerated 
through the continuing medium of surplus extraction as 
state intervention increased.
Clearly the benefits of the Ayub strategy and the patronage 
of West Pakistani industrial capital did not percolate down 
to the great majority and benefited only the Basic Democrats
f!
in the rural areas and some narrow urban groups. It was 
the elements within these classes, who did not have a share 
of the spoils or could not improve their prospects during 
Ayub's gde©ade of development* who sought -t<o. promote their 
material aspirations through the Awami League which had 
been spearheading Bengali nationalist values. The bulk 
of the Awami League support base, thus, came from the class 
of petty bourgeoisie, drawn for the lower level of govern­
ment servants, small businessmen whose businesses had not 
benefited from state patronage, district court lawyers who 
had not shared in the patronage of Pakistani business farms, 
school and college teachers who had not been sent abroad 
under government scholarships, and surplus farmers who had 
not had access to the circle officer or a hand in the 
distribution of works programme funds. (Sobhan and Ahmedil976:21)
There are two important points here. Firstly, whether we 
consider the Bengali industrial bourgeoisie, the commercial 
capitalists, the surplus farmers in the rural areas, or for 
that matter, the bureaucracy, there was a distinctly identi­
fiable comprador character in that they all benefited either 
as a direct function of state patronage or out of the patronage 
of the West Pakistani ruling military bureaucracy and 
industrial capital. Secondly, that although there was a 
contradiction of interest between those elements of the 
business community and surplus farmers who prospered under 
the Ayub regime and those who thrived under the Awami League, 
the class character of the two groups was the same. Both 
believed in maximising surplus extraction and using it in 
consumption rather than in production. Both were of petty- 
bourgeois origin. Politically, they were opposition factions 
but they were not antagonistic classes and in such cases, 
shifts in political allegiance take place as a rule rather 
than an exception.
Thus, it was the interests of different shades of the 
Bengali middle classes who spearheaded the 1969 movement, 
which gained it® own momentum as it grew and initiated the 
chain of events which eventually culminated in the liberation 
of Bangladesh, The Mukti Bahinl returned to the capital 
city, each claiming to be holier than thou,: and bringing 
the Indian Army in as an equal partner in the victory. 
Politicians made exhortations about national reconstruction 
and world aid poured in. But the euphoria was destined 
to be short lived. The class character of the ruling party 
soon became evident.
While the'development of a small industrial and a significant 
commercial bourgeoisie in East Pakistan was made possible, 
principally by the innate strength of the state apparatus 
and its integration with the forces of capitalism during 
Ayub's regime, such development was not possible when the 
Awami League came to power in Bangladesh. The state machi­
nery was weakened, the army was dispersed and disorganised 
and the bureaucracy was made subsidiary to the power of the 
party. The institutional agencies were restructured to 
help denude the bureaucracy of authority. The infra­
structure had collapsed and the economy had ground to a 
halt.
The power of the state during the post-liberation period 
under the Awami League lay in a precarious balance between 
meeting the plunder of the petty-bourgeois power base which 
the party was built to serve, and the raids of Indian economic 
interests to which the Awami League was committed in terms 
of the price for ensuring seizure of power, and on the 
other hand in its ability to sustain itself. In this, the 
resources and the power of the state machinery proved to 
to be hopelessly inadequate.
In the preceding section I have established the links 
between economic and political factors and the current 
polarisation, differentiation and expropriation of the 
peasantry. Against this background I shall now examine 
the principal demographic characteristics, the distribution 
of land holding and income and the patterns of economic 
growth.
Section III
Scale of Poverty and Inequality
1. Farm Size and Distribution of Land
According to the Master Survey of Agriculture 1967-68, the 
total number of family farms in Bangladesh was 6,870,000 
and in 1970 this figure had increased to 7 million. The 
total farm area was 22 million acres and there was virtually 
no room for a further increase in land under cultivation.
The average farm size was 3.5 acres in 1960^, had declined 
to 3.2 acres^ in 1967-68 and had further declined to
3
2.8 acres in 1974 * Regional variations in the average 
size of holding are not very significant whether measured 
in terms of ownership or operational holding.
Although the average holding size is small, the distribution 
of land is highly skewed. Almost 33 per cent of households 
are landless i.e. over 27 per cent of the total population. 
Landlessness increased from 17 per cent in I960, to 20 per 
cent in 1968 and leaped to 33 per cent in 1977^. In 17 
years landlessness grew faster than population growth rate.
1. Agricultural Census I960,
2. Master Survey of Agriculture, 1967-68.
3. Based on a smaller survey by Alamgir, (BIDS), in 1974.
4. Different surveys and reports have quoted different figures 
for landlessness. Thus, the IRDP Benchmark Survey (1973-74) 
quotes 37.60$(38$ based on a more intensive study of 14 
villages); Stepanek's finding is 50$; and the 1977 Land 
Occupancy Survey provides the figure of 32.79$. Part of 
the difference may be explained by definitional differences 
and part by data quality, or perhaps more appropriately, the 
lack of it.
Table : 1.3.1
Size Distribution of Land in Bangladesh
Peasant 
Strata 
(by holding 
size in 
acres)
I960
$ of
total
farms
a
$ of
total
land
1968
$ of
total
farms
b
$ of 
land
1977
$ of
total
farms
c
$ of 
land
Landless* 17.2 - 20 - 32,79* -
Small
(0.1-2.5) 51.17 15 56.63 21.32 66.77 25.17
Middle 
(2.5-7.5) 38.00 17 35*52 17.71 29.01 19.21
Rich
(7.5 acres 
and above) 10.53 38 7.85 30.91 1.12 25.59
100 100 100 100 100 100
Sources: a) Agricultural Census, i960.
b) Master Survey of Agriculture, 1967-63, 7th round, 
2nd series,
c) Land Occupancy Survey, 1977; Summary Report, 
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, For 1977 
figures the holding sizes have been slightly 
altered to accommodate the new classification 
categories in the Summary Report, as follows: 
Small 0,01-2,00; Middle 2.00-8.00; and Rich 
8,00 and above.
* Landlessness is defined as including those households 
having no farm land and little or no homestead; figures 
quoted for 1977 vary widely, e.g. 37,60$ (IRDP Benchmark 
Survey, 1973-71); 50$ (Stepanek, 1979:100-101).
The Agricultural Census (i960) and the Master Survey of 
Agriculture (1967-68) adopted 2.5 acres and 7.5 acres as 
the dividing line for identifying small, middle and rich 
peasants. Although in Table 1.3*1 these categories have
been maintained for the I960 and 1967-68 figures, for 
1977 the dividing lines have been slightly changed to 
3 and 8 acres because the data are based on the Land 
Occupancy Survey.
From the point of view of Table 1.3*1* significant changes 
have taken place over the years. Landlessness has increased 
progressively, and particularly dramatically between 1968 
and 1977; the number of small peasants has also increased 
progressively and significantly; and although the number 
of middle peasants has declined, area farmed by them has 
in fact increased; finally, the number of rich peasants 
together with their farmed area have declined steadily.
It seems that among the land holding groups, although in 
absolute terms inequality in terms of land distribution 
exists, over the years polarization has reduced. However, 
when the figures are seen in terms of the entire population 
and not just the land holding groups, such optimism is 
immediately and rightly challenged. It is clear that although 
the position of the big farmers has been weakened at the 
top, more and more peasants have been deprived of their 
land at the bottom.
Alamgir has argued rightly that, in the middle peasant 
group, two forces have been in operation. These are 
population pressure which together with the law of inheri­
tance has resulted in the sub-division and fragmentation 
of land (this also explains the decreasing average farm 
size) and the acquisition of new land by the relatively 
affluent thus increasing their share in the total land 
holding.
For the small peasants, the swelling of their numbers has 
been as a result of a pauperization process due to the 
forces of the market and of usury.
Thus, Bangladesh is principally a differentiated peasant 
economy where the dominant contradiction in the agrarian 
formation is that between those with land and those 
without.
2. Demography and Food Production
The relationship between the postulated rate of increase
of population and the rate at which food output can be
increased is critical. The population of Bangladesh was
estimated at 76.2 million in 1974.^* This makes Bangladesh
the most densely populated with 1371 persons to the square
2
mile, of all the countries of a reasonable size. The 
rate of population growth between 1961 and 1974- was 2,8
3
per cent.
As far as food output is concerned, estimates of the 
sectoral composition of national income show that crop 
production contributes nearly three-quarters of agricult­
ural value-added and 70 per cent of this comes from rice 
alone,^ Historically, per capita production of rice 
seems to have declined. During the first half of this 
century rice production (which contributed about 90 per 
cent of foodgrain production) registered a decline of
1, This was the adjusted figure from the post-census 
survey following the 197-4 census and takes account 
of the underestimation of as much as 8 per cent.
2, No other country with a population of more than 10 
millions records a higher density.
3. UN Demographic Yearbook:1974:table 3:111; quoted in 
Hossain:op.cit.:11-12,
4. Hossain:1977:17; based on figures in Khan and Bergan 
(1966) ,
51
0.76 per cent per annum in undivided Bengal.(Blyn:1966:131) • 
Table : 1,3.2
Demographic Features of Bangladesh, 1951 to 1974
1951 1961 1974
Population
(millions) 4-1.9 53.4 76.2
Rate of population 
growth 2.44 2.77
Density of population 
(per square mile) 754 961 1371
Labour force 
(% of population) 30.7 33.2 35.2
Male 54.2 45.2 50.6
Female 5 oO 10.8 18.6
Agricultural 
labour force 
(in % total labour 
force) 83.2 85.1 55.4
Male 83.3 84.1 67.8
Female 82.4 91.7 19.5
Sources and notes:
The figure of population for 1961 is from PIDE report(1969/70) 
which adjusts the 1961 census figure on the basis of the 
post-census population growth estimation (PGE) information.
The 1974 population estimate is the adjusted figure from 
the 1974- census on the basis of a post-census survey which 
showed a 16 per cent under-count in the four big cities 
and a 6 per cent one in other areas (see Bangladesh Population 
Census 1974> p.(i)).
All other figures are from the reports of the 1961 and 
1974- censuses.
1. After partition especially between the early 50s and 
late 60s production of rice increased by over 4-0 per 
cent from about 7i million tons to up to lOf million 
tons,(Faahland and Parkinson:1976:10 and 71). However, 
Hossain notes three distinct phases of growth of pro­
duction: apperiod of near stagnation up to 1958-59 
followed by a period of high growth up to 1964-65 and
then a period of moderate growth until 1975-76. Falcon
n a S 4
The trend in the rate of growth of food crops during the 
period between 194-7-4-8 and 1975-76 was 2.08 per cent of 
which 0.95 per cent was contributed by acreage expansion 
and 1.13 per cent by yield improvement. During the same 
period, population grew by around 2.6 per cent and there­
fore per capita production of rice declined over the years. 
Consequently, the import of foodgrains, partly from 
Pakistan and partly from abroad, increased from about k 
million tons in the 1950s to about if million tons at 
the end of the 1960s. (Faahland and Parkinson:10)^
1. Contd.
and Gotsch estimate that during the peak period, that 
is between 1958-59 and 1964.-65, rice production grew 
by 3*4- pei* cent. (Falcon and Gotsch :1968: table 9.11s292). 
While in the earlier period increased production was 
due more to double cropping rather than to an increase 
in yield, in the latter periods it was found to be 
owing to an improvement in yield per acre and more 
specifically the yield of aman rice, (see Faahland 
and Parkinson:p.l0; Falcon and Gotsch:p,292) which 
resulted from the introduction of the seed-fertiliaer 
technology during this period.
1, See Hossain, M., Chart l:p.20 and 21.
2. The World Bank by studying the potential for increased 
production came to the conclusion that by changing the 
inputs alone - i.e. by introducing new seeds, fertilisers 
and pesticides - it would be possible to double rice 
output; by using irrigation technology as extensively
as possible, output could be trebled and finally with 
the further addition of drainage and flood control, 
it would be possible to quadruple output. However, 
the economic constraints, like the progressive costs 
and the time required for implementation of such 
extensive technology, were not taken into account 
by the World Bank researchers. See World Bank Report 
1971.
3. Economic Growth Performance
With a per capita GDP of $80, Bangladesh is one of the 
poorest countries in the world. The gross domestic product 
of the economy is estimated by using the same base year, 
at $64.00 million; gross investment at $550 million to 
include both public and private investments and net 
capital imports at $800 million. These estimates 
determine the structure of the economy in the base year 
1975 as shown in Table 1.3*3. including levels of overall 
and per capita consumption and savings. It reflects the
Table 1.3.3
Development Scene (values in approximate 1974. prices in US$
equivalent)
Population and Major National Accounts Magnitudes 1975
Population (mill.) 80
Gross Domestic Product (mill.l) 64.OQ
Gross Investment " 550
Net Capital Import H 800
Domestic Savings ” -250
Consumption " 6650
Gross Product Per Capi-ta ($) 80
Consumption Per Capita n 83
Domestic Savings Per Capita ($) -3
Gross Investment as Per Cent of GDP 8
Capital Import as Per Cent of GDP 12
Domestic Savings as Per Cent of GDP -4
Source : Faahland and Parkinson: p.68
extremely low level of production, income and productivity, 
the relatively large addition to domestic production 
represented by foreign assistance and the dependence of 
Bangladesh on foreign supplies for investments and for 
food and other consumption items (lbid:69).
1. Taking 1975 as the base year this figure is higher than 
the figure for GNP of $70 used by the World Bank 
(World Bank Atlas, 1974). The difference in concepts 
used- GDP versus GNP, is numerically insignificant.
Information on the composition of GDP and changes in 
its level since partition of the subcontinent, is given 
in Table 1.3 *4-• This table shows that in the fifties
the economy made little progress, with GDP growing at a
rate of 2.3 per cent compared with a population growth 
rate of 2.5 per cent during the same period. In the 
sixties, on the other hand, growth was much more satis- 
factory with GDP growing at a 1.3 per cent higher rate 
than the population growth rate. The early seventies 
was a period of relapse. Indeed in 1974--75 GDP was 2.5 
per cent lower than the 1969-70 level.(Government of 
Bangladesh 1976c). The following year there was a bumper 
harvest increasing rice production by 17.7 per cent over 
the previous year and per capita GDP reached the 1969-70 
level. During the period between 194-9-50 and 1975-76 the 
annual rate of growth in GDP was about 2.7 per cent. Given
the population growth rate of 2.6 per cent during the same
period, it would be reasonable to conclude, that the long 
term growth in per capita income in Bangladesh has not 
been significantly above zero. ( Hossain:op• cit. : 14-)
4-. Extent of Poverty. Employment and Income Distribution
In the circumstances outlined above*.-the poorer section of 
the population suffer most. Available data indicate that 
the most important sources of poverty and inequality are 
the distribution of porperty, the structure of the relations 
owners and producers enter into in the process of production, 
and finally, the distribution of income. The reason for 
the continuing existence of a large number of people below 
the poverty line is lack of access and control over land, 
the principal means of production (Bardhan:April 1973;
Alamgir:April 1975)» and the relative absence of non-agricultural 
employment in the rural areas (Clay:1977). In the urban
1, The assumed- poverty line is Rs.250 in rural areas and
Rs.300 in urban areas both measured in constant 1959/60 prices.
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areas this has been caused b y >the lack of access to such 
income generating assets as equipment and machinery and 
the shortage of industrial employment (Alamgir:July 1975). 
Market forces have also contributed to this process. 
Between 1963-64 and 1967-68, inequality in landholding 
was reduced, consistent with the trend in ine©m© 
inequality. During the later period, however, inequality 
increased (Alamgir:April 1975:173). During 1963-64 almost 
50 million people in the rural areas and over 3 million 
in the urban areas, lived below the poverty line. Corres­
ponding figures for 1968-69 were 50.70 and 4.35 million, 
(See Table 1.3.5).
Percentage and number of persons below poverty line in 
Bangladesh
Year % Number in Millions
Rural Urban Rural Urban
1964/64. 88 82 49.89 3.24
1966/67 62 72 37.92 3.84
1968/69 79 70 50.70 4.35
1973/74 94 n.a. 63.961 n.a.
Source : Alamgir:1975:171
Some reports suggest that in Bangladesh the average family 
consists of 5.5 members and needs at least 2 acres of land 
for subsistence, (Bertocci :1972:36f. f.o©tnote 3). Others 
point out that the average size of f.arm that produces an 
above poverty level income is over 5 acres. (Alamgir:April 
1975:175). The number of people having no land, or having
1. Estimated figure based on preliminary release of 1974-
census and adjusted for an assumed 6 per cent undercount.
R S 9
a holding of under 5 acres, was estimated to be about 
64. million in 1973-74-* Thus for a large porportion of 
rural households the average landholding is inadequate 
to ensure them the minimum subsistence level of living.
According to the censuses of 1951 and 19&1, the number
of landless agricultural labourers increased by 63 per
cent in ten years while the number of cultivators as a
whole increased by 33 per cent. In 1951 landless labourers^
were 14-.25 per cent of all cultivators while in 1961 the
percentage had risen to 17.52* In 1976 this figure may
2have risen to anywhere between 30 and 38 per cent assuming 
that most of the landless are agricultural labourers.
Almost half these landless labourers had secure employment. 
(Abdullah et al:April 1976:212-214-).
An analysis of major agricultural subsectors (1975-76) 
shows crop production as the major area for jobs, offering 
69 per cent of the total employment (Clay:1977:21), In 
this, rice dominates, providing around 80 per cent of 
agricultural employment (Ibid:2l). However, since I960 
the average rate of growth in production of cereals has 
been less than 2 per cent per year whilst the rate of 
growth of agricultural production in value terms over the 
same period was only 1.25 per cent per annum (Alamgir and 
Berlage:1974-sTable 3). Consequently there has been little 
increase during the past decade and a half in the aggregate 
demand for agricultural labour.
The income of the poorest section of the rural population 
seems to have remained at a more or less constant level 
over the last two and a half decades. According to estimates 
made by Bose (1968) and Alamgir (1974-) * the annual real
1. 12 years old and over,
2. This is based on the figures for landlessness. No comparable 
figures for landless agricultural labourers is available
for later years.
 ^ rf*
wages of an agricultural labourer (at 1966 prices) of 
Tk.697 in 194-9» were never equalled before 1961 (Tk.773)» 
hit an all time high of Tk.852 in 1964-# another high - 
Tk.834- - in 1969* and declined steadily from then on to 
Tk.580 in 1973.
The structure of poverty can best be seen by comparing 
the agricultural wage index to the cost of living index.
Table 1.3.6 shows that the imbalance has become more marked 
in the past few years. The average money wage rate for 
agricultural workers per day was under Tk.3 in 1970 and 
shot up to over Tk.8.50 in 1975> implying an increase of 
191 per cent. The cost of living index, on the other 
hand over the same period increased at a much higher rate - 
by 322 per cent, showing a fall in the real wage index 
of 4,4. per cent. The fall in the real wage rate of unskilled 
industrial workers was even sharper, their money wage 
rate increased by only 50 per cent over this period 
(from Tk.4-.50 to Tk.7.07). (Hossain:op.cit. :15) .
The short harvests of 1972-73» the shortage of imports
and its effects on industrial production, the near doubling
of import prices in two years from 1972-73 to 1974--75,
and of course budgetary deficits, all combined to increase
prices. The price of rice, which in 1967-71 had been
Tk.1.2 per seer had by the end of 1974-* as the effect of
floods on the supply of rice made itself fully felt, shot
up to Tk.7.8 per seer and did not come down, but continued
to rise until the early part of 1975 when, following
continued imports, better prospects for foodgrain production,
and indeed the army takeover of power (as an immediate
effect) food prices dropped. (Faahland and Parkinson:op.cit.:l6).
Short term fluctuations in the cost of living in response 
to variations in the supply of rice are understandable.
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Table 1.3*6
Agricultural Wages.in Bangladesh.
Money wage 
Takas/day
Index of
cost of living
1963-64=100
Index of 
real wages 
1963=100
I960 1.95 94.9 87
1961 2.18 95.9 96
1962 2.25 102.0 90
1963 2.41 102,2 100
1964. 2.65 99.7 113
1965 2.34 105.4 94
1966 2.40 126.1 81
1967 2.60 135.3 81
1968 2.75 134.6 86
1969 3.12 140.3 94
1970 2.98 132.8 95
1971 3.15 n.a. n.a.
1972 3.93 246 68
1973 5.59 351.5 67
1974 8.04 565.2 60
1975(p) 8.72(p) 560(p) 66(p)
Source : E.J. Clay:1976s Table 1
Notes : p. Provisional,
n.a. Not Available
The demand for rice in a poor economy like Bangladesh is 
inelastic. When rice is in short supply, consumers divert 
most of their current income to purchasing it and this 
further shortens the supply. In this competitive situation 
many face difficulties not only over payment but also in 
obtaining the rice itself as surplus farmers and traders 
hoard it in the hope of bigger profit margins. As prices
soar and the competition for securing rice becomes keener, 
the poor peasant is forced out of his land either through 
direct sales or via the surplus farmer/money lender and 
the destitute landless labourer starves. Thus, increases 
in the price of rice relative to other commodities, 
fall unevenly in their impact and affect different classes 
of the population in different ways. Big farmers benefit 
most, small holders survive and the poor perish.
Having outlined the demographic characteristics, land 
and income distribution, and economic growth in the 
context of the level of poverty it is now possible to 
analyse some of the policies and programmes adopted in the 
past three decades by the various civil and military 
governments, ostensibly to help the poor and reduce 
inequality. In the following section I shall discuss the 
different 'Land Reform Measures', 'Pricing, Procurement 
and Exchanges Policy' and 'Food for Works Programme',
Section IV
Policy Analysis
1, The Politics of Land Reform
Broadly, the logic of land reform as a policy measure operates 
as follows : firstly, if productivity can be raised success­
fully by means of land reform there will come about an 
increase in the volume of consumption and saving; secondly, 
agriculture being the dominant mode of production, increased 
productivity will have a strong impact on the economy as 
a whole; and lastly, the overall effect of the successful 
implementation of land reform measures will be a reduction 
in inequality in the agrarian sector.
Since the partition of India three attempts have been made 
to reform the land holding structure. First, in 1950 the 
British land revenue system of permanent settlement i.e. 
zamindari and other rent-receiving interests, were abolished 
with compensation and a weak attempt at ceiling legislation 
was made. The ceiling on total land holding was set at 
100 bighas (33.3 acres) per family^ and the acquired land 
was to be distributed among the landless and poor peasants. 
Second, in 1961 three years after Ayub Khan came to power 
in Pakistan the land holding ceiling was raised from 100 
bighas to 373 bighas per family in an attempt to build 
support among the surplus farmers and the government 
emerged as a modernising agent through the supply of the 
seed-fertiliser-irrigation technology. The last attempt 
at reform was made following the liberation of Bangladesh 
in 1972 when the land ceiling was restored to the 1950
1, East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, February, 1950
limit of 100 bighas, family holdings up to 25 bighas (8.3
acres) were exempted from payment of land revenue, and
arrears rents for those holdings of less than 25 bighas 
1
were commuted.
The impact of these attempts, however, was negligible.
During the first attempt it took two and a half years before 
the legislation went through giving the Hindu zamindars 
enough time to convert their landed property into liquid 
capital and to smuggle it out to India, According to 
one estimate, between 194-7 and 1971, the zamindars, marwaris 
and Hindu seths smuggled out to India on an average, annually 
about Tk, 60 crores (see Siddiqui:1978:4-7-4-9) °
Such a massive transfer of resources from the country greatly 
reduced the possible benefits of the zamindari abolition.
As for redistribution, this indeed had taken place but 
it was not from the rich landowners to the poor ryots, but 
a distribution of income from a class of rural intermediaries 
to the urban middle-class based provincial government.
The ceiling legislation was hampered by a very ambiguous 
definition of family* and the result was the transfer of 
some 105,600 acres of agricultural land in an effort to 
evade the ceiling (Zaman:1975:102). The total amount of 
land finally available through acquisition was l63»74-l 
acres, which was less than 1 per cent of the net cropped 
area of 19.2 million acres. Even if this land had been 
distributed among the 2.54- million landless labourers they 
would have received an average 0.06 acres per head (Abdullah: 
op.cit.:82). Given the fact that most of the surrenedered 
land was of poor quality (Ibid), their share in the redistri­
bution would have dropped even further,
1. Presidential Orders (P.O. 96 and 98 and Bangladesh Land 
Holding Order 1972).
In production terms the new measures did not give tenants 
any security with the result that the majority of the 
ryots were lacking in what is often stressed as a-major 
pre-condition to investment in land improvement* In a 
sense, the tenants now had less security. In cases of 
default, for example, the new recovery provisions made 
it possible for the interested parties to bribe the govern­
ment collector and his subordinate staff in order to get 
sales for default held without the tenants knowing anything 
about it until the period of appeal was over.'1'
The proximate effect of the Act of 1950, therefore, was 
an enhancement of Government land revenue. Thus, the 
Government of East Pakistan 'actuated partly by the need 
to increase land revenue and partly by political consider- 
ation' eliminated the mainly Hindu established landed 
families of Bengal exactly in the same way Lord Cornwallis 
did in 1793.* But it did not benefit the rural poor. It 
'benefited an intermediate class which failed to perform 
any dynamic productive mission ... The newly emerged 
(primarily Muslim) surplus farmers merely slipped into 
the power vacuum left by the departing Hindu landlord 
quietly and took up the money lending function of the 
Hindu banya.' (Abdullah:1976:91-92, 89).
As regards Ayub Khan's legislation to raise the land 
holding ceiling, this was clearly a reform in favour of 
the better off farmers in order to strengthen his support 
base in the rural areas and directly contributed to increased 
polarisation during his so called 'decade of development' 
(Siddiqui:1978:53-56). The legislation was carried
through at a time when the bottom 4*2.1 per cent of all rural
1. Government of East Pakistan, Board of Revenue; Report 
of the Committee for Streamlining the Procedure for 
Payment of Land Revenue in East Pakistan, Dacca, 1970; p.12.
households, having less than 0,75 acres owned 2.3 per cent 
of the cultivated area, and the bottom 62,2 per cent of 
households, having less than 2 acres, controlled only 9.5 
per cent of the cultivated area (Sobhan:1969:5-6), Thus 
the amendment of the Act of 1950 by Ayub directly contri* 
buted to increased polarisation of the rural society 
between those who had little or no land and those having 
relatively large farms.
In the post liberation reform, on the other hand, the 
exemption from payment of land revenue and commutation of 
the arrears rents for holders of up to 25 bighas benefited 
the upper strata of the peasantry much more than the poor 
peasants, since by our calculation (Table 1*3.1) the bottom 
67 per cent of the peasantry are poor peasants holding 
under 2,5 acres as against 29 per cent of the peasantry 
who hold between 2.5 and 7.5 acres. On the other hand, 
by exempting almost 96 per cent of rural households from 
payment of land revenue, the Government was deprived of 
substantial income. As for the various forms of rates 
and cesses which were brought under an all-embracing 
•land development tax*, this constituted only 30 per cent 
of the actual land revenue and thus the cost of collection 
became higher than the total receipts (Siddiqui:1978:105-106).
In 1977 the USAID Report stated that;
The evidence of field surveys, together with experience 
gathered during the 1977 Land Occupancy Survey confirms 
that there are large numbers of owners of land, whose 
holdings exceed the legal limit. There is difficulty 
in establishing a national estimate of the numbers of 
owners of land whose holdings exceed this ceiling. Few 
large land holders will admit to having holdings that 
are larger than the maximum set by law. This holds 
especially when such landholders are interviewed by 
representatives of Government ... However, the authors 
are satisfied ... that the current ceiling on the size 
of holdings is not strictly enforced and that many 
thousands of acres of land are retained illegally by 
owners. Though attempts have been made by individual
owners to suppress the fact that they hold land above 
the ceiling, local villagers, revenue officials and 
others have helped to confirm the existence of such 
holdings (Jannuzi and Peach:1977:76).
It was originally estimated that 1.2 million acres of 
land would be available to the Government from the impo­
sition of the ceiling (Bangladesh Observer, May 25, 1972). 
However, subsequently this was reduced to 800,000 acres 
of surplus land and the excess land that was finally 
obtained was only 58,4-09 acres, from 5,371 families. Of 
this, as of January 1976, only 31,250 acres were taken 
’possession of* officially by the Tehsildar on behalf 
of the Government (Siddiqui:op,cit.illO).
Thus all attempts to reform the land holding structure 
ostensibly in order to build an egalitarian society, were 
frustrated by the class character of the ruling elite and 
the interests of the lumpen class they served. At any 
rate, in a country where farms are small and getting 
smaller, even if it were possible to achieve complete 
equalization through redistribution of land, it would 
not solve the agrarian problem. As a result of demo­
graphic forces, inequalities would reappear and area 
per family would continue to decline. Ultimately, 
agriculture will have to develop capitalistically and 
employment within and outside agriculture will have to 
grow faster than total population,
2. Pricing, Procurement and Exchange Policy
The terms of exchange of agricultural products in Bangladesh
are influenced by the prevailing prices of the two main
crops - paddy apd jute. The growers' share in the consumer
price is dependent upon such factors as; accessibility 
between producing and consuming areas, conditions for
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transportation, existing channels of marketing, number of 
intermediaries, processing and, above all, demand# Both 
in order to maintain a production incentive and as well 
as a means to achieve a reasonable degree of price stability 
throughout the country, Government policy has been to 
fix producer prices for these two principal crops. This 
in turn has affected agricultural prices, production, 
allocation of resources and distribution of income.
A policy of a combination of import substituting; industri­
alisation under a protective tariff barrier and export taxes 
on major items such as jute, was adopted until the late 
fifties for generating capital for industry and to centralise 
foreign exchange earned through agriculture for payment 
of the necessary imports. This adversely affected the 
terms of trade for agricultural commodities vis a vis the 
manufacturing sector and depressed domestic prices for 
raw materials.'1' The unfavourable price movement for jute 
in fact continued until well after liberation in 1971 with 
a break in the mid-sixties when export duties were reduced 
(Falcon and Gotsch:op.cit.:53-55)* All this resulted in 
a reduction in jute acreage. To help reverse the trend 
and also to protect the growers from exploitation by 
middlemen, the Government set a minimum price for growers 
but this has never been seriously enforced (see Alamgir:1975: 
287-288).
Unlike jute, foodgrain prices were stabilised throughout
the fifties and early sixties through a system of internal
procurement, imports and distribution by rationing.
Although the size of the procurement was less than 3 per
cent of total production, it had a depressing effect on
2
market prices and production. Internal procurement was
1. For intersectoral terms of trade see Lewis and Hossain 
1967 and 1970.
2. Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Bangladesh Agriculture in Statistics, November 1973.
in fact practically given up in the sixties, but was 
reintroduced by the Bangladesh Government in 1973 (Ibid:288),
The stated objective of Government grain procurement is 
to keep the price to the farmer at an incentive level 
to accelerate the pace of agricultural development on 
the one hand, and on the other, to secure as much of the 
domestic grain as possible for the Government rationing 
system. However, so far, Government strategy has been 
geared mainly towards building a reserve stock, which 
in addition to grain imports is to be used for ration 
distribution and in an emergency (distress distribution 
or market stabilisation).
Government procurement stocks and grain imports amount 
to about 2 million tons per year and so far have been used 
to supply the ration system which feeds the politically
volatile urban population in five major cities at a
2
$0 per cent subsidy. Of the annual offtake through the 
ration system, only 10 percent reaches the poor and more 
than one-third is allocated to priority groups such as 
the civil service, the military and the police. The 
portion distributed through the rural modified ration 
centres is supposed to be given to those earning Tk.100 
per month or less. In practice, however, the Government 
has virtually no distribution system for the rural poor 
(FAO/UNDP Working Paper II : 21-22),
The internal pricing, procurement and distribution policies 
were combined with various exchange rates and import-export 
regulations which created a situation in which the implicit 
exchange rate for a unit of agricultural commodity was 
considerably lower than that for a unit of manufactured
1, FAO/UNDP Working Paper X : 25 (no source has been given),
2, The remainder of the domestic marketable surplus, also 
about 2 million tons circulates mostly in the rural areas 
via private traders,
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commodity. At international prices, the agricultural 
sector was losing about 33 per cent in its exchange with 
the manufacturing sector due to distortion in domestic 
prices. The combined effect resulted in a transfer of 
income from agriculture to manufacturing which was inequi­
table in that it implied a transfer of resources from the 
rural poor to the urban rich (Islam: 1971:11-19; Alamgir: 
1975:289-290).
3. Food for Work and Relief
This programme was institutionalised after being initiated 
in the winter of 1975-75> following a largely man-made 
famine (Rafferty:Financial Times:1974-S Jan 6) in which the poor 
suffered a reduction in purchasing power at a time of 
uncontrolled inflation. At this time it was felt necessary 
to supplement the existing strategy with a consumption 
oriented programme so that malnutrition could be reduced.
Later it was argued that, while the short term generation 
of new employment in the agricultural and industrial 
sectors would not expand fast enough to absorb completely 
the present manpower supply, relief in the form of Food 
for Work appeared to be the best alternative for utilising . 
available manpower in constructive activities -(FAO/UNDP:WP X:33)#
In Food for Work programmes payment for labour is made 
in wheat, which is received as aid from the US grain surplus.
Most of the projects however, are carried out in the 
winter months when the main rice crop - aman, and the 
bulk of the marketable surplus, is marketed and the prices 
are low. Most of the buyers at this stage are the landless 
labourers and the intermediate traders. As a result the 
programme considerably reduces the demand from the landless/ 
poor peasants in the grain market and consequently depresses
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market prices for the producer. It also depresses market
prices for wheat growers and frustrates the Government's
1
incentives to growers of wheat.
In 1976-77, under the programme, labourers were paid 6 lbs, 
of wheat per 70 cu.ft, of earth work. The market price 
for the same amount of wheat was Tk.X«50 whereas the 
average market wage rate for the same period of labour 
was Tk. 8 (Field Work:1976-77), Thus labourers were 
being paid at unfair rates.
Finally, the purpose of the programme is to increase food
production by digging irrigation canals and fish tanks or
building embankments as protection against floods and/or
saline water or roads to facilitate transportation and
market penetration. Given the fact that the highly sub-
2sidiaed Government irrigation projects are controlled by 
the large landowners (see Ahmed:1972; also Mannan:1972) 
and in the absence of any machinery to establish in advance 
who is most likely to benefit from a proposed capital 
work under a given project, the better-off are more likely 
to benefit from Food for Works programmes.
1. 3 million out of the 22.5 million acres of arable land 
are suitable for wheat cultivation and need only 1/3 or 
i the water needed for rice production.
2. The Government programme for input subsidization as a
part of an increased production strategy has been discussed 
by Alamgir:1974, 1975, 1975a; Jahangir:1977; Hossain:1977;
also see FAO/UNDP Working Papers, I, II, X, and XI.
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Conclusion
So how do we define Bangladesh agriculture ? Is it 
capitalist, feudal, peasant or in a transitional mode ?
If an adequate definition of the agrarian class structure 
is to be achieved a critical analysis of the forces and 
relations of production is essential. However, it is the 
purpose of this thesis to relate such an understanding 
to the ecological environment in which agriculture is 
set. Such a critical analysis must wait, therefore, until 
the environmental character of the district under study, 
has been explored. Khulna, where all the three villages 
under study are situated, is the southern most district 
of Bangladesh. In the next chapter I shall discuss the 
varied physical characteristics of the district and trace 
how these may have affected settlement patterns, especially 
in the south.
CHAPTER 2
INTRODUCING A SOUTHERN DISTRICT : AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
This part of the chapter has been divided into three parts: 
(i) general physical features of the district; (ii) settle­
ment pattern in the Sundarbans, and (iii) class structure 
during the period of early settlement. In the first section 
I have dealt with the ecological background and its effect 
on early settlement particularly in the south of the 
district, and general physical chacteristics such as 
climate, soil and salinity. In the second section a 
brief history of early settlement in the Sundarbans has 
been given to help analyse some of the key questions that 
need to be answered before we can formulate our hypothesis. 
The second part is perhaps more important in that it will 
help establish the basis for some of our empirical data 
and indeed some of our assumptions. The physical part, 
however, is useful in understanding the general physical 
background of the population we are dealing with and I 
find the historical material in this context (Rennel’s 
account) particularly interesting in that it establishes 
a positive correspondence between salinity (availability 
of drinking water) and settlement.
In order to establish some sort of a relationship between 
ecology and the differentiated structure of the peasantry 
in our villages (which will be dealt with in depth in 
Chapter 5) we need to see whether the original settlement 
was unequal or whether inequality accelerated over the 
years. Once this has been established, we can make a 
further enquiry into the question of differentiation and 
try and see how its structure may have been affected by
n
..ecology. For this purpose, the principal classes and the 
intermediary interests will have to be identified and also 
the extent to which jungle clearance itself, and for 
example, accessibility and cheap means of transport to 
market were responsible for the way class structure 
evolved, will have to be analysed. Before we do this 
however, the question of differentiation will have to be 
understood clearly and this calls for two further crucial 
questions: (a) by what classes, through what process and 
in what forms was the agricultural surplus being appropr­
iated from the direct producers; and (b) were the peasantry 
themselves a relatively homogenous exploited mass, or 
were they already becoming differentiated into strata with 
differential access to the means of production ?
I have tried to answer these questions in Section III, and 
bearing our principal questions in mind X have concentrated, 
naturally, on those aspects of history which bring out 
the critical issues involved.
\
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Section I
General Physical Features of the District
Khulna is the southern-most district in the Bengal Basin, 
extending over an area of 4»630 square miles and bounded 
on the north by the district of Jessore, on the east by 
Barisal (Bakerganj) and Faridpur, on the west by the district 
of 24-Parganas in India and on the south by the Bay of 
Bengal (Map 2.1.1).
Taken as a whole, Khulna is a low-lying, flat, deltaic 
area occupying the central portion of the southern delta 
between the Hooghly and the Meghna estuary and interlaced 
by an intricate river and tidal channel system which cuts 
the land into numerous separate areas. These channels 
carry flood water from the Ganges, Brahmaputra, Meghna 
and other rivers and also act as conveyance channels for 
rainfall and tide water to the Bay of Bengal. The physical 
features of Khulna are much the same as those of other 
deltaic districts. The land is exceptionally flat and 
includes numerous low-lying areas called beels. Land 
masses are generally at elevations slightly above sea 
level but are subject to inundation at the higher levels 
of the tidal cycle. Ground levels vary from below, to 
20 feet or more above sea level. The usual maximum level 
however, seldom exceeds 10 feet. The villages cluster 
along the banks of the rivers. The southern portion 
of the district exhibits the delta in a less advanced 
state of growth, covered in swamps and ending towards 
the coast in a network of sluggish channels and back­
waters, Further to the south lie the Sundarbans, separa­
ting the district from the Bay of Bengal by mangrove 
swamp forests which form a protective belt, from 25 to 
40 miles wide, along the southerly part of the district.
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Remnants of swamps and forests appear in the form of peat 
layers and excavations of wood, trees or other vegetation 
at depths of up to 100 feet below ground surface provide 
evidence of large scale subsidence caused by compaction of 
recent sediments and possibly by structural downwarping.
1. Ecological Background to Early Settlement
When this part of Bengal was surveyed by Major Rennell 
between 1764- and 1772 the banks of two of the oldest 
rivers, the Kabadak and the Bhairab, appear to have been 
the only habitable tracts above the general level of 
the swamps west of the Baleswar. That the latter have 
recently been raised by natural action, admits of ho 
doubt, for during the time which has since elapsed, 
the banks of numerous other streams and creeks inter­
secting the swamps and connected with the principal 
distributaries of the Ganges have been gradually 
raised with the assistance of human industry above 
the general level of the marshes and are now bordered 
by villages and hamlets, (01Malley:1908:3)
By comparing Rennel1s map with that made nearly a century
later in the course of the revenue survey of the area
during 1858-64., 0 fMalley points out that cultivation and
villages existed where a century ago all was waste. He
writes,
At the same time, ancient ruins discovered from time 
to time in making new settlements seem to show that 
portions of the district which are now being reclaimed 
were formerly inhabited, (Ibid:4*)
O'Malley discounts the various theories, such as the 
inroads of pirates, the devastation caused by cyclones 
and the inrush of irresistible storm waves, put forward 
to account for the extinction of the villages and the 
abondonment of the land, and apparently seems to agree 
with a more direct ecological explanation of this phenom­
enon given by Dr Thomas Oldham.
Oldham suggests that the whole of the south, including 
the Sundarbans proper, is only the delta caused by the 
deposition of the debris carried down by the rivers Ganges 
and Brahmaputra and their tributaries. It is well known 
that in such flats the streams are constantly changing, 
eroding one bank and depositing on the other, until the 
channel in which they formerly flowed becomes choked up 
and the water is compelled to seek another course. It 
is also certain that in the Bengal delta the general 
course of the main waters of the Ganges has gradually 
tracked from the west towards the east until 1 of late 
years’ the larger body of the waters of the body of the 
Ganges united with those of the Brahmaputra and together 
proceeded to the sea as the Meghna. Every stream, whether 
large or small, flowing through such a flat tends to 
raise its own bed or channel by deposition of silt and 
sand and by this gradual deposition the channel bed of 
the streams is raised above the actual level of the 
adjoining flats.
With these principles in mind, Oldham analyses the results
arising from the original flow of the main body of the
Ganges which went along the general course indicated by
the Bhagirathi and the Hooghly, and its changes as affecting
the existence and distribution of population. Oldham
writes as follows
The very first necessity for the existence of 
man is the presence of drinkable sweet water.
Where this cannot be procured it is certain 
that man can make no settlement and it is 
equally certain that the removal or destruction 
of the sources of supply of this necessary 
element of existence will compell him to 
abandon his abode and change his habitation.
We have not to go beyond the delta of the Ganges 
itself to see the application of these facts 
in explanation of the former history of the
Sundarbans, The more modern courses of the 
large rivers give us a patent illustration of 
the successive condition of all. To the east 
where now the great body of these rivers is 
discharged, we find the force of the fresh 
water sufficient to overcome the strength of 
the tide and the influx of salt water from the 
sea. And down to the very mouths of the rivers 
here fresh water (often for hours in the day 
flowing over a basis of salt water beneath) can 
readily be procured. The consequence is that 
towns and villages line the banks of every 
stream and population and cultivation follow 
the course of this, the prime element of their 
existence. To the east, the filling of the 
delta has not yet reached the same level as 
to the west and the fresh waters here retain 
sufficient power, therefore, to be carried 
down to the sea. In earlier times precisely 
similar conditions must have existed further 
to the west; the larger portion of the river 
waters found their exit through the channels 
there, and were thus in sufficient force to 
be carried down to the very sea; and the natural 
consequence of this was that man fixed his 
abode where he could procure fresh water, 
towns and cities arose, and taking advantage 
of the great facilities of trade offered by 
their position increased in importance and 
number until the necessary changes in the 
course of the stream which supplied them 
deprived them of the possibility of existence. 
That this is the natural interpretation of the 
facts, appears to me abundantly evidenced by 
the circumstance that within this abandoned 
tract and in its vicinity, at the present day 
when the swarming population is seeking utility 
for settlement in every direction, not a single 
spot finds its settler save where fresh water 
is to be had; and the traveller may go for 
days or weeks through the countless astonishing 
creeks and channels of the tidal Sundarban 
without finding a single abode, whereas the 
moment he reaches any spot where fresh water 
is obtainable he finds cultivation spreading 
and the population increasing. (Oldham 1870 ; 4-9
O'Malley seems to agree with Oldham's theory that availability 
of fresh water is a condition for human settlement and 
in support of his belief he cites Gastrell's account of 
the growth and decline of the village of Kabadak. Colonel 
Gastrell argues that once upon a time, Kabadak was 
connected directly with the Ganges and naturally its 
water was fresh instead of brackish, and there would have 
been every prospect of its banks being still further raised 
and consolidated* This is where the original Gobra 
flourished with its 'masonry buildings and courtyards'.
But long before Rennell's days, other streams had 
interfered with and cut off the Kobadak from the Ganges 
and left it to be reduced into a mere tidal creek with a 
headway of fresh water* Fresh deposits on its banks 
had then ceased to a great extent; the rains gradually 
washed away the upper stratum of soil and lowered the 
general level; soil gradually became more and more 
impregnated with salt and was unfit for crops and the 
population moved out. '..* were it not for the embankments 
and the fresh water that drains into and passes down the 
Kobadak in the rains helping to wash out the salt of the 
soil near the banks, Gobra would soon be deserted .
1. Quoted in 0'Malley:1908:7
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2. Agro-Ecological Regions
O'Malley divided the district into four parts : (i) the 
high lands to the north west lying along the banks of 
the rivers; (ii) the north eastern low lands situated in 
the interior away from the banks of these rivers; (iii) 
the central and southern region adjoining the Sundarbans; 
and (iv) the unreclaimed Sundarbans (05Malley:1908:90).
In the north western portion the land is well raised and 
is ordinarily above flood level and contains old settled 
villages and gardens. Its population is fairly dense 
and the surface is diversified by groves of date palms 
and coconut trees and plantations of mango and other 
trees on the outskirts of the villages; indeed nearly 
every village is surrounded by a fringe of orchards.
In the north eastern part, from the boundary line between 
Jessore and Khulna down to the latitude of Bagerhat, the 
land is low and contains extensive areas of beel lands, 
large flat tracts on which hardly a tree can be seen.
These lands are mainly cultivated with rice and are 
also suitable for jute and oil-seeds. Beels connected 
with the rivers by means of efficient channels contain the 
best land for many varieties of coarse paddy and jute 
for the creeks bring down rich river silt and also drain 
away the water. The rivers Madhumati, Atharbanki, Betbunia, 
Taleswar, and Tanguchi with their tributaries, traverse 
this part of the country. From December to the end of 
June the river water almost invariably remains brackish, 
but after the rains have set in, the salt water is usually 
driven back from the limits of cultivation by the volume 
of fresh rain water and drainage coming down. Population 
here is sparse.
The central tract is intersected by innumerable rivers and
khals which remain saline for a great part of the river.
Many of the khals used to be dammed up during the summer
months to prevent the salt water getting into the fields
and as a result, at the time of flood tide, sea water
which used to inundate the area extended further up the 
1river.
Further to the south is the unreclaimed Sundarbans tract, 
a region of morasses and swampy islands, most of which are 
covered with a dense evergreen forest, while some areas 
are covered in salt water at tide level.
(a) Climate
The district is within the tropical zone, being 
located between latitudes 21° 38' and 23° l f.
There are distinct seasonal weather patterns which 
are governed by the monsoons. These may be cate­
gorised as follows :
(i) The dry season from November to April : Rainfall 
is infrequent under the influence of dry air 
carried in from the north west. Temperatures 
in the seventies during the day and in the 
fifties at night are common from December to 
February. Temperatures may rise above 100°F 
in April. Humidity gradually decreases during 
this season, reaching a minimum of 60 to 70 per 
cent in March and April. Skies are generally clear.
(ii) The wet season from June to September : This
season is characterised by heavy rainfall under 
the influence of the south east monsoon with
1. This area has now been brought under the embankment 
programme and work has been completed.
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75 per cent of the annual total occurring in 
this period. Storms are usually of several days' 
duration and rainfall is steady at moderate 
rates. Mean temperatures are in the low eighties 
and humidity averages about 85 per cent. Skies 
are normally overcast,
(iii) The transition periods during May and October : 
The months of May and October are characterized 
by violent, short duration thunderstorms^ over 
the land masses and severe cyclonic storms 
generated in the Bay of Bengal, Nearly 75 per 
cent of the latter type storms that strike the 
district occur during these two months. Almost 
all of the remainder occur in the immediately 
preceding or following months.
Mean annual rainfall is approximately 67 inches in 
the northwest part of the district, the heaviest 
occurring in June with about 29 inches and practically
p
no rainfall from December through to February,
(b) Rivers and Salinity
A few major rivers connected by numerous cross channels 
and known by a multiplicity of names in different parts 
of their courses, gradually find their way through the 
district to the sea. In the extreme west is the 
Ichamati flowing from north to south and forming the 
border with India, Further to the east run the 
Kabadak (Kapatakkhaya), the Bhadra, the Bhairab and
1. Thunderstorms in May are known as kalboyishakhi,
2, Khulna Meteorologic and Chalna rainfall stations; 
station numbers 503 and 510 respectively; data 
collected during field work in 1977.
the Atai and their continuations traverse the centre 
of the district, while the eastern boundary with the 
district of Barisal is formed by the Madhumati which, 
further south, is called the Baleswar. In the south 
there is a labyrinth of rivers for example; the Jamuna, 
Arpangsia, Sibsa and the Pasur which, deep in the south 
gush into the Malancha, Marjata, and the Haringhata, 
each of which is large enough to be called 'an arm 
of the sea'.
A Coastal Embankment Project comprising a complex 
system of dikes and drainage sluices for flood protection 
in the coastal areas, was undertaken by the Government 
in 1961 and work under the first phase was completed 
in 1972* The objective was to protect the areas from 
tidal salinity so that production could be increased 
significantly through higher yields and multi-cropping.
Saline water from the Bay of Bengal is transported 
throughout most of the district by tidal flows. In 
the western part of the district only the Kabadak 
river appears to be influenced by the Ganges river 
flow. Salinity in the Morirchap, Betra and Bhadra 
rivers appears to be influenced almost entirely by 
local rainfall and runoff. In the areas where 
drainage channels receive only local runoff, salinity 
moves far inland during the months of low rainfall, 
whereas salinity in the Kabadak river remains nearer 
the sea.
The eastern portion of the Khulna district between 
the Pasur and Madhumati (Baleswar) rivers is influenced 
mainly by flow from the Ganges. The Gorai river carries 
fresh water spills from the Ganges into the area and
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during many months of the year effectively repels 
salinity incursions. There is a low pocket near 
Bagerhat which is not directly connected to a fresh 
water source. It becomes saline during the low flow 
period and remains so during June, July and August 
even though adjacent areas have become fresh, (Project 
74; Plate 17).1
Embankments have been built for generations by farmers 
or landowners to control tidal and rainfall flooding. 
Local low embankments are most common in areas with 
highly saline waters. In these areas the smaller 
khals are closed by dikes each year to keep tide 
water off the land during the dry season when the water 
reaches peak salinity. The low embankments are 
generally constructed and left in place throughout 
the year in perennially saline areas, such as the 
western part, where rainfall is the main if not the 
only water source for agricultural use. In the 
eastern part where the upstream flows bring in sweet 
water, the farmers make openings in the low embankments 
to let in the tidal waters. These waters move under 
tidal influence into and out of the khals and inundate 
the low, medium, and, during the extreme tides, even 
the high lands. These local embankments are not 
generally substantially built or maintained and are 
frequently overtopped or breached.
High tides flood into and out of the drainage channels 
in the western portion of the district which is out 
of the WAPDA Embankment, and during the rainy season 
the majority of the land is completely flooded. In
areas where the water is usually too saline for crop 
growth, very little production is realized from the 
land.
In the area south of Khulna, the salinity concentration 
varies throughout the year from fresh to very saline.
Here crops grow only when fresh water is available,
i.e. during the monsoon, and consequently these are
mono-cropped areas usually producing transplanted
Aman (Map 2*1,2)• In the protected areas, on the other hand,
embankments prevent inundation during the saline
period as well as deposition of salts on the land.
This has generally helped increase yields and make 
possible the production of additional crops.
People in the coastal area have learned to live in 
their saline environment by constructing tanks in 
which rain water is stored for domestic purposes.
Such fresh water is often the only source for human 
and animal needs in the perennially saline areas.
In other areas fresh water from the rivers and khals 
is used during the high runoff period of the year.
The absence of an adequate and reliable supply of 
fresh water creates hardships for residents of the 
saline areas.
(c) Soils
Most of the soils in the district are recent alluvium, 
mineral in character, that have been deposited by the 
river drainage system and the tides. Silty clay loam 
is the predominant agricultural textural classification. 
There are localized areas of organic peat muck soils
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and acid sulphate soils in western Khulna, The 
majority of soils are fertile and respond well to 
nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium chemical ferti­
lizers and also to manure, The soils are young, and 
most contain calcium carbonate or considerable 
exchangeable calcium. However, some soil deposits 
in western Khulna are low in available calcium.
Soil salinity in the southern area varies from non­
saline to strongly saline as a result of the degree 
of normal tidal inundations and tidal surges assoc­
iated with storms. (F.A.O, 1971); Map 2.1.3.
Soil formation has taken place from sediments of the 
river Ganges and to a lesser extent from contribut­
ions from the Tista and Brahmaputra rivers. Soils 
of the south western Khulna district have a low 
lime content and are more susceptible to soil 
structure difficulties and to acid sulphate problems.
Limited areas of peat and muck soils occur mostly 
west of the Pasur river and in the beel areas in 
eastern Khulna, These soils are derived from the 
mangrove species of shrubs and trees in the Sundarbans 
that adapt to growing in the saline and brackish 
water of the coastal area and from swamp vegetation 
in the beels.
During the dry season from November through March, 
evapo-transpiration dries the soil surface layers 
and sub-soil moisture moves by capillary forces to 
the surface. By this means considerable salt from 
the sub-soil is carried to the surface and visible 
salt crusts appear. The salt content of the surface 
soil layers is reduced during the rainy season by 
surface runoff and deep percolation. In soils of
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high clay content, percolation is slow and surface 
runoff accounts for the majority of the salt removal. 
However, the small differences in elevation between 
the land surface and the water table surface ranging 
from four to eight feet during the dry season and 
approaching zero in the rainy season, tend to restrict 
the amount of percolation, (Brammer 1976)
Land alteration due to sedimentation and erosion is 
relatively minor in Khulna* Only a small amount 
of upland river flow passes through this district 
particularly in its central and western portions, 
and flow conditions are primarily determined by local 
runoff,
Section II
A History of Early Settlement in the Sundarbans
There has never been a peasant society in which at any 
point in time there were not rich peasants and poor 
peasants. However, depending on the dominant mode of 
production, feudal, colonial or capitalist for example, 
this differentiation will have different origins and 
different structural effects, I shall analyse this in 
the context of the history of peasant settlement in the 
Sundarbans area. But before I do this, we need a more 
elaborate description of the Sundarbans during the time 
of reclamation and gradual settlement.
Briefly, the Sundarbans may be described as a low flat 
alluvial plain covered with forests and swamps in which 
land was reclaimed for cultivation. The tract is inter­
sected from north to south by wide tidal rivers and 
estuaries and from west to east by narrow tidal rivers 
and creeks. All the estuaries and most of the rivers are 
saline and are inter-connected by an intricate series of 
branches and these in their turn by innumerable channels, 
so that the whole tract is a tangled network of estuaries, 
rivers and watercourses. Along the sea face, the forest 
is almost exclusively composed of mangroves which some­
times extend into tidal water, but elsewhere are separated 
from the sea by a line of low sand hills or dunes.
Cultivation was confined to the north where reclamation 
had been effected with considerable difficulty. For 
cultivation the land had to be embanked by cutting through 
the forest and throwing embankments along the banks of
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the streams. Strong dams were constructed across the 
mouths of the smaller streams to keep the salt water out. 
After this, the forest had to be cleared, tanks dug and 
huts constructed. Tigers, crocodiles and malaria were 
serious hazards.
The general aspect of the Sundarbans gradually changes as 
one travels west to east from the Hooghly towards the 
Meghna and the whole tract may be divided into three 
distinct parts; (l) from the Hooghly to the Jamuna and 
Kalindi rivers, included in the 2k-Parganas, (2) the 
tract between the Jamuna and Baleswar lying in Khulna 
and (3) the area between the Baleswar or Haringhata and 
the Meghna in the district of Bakerganj, The belt of 
cultivated land from the Hooghly to the Jamuna in the 
24-Parganas is surrounded by large embankments to keep 
out the saline water; the land is comparatively high and 
dotted with small hamlets or single huts surrounded by 
little gardens. In the marshy tracts of the Khulna 
Sundarbans. between the Jamuna and the Baleswar, miles 
of low-lying, half-cleared land extends without a 
vestige of habitation. The cultivators who tilled this 
section rarely lived on or near their fields. The 
Bakerganj Sundarbans on the other hand, offered a pleasant 
change from the depressing swampy atmosphere of the 
Khulna Sundarbans. The land being high and the river 
water comparatively sweet, no embankments were necessary 
to protect the crops.
Land Revenue and the Process of Settlement
The Diwani of Bengal which included the administration 
of the collection of revenue, was made over to the East 
India Co. in 1765 hut it was not until 1772 that a Board 
of Revenue was appointed in Calcutta. Settlements for 
the samindars in Bengal were adjusted from year to year 
following the Five Year Settlement in 1772 until 1790 
when the Decennial Settlement was formed which was declared 
permanent in 1793. The zaroindaries that bordered on the 
Sundarban forest had no fixed boundaries on that side 
and cultivation advanced and receded according to the 
general circumstances of the country and the capabilities 
of the landowners. The forest was the property of the 
State and was not included in the Permanent Settlement.
Mr Tilman Henckell was the first Judge and Magistrate 
of Murli (present Jessore). In 1784- he obtained per­
mission from the Board of Revenue for a scheme to grant 
leases of the forest land to a body of independent 
peasant proprietors directly under the Government.
The principal objective of the scheme was fourfold:
(i) to gain revenue from land which lay unproductive;
(ii) to obtain a reserve of rice against seasons of 
famine, the crops in the Sundarbans being practically 
immune from drought; (iii) to drive out the bandits 
through cultivation and settlement; and (iv) to facilitate 
the manufacture of salt (Pargiter; 1885; O'Malley: 1908: p.4.0) 
Mr Henckell after roughly defining the boundaries of the 
Sundarbans forest, granted approximately 150 leases during 
1785. The implementation of his scheme however, was
1. This section is based on the works of Ascoli: 1921; 
O'Malley: 1908; Pargiter; 1885; and Westland: 1874, 
all of which are concerned with the revenue history 
of the Sundarbans.
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opposed by the neighbouring zamindars who claimed the 
land cleared by the grantees. This led to a chronic 
feud between Henckell's lessees who acquired the name 
and status of talukdars (their grants being taluks) 
and the zamindars, resulting in the elimination of the 
weaker lessees. In 1792 the number of lessees was 
reduced to 16.
In 1782, the Government asserted its exclusive right to 
the Sundarbans and the region was surveyed by one Lt. Hodge 
who divided all the forest as far as the river Pasur into 
236 blocks. The aggregate area of these Sundarbans 
blocks was computed at 1,702,4-20 acres or 2,660 square 
miles,
In 1830 rules for the grant of the forest area were 
issued and land was eagerly taken up mostly by the 
Europeans resident in Calcutta. By 1835, 110 lots had 
been granted, the total area of the grants being 551,520 
acres. The grants were made in perpetuity at a rental 
of Rs 1.8 annas per acre. Nothing was payable during the 
first 20 years but it was prescribed that one-fourth 
of the area should be fit for cultivation within 5 years, 
failing which the grant was to be forfeited to the 
Government. However, upon petition by the grantees for 
more liberal terms, the rules of 1830 were modified in 
1853, grants were to be made for 99 years and the revenue 
assessed on them was reduced to about 6 annas (16 annas 
to a rupee) per acre with nothing payable for the first 
20 years. The grantee was required to have one-eighth 
of his grant fit for cultivation in 5 years. The earlier 
grantees were allowed the option of giving up their old
leases and taking fresh leases under the new rules.
About seventy per cent of the earlier lessees accepted 
the modified provision. Altogether 157,990 acres were 
held under the rules of 1853.
The rules of 1853 were, however, superseded by several 
sets of sale rules after 1862, but as the latter proved 
inoperative, a revised set of rules came into force in 
1879. Under these rules, two types of grants were made;
(i) blocks of 200 acres or more were leased to large 
capitalists who were prepared to spend time and money 
on them; and (ii) plots not exceeding 200 acres were 
leased to small capitalists for clearance by cultivators.
(a ) Large Capitalist Rules
It was thought that the unlimited grant of 1853 
had merely opened the way for speculators and made 
the fulfilment of any clearance conditions practi­
cally impossible. By the new rules, clearance 
conditions were relaxed to a single condition of 
one-eighth of the area by the end of the fifth 
year of the lease, but to ensure early clearance the 
revenue free period was reduced to 10 years and the 
succeeding rates fixed at higher standards. (Ascoli: 16) 
The term of lease, however, was reduced from 99 years 
to 4-0 years. According to the rules, the Government 
reserved to itself all rights to minerals and to 
its proprietory rights but the grantee had, what 
was termed hereditary and transferable occupancy 
rights, in fact the right of a permanent tenure 
holder. It was stated that all lots applied for 
must be compact and that cultivation must not be
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scattered but proceed regularly through the blocks.
If there was only one applicant the grant would be 
sold at a price of Rs 1 per acre (compared to the 
Rs 2.8 of the rules of 1853)» and in the case of 
there being more than one buyer for the same land, 
the sale would be decided by auction. Twenty five 
per cent of the purchase money was required to be 
paid at once with the balance to be paid within 
a month. One-fourth of the total area was forever 
exempted from assessment as an estimated allowance 
for unassessable land; the balance was leased free 
of assessment for 10 years and thereafter at the 
following rate :
Table 2.2.1 Rates for Revenue Assessment under Large 
Capitalist Rules___________________________________
Area Rate in Annas for Standard Bigha
11-15 yrs 16 -20 yrs 21-40 yrs
Khulna 4 - l 1 - 2 2 - 4
Bakerganj 2 - 4 3 - 6 6 - 1 2
Source j Ascoli:15
On the expiry of the original lease of 40 years, 
the grantee could renew the lease for a further 
30 years.
Small Capitalist Rules
While the Large Capitalist Rules merely attempted 
to reconcile the rules 0f 1853, the Small Capitalist 
Rules of 1879 were an attempt to plough virgin soil. 
Under these rules, plots of land below 200 bighas 
were given to small settlers guaranteeing them a 
formal lease for 30 years if the land was brought
under cultivation within two years. The 30 years1 
lease allowed a rent free term of two years with 
progressive rates of rent on the cultivated area, 
fixed with reference to rates paid in the neigh­
bourhood by ryots to landholders for similar land. 
If available, an area of unreclaimed land equal to 
the cultivated area was included in the lease, 
and in addition, the lessee could bring under 
cultivation any quantity of land adjoining his 
holding which he might find bona fide unoccupied. 
The holding was liable to measurement every 5 years 
and all cultivated land in excess of the area 
originally assessed could be assessed at the same 
rate, (O'Malley ; 14-2)
The tenure was heritable and transferable. Two 
forms of lease were prescribed under these rules; 
(i) a cultivation lease; and (ii) a haoladari 
lease. The former would presumably give the status 
a ryot, the latter that of a permanent tenure- 
holder. The only actual difference in the terms of 
the leases was that the latter gave the power to 
sublet to cultivators though not to create under­
tenures, while the former gave no such right. 
(Ascoli : 16-18)
The system that followed soon showed its defects.
It caused a heavy loss of revenue, afforded no 
adequate control over the landlords and encouraged 
a system of sub-infeudation by which middlemen 
were introduced between the original grantee and 
the cultivator. The original lessee, in order to
3 0 9
recoup his initial outlay, often sublet to smalle r 
lessees in return for cash payments. And the same 
process was carried on lower down the chain with 
the result that the land was eventually reclaimed 
and cultivated by peasant cultivators paying rack 
rents•
It was accordingly decided in 1904- to abandon the 
Large Capitalist Rules and the Small Capitalist 
Rules and to introduce a system of ryotwari settle­
ment as an experimental measure in which small 
areas would be let out to actual cultivators. It 
was decided that assistance would be extended to 
the cultivators by the Government in the form of 
advances, as well as by constructing tanks and 
embankments and clearing the jungle for them.
In Khulna, however, almost the whole of the area 
available for settlement had already been leased 
to capitalists. Table 2 02 e2 shows the area already 
settled, with the revenue payable, and the area 
remaining to be settled in the Khulna Sundarbans.
(c) Estates
At the time of the Permanent Settlement the whole 
district of Jessore contained only 122 estates.
The number of estates, however, subsequently rose 
enormously and when Khulna district was formed in 
1882 there were 971 revenue paying estates in the 
district of which 770 were permanently settled and 
in 1908 this figure rose to 781 and that of tempor­
arily settled estates to 199. In the Sundarbans 
tract which was not permanently settled, there
to
Source 
: 
O'Malley: 
14,3
Id s; Id td t?d bd
P p p 03 ra w xn p
m ra 03 P. P  c+ 0 Cb P Cb O  Cb d
p P  C+ p H  P p P P P H} ps S
d c+ P p P  cb •d C+ *d Cb cb P
<: c+ B C+* P H* P H- P H  p d
p 1-1 h-J P H- 03 c+ CO cb M 00 01 P
Pi p  p Pi 0 p P vn d
pi p £3 oi H 01 H 03 Vo xn C+
dj pi P P H- P H- P P H
0 03 03 P  c+ 03 Cb xn Cb cb "<!
d c+ P  c+ Cb Cb cb Cb Cb
p P P p  p 1— 1 H M w
ra P c+ p d P hi P p p
c+ S p 0  pi P Pi P Pi Pi Cb
P 0) rb H M Cb
H- d 4 P P P P P p H
fc* P  d m d xn d d P
H* d  Pi p . Pi pi Pi
P P p P p
b-3 CK) >  d d d hi P
O 0 xn
cb c+ t'b C+" <yf* Cb C+ cb
P O xn fr d" d" d 4 p
b-1 P p P p Cb
O' P
P Id to H hi xn
P 3 p P
cm P hi H
1 H cm p
T— 1 p xn
H H
N# *
0 H
TO vO M 00 H 00 TO O n
O O Vo TO TO H 0 H 1— 1
« <• » <• «• * <w <•
VjJ 00 00 H 00 Cb. H O
H to vn 0 VTi -T^- \D vn 00
TO -0 TV) H TO TO ov VD H
« • • • • •
Vn vn vn vO TO TO
03 ■P" P- 00 vn <1
M
00 vO H VO VO
-r>- 0 vO H 00
** * ** »# <« w px)
VO 1 1 1 0 -O vn H VP xn
to 0 TO 00 O vn a
VO Vo vO TO <] TO
H it=»
Vn -0 O 0 O -O •
H £- O 0 O VO hd
•
JO
O VO H TO vo •p-
vQ 0 TO vn
* Nft |d
0 1 1 1 1—■ Vp TO <1 0 xn
vO •P" H O 00 vn •
vO -h- vO O 0
H >
vn O O O -0 •
1—• O O O vO •d
1 •
aa>
tno
dH-
*d
cb
H*
O
tJ
>■ 
d  
P P 
O P 
d
P H* 
w  d
hD
d
p
03
P
dc+
Id
P
C
P
d
P
P
<
P
d
c+
P
P
1 1 1
Table 
2.2.2 
Land 
Settlement 
in 
the 
S
u
n
d
a
r
b
a
n
s
were 171 estates which were periodically settled.
In some of these estates the Government was the 
proprietor and in others, settlement holders had 
proprietory interests. These settlement holders 
were commonly known as zamindars or talukdars.
While the latter were petty land-holders who 
resided on their estates, the larger proprietors 
(the zamindars) were generally non-resident,
The taluks had their origin in the separation 
of a part of estates by zamindars for sale, gift 
or otherwise, and the talukdars paid their revenue 
either through the zamindars or directly to the 
Government. However, the exactions of the gamindars 
soon obliged them to obtain recognition as owners 
of distinct estates.
In the Sundarbans the term taluk had a meaning 
different from that found in other parts of the 
district. In the Sundhrbans, grants themselves 
were called taluks and their possessors talukdars. 
Reclamation tenures granted for jungle clearance 
were called j angalburi abadkari or patitabadi.
They were permanent tenures, held exempt from payment 
of revenue for a fixed period subject to a specific 
assessment for land brought under cultivation.
In other areas, tenure holders directly under 
zamindars were known as talukdars and those under 
independent talukdars were called gantidars.
Gantidars were variously known as haoladars or 
patnidars and there were several grades of under­
tenure holders below them.
The rates of rent paid by the cultivators in Khulna 
varied according to the position and quality of 
the land and also according to the demand for it.
Land growing cash crops like pan or betel-leaf. 
sugar cane and other high return crops, fetched a 
higher rent.
The average rate of rent for different varieties 
of land in the three subdivisions of the district 
(Khulna, Bagerhat and Satkhira) were as follows:
Table 2.2.3 Average Rent for Different Varieties of Land
Land Type Average rate per acre g in Rupees
Khulna Bagerhat Satkhira
dhani land 
(for rice/pulses)
4.8-9 3-18 3-7
bagan or 
garden land
9-18 6-9 8-40
pan/betel-leaf 9-18 6-9 7-40
Source : O'Malley : 108
Although, as we have already noted, very few 
ryotwari settlements were made in the Khulna 
Sundarbans, as most of the tracts were already 
settled under the rules of Large Capitalists and 
Small Capitalists, significant settlements were 
made under the ryotwari system in other areas of 
the district. As regards their different classes, 
the rate of rent paid by the ryots and the under- 
yypts varied from 6 annas to Rs. 45 per acre, the
average worked out at Rs.12 per acre. In the Sundarbans 
there were special rates, which varied between Rs* 1.8 
annas and Rs. 3 per acre. Privileged rents were 
paid by some tenants, such as the original settlers 
who had cleared the jungle, and their descendants* 
Similar concessions were allowed to tenure-holders 
and under-tenure holders and to their successors 
in consideration of the outlay incurred in clearing 
the jungle and maintaining embankments.
The provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act (Section 
50) made it clear that unless a landlord could 
prove that the rate of rent had been altered within 
the preceding 20 years, it should be presumed to be 
permanently fixed. Thus the provisions tended to 
convert the holding of an occupancy ryot into a 
permanent and hereditary tenure and a suitable 
investment for the moneyed classes. Accordingly, 
there was a tendency for the non-cultivating 
middlemen to buy up the rights of the occupancy 
ryots, sublet the lands to the under-ryots who 
actually cultivated them, and extort exorbitant 
rents from them. Thus, while the holder of a 
permanent holding directly under the proprietor, 
payed rent varying from Rs 1.8 annas to Rs.6 per 
acre according to the class of land, which was about 
a sixth of the annual value of the gross produce, 
under-ryots in their turn, paid either half their 
annual gross produce or if they paid in cash, about 
a third of the value of the gross produce.
As the jungle was gradually pushed back and more
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land was brought under cultivation, steady progress 
was made in the settlement of cultivators in the 
new clearings not only from other parts of the 
district but also from other districts.
As opposed to the 24, Parganas Sundarbans (Ascoli: 1921
p.158), where cultivators moved into the jungle and
settled in isolated homesteads, the possibility of
settlement in new agricultural areas of the Khulna
district was severely limited because of the more
active drainage pattern, the comparative youth of
the rivers and hence the greater depth (volume) of
the annual floods. Instead, cultivation here was
carried out by means of seasonal migration. A
large number of ryots (tenant cultivators) who lived
and cultivated the land north of the Sundarbans also
had land in the Sundarbans.
The cultivating seasons in the Sunderbans are 
later than those further north, and the plan 
which is followed by these double cultivators 
is this. The months of Chaitra, Baisakh 
anc^  Jaistha, corresponding roughly to the 
English months of April, May and June, are 
spent in cultivation at home. The husband­
man then having prepared his home cultivation, 
embarks with his ploughs, oxen, and food 
and proceeds to his abad or Sunderban clearing. 
July, August and September are spent in 
ploughing and sowing and preparing the crops 
there, the peasant building a little shed 
as a dwelling for himself. The water gets 
high in August and September, but this is 
little impediment to cultivation. A cons­
iderable portion of the land under rice is 
situated below high water mark; but the 
planting is easy, for rice sown in higher 
lands is transplanted into these low lands 
when is ife strong enough to bear the waters. 
After having sown and transplanted his 
Sunderban crop, the husbandman returns home,
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and these outposts of civilization are abs­
olutely abandoned .... By the middle of December, 
the home cultivated rice has been cut and 
and stored and the peasant then returns to the 
Sunderbans, and reaps the crop on his clearing 
there. At this time of the year (January®February), 
reapers or dawals crowd to the Sundarbans and 
are extensively employed for the harvesting.
When the rice is cut and prepared for sale, 
beparis or dealers come round and buy 
it up and the zamindar also sends his agents 
round to collect the rents from the cultivators. 
(Westland: 1874: 178-180)
While considerable cultivation in the more remote
parts of the Sundarbans followed this pattern, in
the nearer tracts especially when a sufficient
number of people were gathered in a new clearing,
they tended to form a settlement and to remain
permanently where they were. The largest group of
immigrant population consisted of cultivators
from Bakerganj who settled down on the newly reclaimed
land. In fact everybody had their eyes on the
fertile south. There were for example, the high
caste Hindus living on the banks of the Kabadak, the
Bhadra or the Bhairab, who could not get enough
fertile land in their own neighbourhoods and turned
their eyes to the south, obtained a ganti, or large
allotment, settled it in plots with the actual
cultivators and maintained their families on the
difference between the rents they received and those
they paid. The landless classes in Kalaroa thana
where fall the land had already been cultivated and
there was no room for any expansion1 and naturally
wages were low, went to the southern thanas to help
reap the plentiful harvests and then returned home
taking with them their wages earned in money and
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kind. Fisherman also came every year from Chittagong, 
built huts in the Sundarbans and remained for three 
or four months after the rains, catching and salting 
fish. There were in additions? many traders who came from 
as far as Dacca, Mymensingh, Tippera (Comilla),
Sylhet and Noakhali mostly in their cargo boats 
and bought rice paddy, oil-seeds, timber, firewood 
and other jungle products such as shells, honey, 
bees wax, the thatching leaves called goal°patat. canes 
and reeds and sold raw cotton, hardware, glassware, 
sugar, shoes, kerosene oil, coal, lime and tobacco, 
in the village haats.
Besides the regular merchants and shop-keepers of 
the towns and the villages, there were a number of 
traders' carrying on business in the Sundarbans.
Some with large boats visited the clearings at 
harvest time; others stationed in a particular 
village bought up grain and sold it to the larger 
traders; and everywhere there were the farias who 
pushed themselves between the petty sellers and the 
regular traders (commonly known as beparies) buying 
in very small quantities from the former and selling 
to the latter. In this way rice passed from the 
hands of the real producers. The bulk of agri­
cultural exports consisted of rice, as the excess 
of production over consumption resulted in a massive 
surplus.
The multitude of waterways contributed greatly to 
prosperity by rendering carriage to the market and 
sometimes direct to Calcutta easy and relatively 
cheap,
I t ?
The regular route of the river-borne trade 
from Calcutta to East Bengal or the other 
way round, ran through the district and was 
well served by steamers. For internal trade, 
however, country boats provided the principal 
means of transport owing to the innumerable 
tributaries which enabled boats to find their 
way to every village and almost to the door 
of every cottage. (O’Malley: 127)
For the same reason roads were necessarily few in
number, short in length and unmetalled as they
were little used during the winter season.
In the Sundarbans, the husbandman either imported 
labour for the cultivation of his land which was 
usually extensive, leased it out on a regular basis1 
or rented it out on a share cropping basis. His 
share was usually one half of the produce and the 
tenant provided seed, ploughs and other necessary 
agricultural implements, while the lessor supplied 
the bullocks.
The average daily wage of a common adult field 
labourer was about 4- annas plus two meals which 
cost an additional 2 annas; but during the cultivating 
season, wages rose to 8 annas per day plus two meals. 
Agricultural labourers were commonly paid in kind 
and the labourers employed as harvestors (cutting 
paddy) were paid usually with a share of the crop 
varying from one-third to one-eighth of the amount 
cut by them.
The average prices for the two staple crops, rice 
and gram, and salt were as follows (in seers and 
chattacks per rupee):
1, On a yearly basis against a fixed sum of money 
received In advance.
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Table 2 , 2 , 1 Prices for Various Crops/quantity per rupee
Year
Common
rice
Gram Salt
S. Ch. S. Ch. S. Ch.
1901-05 11 9 9 1 12 12
1905-06 11 13 12 9 11 6
1906-07 7 13 8 15 13 12
S - seers (approximately 2 pounds)
Ch - chattacks (approximately l/8th of a pound)
Source : O'Malley: 110
Within the district of Khulna no distinction was 
made as such between the urban and the rural 
population for there was no industry or manufacture 
necessitating the formation of towns and almost the 
entire population subsisted on agriculture. There 
were three towns: Khulna, Satkhira and Debhata with 
a total population of 21,236 representing 2 per cent 
of the population of the district. The remainder 
of the population lived in the 3,14-1 villages. Most 
of these villages were thinly populated with 16 per 
cent of the rural population living in villages 
with between 500 and 2000 people. Northern villages 
were the most densely populated and among these 
Daulatpur, Phultala, Dumuria, Bagerhat, Kachua, 
Morrellganj, Bardal, Kaliganj, Kalaroa, and Tala 
had the highest density.
Southern villages were sparsely populated. In fact 
villages were few in number and consisted generally
i i  q
of a cluster of cultivators' huts. In the Sundarbans 
they were even fewer and smaller, for the settlers 
there did not tend, as in other places, to group 
themselves into villages. many of the village
names on the map represent no sites of villages 
as we usually understand a village, but wide stretches 
of waving paddy, with homesteads scattered about 
them, where the cultivators' families live apparently 
in perfect seclusion.' (Ibid: 58)
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Section III
The Class Structure
Having given this summary of the history of settlement 
pattern in the Sundarban region, we can now try and 
identify the principal classes and the intermediary 
interests which emerged during the process of settlement 
and see how this structure may have been mediated by 
ecological factors* The analysis will also answer the 
two vital questions set out earlier, relating to
(i) the siphoning of surplus from the real producers 
by the various non-producing interests and (ii) the 
differentiation of the peasantry.
From the above analysis of the history of settlement 
pattern, we could argue that the net result of Henckellfs 
and his successors' scheme for settlement in the Sundarbans 
tract was: (a) surplus extraction in terms of cash (deposit), 
progressive rents and forest resources; (b) the assured 
continuation of this process by 'protecting' the productive 
forces and relations from natural (famine) and human 
(robbers) threats; (c) the strengthening of the hand 
of the metropolitan class in order to reinforce the 
stability of the interests of the empire, and finally 
(d) the creation of a native class of an 'idle' (divorced 
from production) hierarchy of subservient rent-receivers 
'protecting* the interests of the empire.
The Large Capitalist Rules of 1879 were specifically 
evolved to serve the interests of the European speculators. 
The Small Capitalist Rules, on the other hand, were 
necessary because the benefits measured against cost,
time and trouble in the reclamation of the tracts 
would not have justified interest in the lots below 
200 bighas for the Europeans, This in fact had the added 
benefit of creating a subservient class. Table-202.1 
shows that in the Sundarbans very littl© land.had been 
settled with direct cultivators.
Thus during the process of settlement we can identify ; 
(1) a class of metropolitan speculators; (2) Talukdars 
(Gantidars) and a hierarchy of rent-receivers who formed 
the intermediary interest between the State and the 
(3) direct producers who were settled in small plots 
as rent payers (middle peasants); (!) the absentee owners 
who came from different parts of the district, produced 
for the market and employed wage labour; (5) the migrant 
labourers who eventually settled down and share-cropped;
(6) the seasonal agricultural labourers and finally
(7) the traders and the middlemen. It is interesting 
to note that there were no settled landless peasants 
and it is conceivable that the agricultural labourers 
who eventually settled down in small holdings were, 
over the years, dispossessed to landlessness.
The surplus was siphoned from the real producers in 
different ways and by different classes :
(1) through legal rents and other illegal exactions by 
the rent-receivers, the State, the zamindars and the 
talukdars for example;
(2) by rich absentee landowners who produced exclusively 
for the market employing wage labour;
(3) by other settled rich peasants who rented out land 
and received a crop-share paid at fifty per cent of the 
produce by the immigrant settlers and in some cases also
by the local poor peasants; and finally,
U )  in terms of interest payments collected by the 
maha jans (money-lenders)*
It is difficult to establish exactly who these maha.jans 
were. It may however, be assumed that in the absence 
of scope for investment either in agriculture in terms of 
improving the forces of production, or for that matter 
in any other avenues, it was the rich and the surplus 
farmers themselves who diversified into money-lending*
This gave them a high return not only in terms of exorb­
itant interest rates but also in terms of power and 
increased access to land. The volume of trade also helped 
money lending to flourish*
Thus it seems, that part of the surplus extracted in terms 
of rent by those who were totally divorced from production, 
was transferred out of the country by the State and the 
metropolitan bourgeoisie and a part was used up in 
conspicuous consumption by the zamindars and the talukdars. 
The surplus labour exploited by the absentee rich farmers 
and the settled rich peasants through either wage labour 
or share-cropping, on the other hand, was employed in 
usury or in buying land. Usury capital in turn was, of 
course, itself invested in similar ways. Rent, wage 
labour, share-cropping and usury were thus both symptoms 
and mechanisms of differentiation within the peasantry.
It is difficult to determine the position of the petty 
traders, for example, the farias, who bought grain in 
small quantities from peasant households and sold it to 
beP&ri in the market and thus linked the production 
end with the distribution end and lived on the difference
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between their buying and selling prices* The point however, 
is whether or not this difference is peasant surplus 
labour.
The peasant is dependent on the trader for the disposal 
of his surplus unless the traderfs function can be 
substituted by some such organisation as a village 
cooperative. Unless he can dispose of his surplus, the 
peasant cannot procure the goods he needs for consumption 
and therefore cannot continue to produce. Thus, to the 
extent that there is some degree of petty commodity 
production, the petty trader/middleman performs the 
function of reproduction of an enterprise. In order to 
live, the trader must make a profit from somewhere but 
the surplus he lives on is perhaps a division of capitalist 
profit. Although the trader does not directly extract 
the surplus labour of the peasant, he does share in the 
extracted surplus and to that extent he is exploiting.
It would seem, however, that when a trader is in a position 
to build up a monopoly where he can dictate prices and 
obtain super profits, as does for example, a bepari or 
an aratdar, until someone cuts into his monopoly, his 
exploitation is much more clearly demonstrated.
From my analysis of the exploited classes, it would seem 
that the migrant share-croppers found themselves even 
poorer than the poorest settlers who had at least enough 
land to cultivate with their family labour and received 
one hundred per cent of their produce. The migrants, 
in fact helped their owners to obtain 50 per cent of a 
crop from their hitherto unused land. In any case, they 
share-cropped only those lands which would not have
been economic to cultivate with family labour let alone 
with hired labour. However, the poor peasants themselves, 
in the absence of subsidiary occupations, in a bad year 
were forced either to borrow from money lenders or to 
sell their land and thus the process of polarisation was 
already taking place.
Conclusion
It is clear from the history of reclamation and settlement 
in the Sundarbans that the south of the district has 
historically been affected by market economy. From the 
way the absentee owners operated however, in that they 
produced for the market and employed wage labour, it is 
difficult to say that the mode of production was distinctly 
capitalist. If one takes Lenin’s relatively simple 
definition of commodity production and wage labour, one 
sees that the particular sector of production in the 
south was characterised by a mixed form ie. commodity 
production and labour as wage labour. But to the extent 
that some wages for some categories of labour were paid 
in kind, this means that for those categories, the divi­
sion of the total product between necessary and surplus 
product was determined not by the total production- 
circulation process but directly at the level of the 
enterprise, so that surplus was being extracted not as 
surplus value but directly as surplus product. One can 
only say that this represents a hybrid form of capitalism 
which is profoundly transformed by its articulation with 
a backward peasant economy.
As for our principal hypothesis i.e. that ecology has 
a significant impact on the way rural society is struct­
ured, it is important to emphasize that while the decision 
of the Government to reclaim land and encourage settlement 
was augmented by the interests of the empire, its exe­
cution and in fact the schemes themselves and their 
terms and conditions which directly produced the rent- 
receiving classes were dictated to a great extent by 
the ecology of the Sundarbans. Similarly, the nature of
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the operations of the rich farmers were made possible
by the differences in the cropping seasons (making it
possible for them to shuttle between their lands in the
north and the south for cultivation and harvesting),
soil fertility, the clearance of the jungle and finally
easy and relatively cheap accessibility to markets. All
these factors attracted them to the south to profit at
a very low investment cost. The same ecological factors
largely explain the formation of the other classes. Thus, the
structure is determined in the long run by the 
characteristics of the geographical environment, 
which affords men a greater or lesser possibility 
of developing their productive forces. But once 
definite social relations have arisen, their 
further development takes place according to 
its own inner laws, the operation of which acc­
elerates or retards the development of the pro­
ductive forces ...... The dependence of man on
his own geographical environment is transformed 
from direct to indirect. (Plekhanov: 1956: 217)
CHAPTER 3
THE DYNAMICS OF THE THREE VILLAGES
Section I
Ecology And Agrarian Structure
1. Overview of the Three Villages
The three villages are Bajua, Biddya and Jamira. Bajua 
and Biddya are situated in the south, on the Passur river 
about 35 miles from Khulna city, and some 8 miles north of 
the Sundarbans, Biddya is naturally flooded (tidal) and 
is across the river from Bajua which is embanked. Jamira, 
lies along the northern-most border of the district some 
19 miles north of Khulna city. While Bajua and Biddya are 
both connected to the district headquarters by riverine 
transport, only Jamira is connected by road transport - 
the Khulna-Jessore main road, and later by a brick-laid, 
badly damaged road. The journey time to Bajua or Biddya 
is approximately 5 hours from Khulna by motor-launch and 
about 2 hours to Jamira which journey normally includes 
a bus-ride for the first 13 miles to Phultala followed 
by what is locally known as a van ride for the remaining 
six miles to the village.^
Administratively, Bajua is under Dacop© Police Station 
(PS) in Khulna Sadar subdivision; Biddya is under Rampal 
PS in Bagerhat subdivision, and Jamira is under Phultala 
PS also in Khulna Sadar subdivision (Maps 3.1.2 and 3.1.3).
A van is a tri-cycle with a flat-board of about 3 feet 
by 2g feet for carrying passengers or goods. Passengers 
usually sit hanging their feet. It can carry as many 
as 1 passengers.
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Map 3.1.1 LOCATION OF THE THREE VILLAGES.
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Bajua is the largest and perhaps the most advanced of 
the three villages. It has the biggest local market in 
the immediate region which meets once a week, a fish 
factory which offers employment to a significant number 
of the local population for a greater part of the year, 
a cooperative which has succeeded in making a start in 
disseminating the new technology in rice production, a 
bank which is operating more on the strength of the fish 
factory and the cooperative than the people, a 'degree 
college' offering undergraduate degrees in social sciences 
and in commerce, and a secondary school. It has a signi­
ficant immigrant population who have settled in the past 
twenty years or so. Over 50 per cent of the population 
of this village is landless,
Biddya, on the other hand, is the smallest and most 
sparsely populated of the three villages and has no impor­
tant infra-structural complex as in Bajua, Many people 
seem to be dependent on Bajua, the village across the 
river, especially for marketing whatever agricultural and 
non-agricultural goods they may produce, for buying the 
industrial commodities they need and for employment. In 
both Bajua and Biddya, a significant amount of land is 
held by absentee owners.
Jamira is the most densely populated village of the three.
Its economic basis is a domestic coir-making industry 
which contributes towards the subsistence of most of the 
poor and landless families.
2. Ecology and Cropping Pattern
Bajua is high, 70 per cent of the village area is 
elevated above the surrounding area ; whereas Biddya
1. Interview with Thana Agricultural Officer, Circle Officer, 
and village leaders, January-March 1977.
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is low, flat, and level with the surrounding area. The 
region being very close to the sea and directly connected 
to it by the Passur river and being subject to tidal flows, 
the villages experience high salinity especially during 
the dry months between late October and early April. In 
the monsoon months, however, salinity disappears as the 
rivers are influenced by the Padma river flow, local 
rainfall and runoff. Consequently, both the southern 
villages have traditionally been mono-crop areas producing 
transplanted aman in the deeply flooded monsoon months. 
Bajua however, was embanked under the 'first phase' of 
the Coastal Embankment Project in 1972. Broadly, this 
embankment has caused the major ecological difference 
between Bajua and Biddya which has in turn resulted in 
other dissimilarities. The embankment was ostensibly 
meant to protect this area from salinity, promote multi­
cropping through irrigation and consequently to improve 
the general living condition of the villagers. In the 
case of Bajua, the opposite has happened principally 
because of the elevation factor of the region. Bajua, as 
I have already said, is a high, slightly dome-shaped area 
whereas the adjacent villages are very low. In the monsoon 
months, while the Bajua area is shallowly flooded, the 
adjacent areas are deeply flooded which forces the latter 
to release their excess water through the flap-gates of 
the embankment. This causes Bajua to dry out as a result 
of which, rice production has fallen drastically from 
about 36 maunds to 12 maunds per acre.
Apart from this, the embankment has made Bajua a breeding 
ground for poisonous snakes. The massive embankment 
was built out of earth taken from the adjacent ground 
which has resulted in a discontinuous line of ditches.
These were not covered because any such attempt would have 
been beyond the available resources of the project and
in fact it was argued that these ditches would benefit 
the villagers as they could cultivate fish in them. It 
is these ditches and the many creeks which run through the 
village with their tidal flow cut off due to the embankment, 
that breed snakes. In the summer, not infrequently, 
these snakes emerge (especially after dark) and stretch 
out on the embankment.
As Bajua is still predominantly a single crop area, land 
is left after the harvesting of the aman crop in October- 
November until early April to grow weeds and a kind of 
long grass (locally known as bete), After the first 
rain, when it is time to plough the land again, to ensure 
that there are no snakes in the fields, the practice is 
to cutout the embankment and to let saline water in to 
the fields. This drives the snakes out and helps destroy 
the weeds and bete but reduces soil fertility.
During the past three years however, some rabi crops 
such as water-melon, melon, linseed, and oil seed have 
been tried out in the winter months with some success 
and all the indications are that acreage under rabi crops 
is increasing although in absolute terms this is insigni­
ficant, The winter rice-crop IRRI which has been grown 
since 1973 is, on the other hand, on the decline. The 
argument is that rabi crops need less capital investment, 
less water and are low-risk crops in that chances of 
pest-attack are lower. IRRI on the other hand, is parti­
cularly sensitive to salinity (EPWAPDA:pp.112-115).
IRRI cultivation started in this area in 1973 when the 
World Relief Council started a cooperative primarily 
to help the local Christian population although eventually 
others joined in. The Council extended loans, free 
of interest to cooperative members and in the first years
the number of blocks rose to over one hundred# Originally, 
most of the blocks consisted of 20 - 4-0 acres of land rented 
in from some half a dozen owners on a share-cropping 
basis in which the owners got 50 per cent of the crop. 
However, the following year when IRRI was first introduced, 
the land owner’s share was reduced to 25 per cent, the 
input costs being borne entirely by the members of the 
block.
The practice has been that a piece of land, usually about 
25 per cent of the total block size, is separated from 
the block and is cultivated by the members of the block 
as a collective plot. This pays for the loan from the 
cooperative. The rest of the land is shared out between 
the members according to the man-power of the different 
households. If there is a shortage on the collective 
plot, the difference is made up by the members according 
to the size of the land they cultivate. After harvesting 
and drying, the paddy from the collective plot is stored 
free of charge in the cooperative's store-house to be 
sold in the market when prices rise. IRRI, however, is 
sold immediately as it cannot be dried due to the monsoon 
and consequently cannot be stored.
Two years later, however, this is in 1975, the World 
Relief Council was renamed the Christian Services Society 
(CSS) and started operating along Government lines.
Interest was charged on loans at 11 per cent and the 
rent on pumps was raised from Tk.650 to Tk.1100 for one 
season and security of land against loans was introduced.
By 1977 the number of IRRI blocks had fallen to just over 
30. There are of course other reasons for this decline 
of interest in IRRI cultivation. Winter IRRI (boro) 
which is cultivated by pump irrigation is dependent on 
sweet monsoon water held in the canals which run through
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the village. The canals used to be connected with the 
Passur river which is now embanked with sluice gates 
primarily to release water during the winter season. 
S©a©times people who have no interest in IRRI blocks, 
especially those who live by fishing in the canals during 
the winter months, either remove a part of the embankment 
or tamper with the sluice gates so that the canals get 
a fresh supply of fish. This naturally rapidly increases 
the salinity of the canal water and makes its use in the 
IRRI blocks impossible. As a matter of fact the IRRI 
block members have never had a good harvest since 1975 
and now that the subsidy on inputs has been reduced and 
costs have increased substantially there is a marked 
lack of interest in IRRI cultivation. Finally, as 
mentioned above, IRRI unlike aman cannot be stored 
through the monsoon months to be sold when market prices 
rise.
Across the river Passur from Bajua is Biddya, the second 
village in the south. Biddya is saline and shallowly 
flooded by tidal water restricting production to a single 
crop of transplanted aman.'*' This seasonal flooding 
especially during the monsoon months is perhaps the most 
significant hydrological feature in relation to agriculture. 
The surface drainage system of the area is mainly provided 
by an intricate network of innumerable channels and 
creeks. The Passur river is tidal throughout the dry 
season. Both the salinity of the water and the tidal 
range decrease during the monsoon. However, the mean 
level of the river rises during this season resulting in 
a higher tidal level. During the dry season the tidal 
character again becomes more pronounced and saline water 
gradually penetrates inland up the channels and creeks.
be
1. Biddya is to/embanked under the second phase of the 
Coastal Embankment Project.
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Depth of flooding usually depends on topographical 
position*
Artificial field bunds are put up round all shallowly 
flooded rice fields in order to protect the crop from 
excessive water pressure in the winter and from salinity 
in its maturing stage in early winter. However, since 
the villages across the Passur river including Bajua 
were embanked under the first phase of the Coastal 
Embankment Project, water pressure has increased in 
Biddya severely damaging the newly transplanted aman crop 
especially in open fields. This pressure also washes out 
the artificial field bunds and its high sediment content 
in some areas silts up the paddy fields in a matter of days 
completely ruining the early crop.
Thus the two major impacts of the embankment project on 
Biddya and adjacent villages in the deep south are; 
excessive water pressure and over sedimentation* As a 
result of this, crop production has dropped from around 
30 maunds per acre before 1971 to about 20 maunds after 
1973 •'*" On the other hand, in Bajua the embankment constru­
ctors did not take account of the elevation factor of the 
village and the result was a drastic fall in output.
The northern village, Jamira is located in a relatively 
dry region with no rivers or significant canals within a 
radius of six miles. It is situated on flat, high land 
with a low surrounding beel area which is moderately 
flooded in the monsoon months.
As in all the southern villages, paddy is the main crop 
mainly grown in the beel area, notably Jamirar Beel and
1, Production did not take place in 1971 as the villagers 
fled across the border into India during the Pakistan 
Army crackdown. The drop in production has been particularly 
obvious since 1973*
Dakatiar Beel. Usually a mixed aus-aman crop is planted 
in this area early in the season, and the aman is harvested 
before the main thrust of the monsoon sets in. This leaves 
the aus plants to grow with the increasing flood level until 
late October-early November when they are harvested either 
standing in waist deep water or from boats. However, this 
process of mixed double-cropping cannot be maintained for 
three consecutive years as the aus crop shatters at harvest 
time every third year of mixed cropping. Every two years 
therefore, it is necessary to change the pattern and to 
grow aman only and then renew the process of mixed cropping 
from the following year.
In the winter virtually nothing is grown in the beel area 
as the fields do not dry out sufficiently for rabi crops 
to be grown. On the higher land, however, important crops 
such as oil seed and linseed are grown. Water melon espec­
ially of a high yielding variety is becoming extremely popu­
lar as a cash crop but in terms of absolute acreage this is 
insignificant. On the higher land, in the early part of the 
monsoon, an aman crop is grown followed by an aus crop in 
the late monsoon, or alternatively a single aman crop is 
grown. Whether a single crop or two crops are grown depends 
on the opportunity cost of labour weighed against the output 
difference between one crop and two crops.
Unlike the southern villages, Jamira has much more vegetation 
especially coconut, betel-nut and a variety of palm trees.
It is these cash crops, and the labour process that goes 
into making coconut products which forms the bulk of the 
commodity exchange in the market and offers the poor and 
landless peasants in particular, their only dependable non- 
agricultural employment. It is this which keeps them , in 
income terms, above subsistence level.
3• Demographic Structure
The population of the three villages is 5520, 1206 and 
2755 for Bajua, Biddya and Jamira respectively (Table 3,1.1) 
Corresponding areas for the three villages are 304-8, 860 and 
458 acres giving them a population density of 1159* 897 
and 3850 people to the square mile. Although the population 
density for Bajua and Biddya is lower than the national 
average, for Jamira it is well over two and a half times 
the national average.^
When these figures are compared with the figures for 1961 
and 19?4-» some interesting observations can be made.
In Bajua, between 1961 and 1974 population increased by 
only 1.7 per cent as against an increase in the number 
of households of 20 per cent and for the period between 
1974 and 1977, by 5*9 as against an 8.9 per cent increase in 
the number of households. Corresponding figures for Jamira 
are 38.4 and 42.1 per cent for the first period (1961-74) 
and 6,9 and 12.1 per cent for population and household 
increase respectively, for the second period (1974-77).
The figures for Bajua can only be explained by significant 
outmigration principally to India during the first period 
and inmigration from other parts of the district. The 
pattern of Hindu outmigration to India took the form of 
encouragement to Hindu children, especially when they had 
completed their schooling, and to the able-bodied, to 
migrate while the older members of the family generally 
stayed behind. On the other hand, new families moved into 
Bajua having bought cheap land from the outmigrating familie 
In terms of population movement, outmigration significantly 
outweighed inmigration. Outmigration is still taking place
1. The national average being 1320 people to the square 
mile (Ahmed:1976),
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as can be seen from the figures for the second period but 
population movement seems to have stabilised. In Jamira, 
on the other hand, the population growth rate of 2.7 per 
cent during the same period is almost on a par with the 
national average growth rate. The slightly higher rate 
of increase in the household figures can be explained by 
the splitting up of joint families especially in view of 
the increased pressure on land. The figures for the 
second period, however, at 3.3 per cent per year, &how 
a higher rate of population growth than the national 
average•
With regard to the second southern village, as indicated 
in Table 3*1.1> figures for 1974- are not available. It 
is, therefore only possible to analyse the general trend 
for the period between 1961 and 1977. This shows, instead 
of an increase, a dramatic decrease in population. In 
explanation, it can be assumed that the outmigration to 
India following partition in 1947 was no different in 
Biddya than in Bajua up to the early sixties. In the 
later period however, it seems that the population decrease 
is due to a steady outflow of the population ever since 
the Government started acquiring land in the area in the 
early sixties for the eventual development of Chalna port, 
a few miles south of the village. The embankment in the 
villages across the Passur river causing greatly reduced 
yields in Biddya has contributed to the incentive to 
outmigrate especially in the past five years. As a result 
outmigration to India has accelerated but some families 
have settled in Khulna, the district headquarters, and 
some, especially the landless peasants have settled in 
Bajua.
Bajua, on the other hand, despite its fall in yield in 
the past few years has in the past, drawn a large number 
of small families. Its fish factory which was set up in
1966 and now employs about 300 workers, offered fishermen 
a ready market and made fishing a lucrative occupation; 
the private cooperative generated greater employment 
opportunities through the adoptation of the seed-fertilizer- 
irrigation technology; and finally, its local market, the 
largest in the region, allowed scope for petty business - 
all these contributed to a significant inmigration of small 
families.
4-. Distribution of Land
Table 3*1.2 shows population distribution in the three
villages as a whole according to economic status»
Here the six class strata into which the population of the
1three villages was previously divided aecorddng to 
their production from the land, have been grouped into two 
major categories, i.e. (a) below subsistence and (b) 
subsistence; based on whether or not each family produces 
above or below a minimum average of eight maunds of 
paddy per head of adult household members per year.
Table 3.1.2 shows, that while the landless peasants consti­
tute the largest single class with 4-2 per cent of the 
households, as against the national average of 33 per cent, 
for the three villages taken together, over 74- per cent of 
the households are in fact living below subsistence level.
It is also interesting to note here that contrary to what 
one would expect, the average household size for the 
poorer class is smaller and increases as the economic 
level of the household rises with the exception of the 
self-sufficient classes.
A breakdown of the figures for each of the three villages 
is given in Table 3.1.3. This shows a significant difference
1. See methodology pp . - 4 3 2“
Table : 3 . 1 * 2 Distribution of Aggregate Population
7*3 Villages) according to Economic Status
All three villages
Economic Status 
Structure Households Population AverageHousehold
sizeNumber % Number %
Total 1851 100 9481 100 5.1
Below Subsistence 
Level 1377 74.3 6535 68.9 4.7
1. Landless 779 42.0 3455 36.4 4*4
2. Poor 598 32.3 3080 32.5 5.1
Subsistence Level 4-74- 25.6 2946 31.1 6.2
3. Subsistence 239 12.9 1417 14.9 5.9
4-. Self-
sufficient 140 7.6 763 8.0 5.4
5. Surplus 72 3.9 541 3.7 7.3
6. Rich 
Is------------------
23 1.2 216 2.3 9.4
Source : Field Work 1976-77
in the percentage of landless peasants between the three 
villages, i.e. 52 per cent for Bajua, 20 per cent for 
Biddya and 30.4- per cent for Jamira. The high' percentage 
of landlessness for Bajua may be explained by the combined 
effect of the pauperisation process and the fact that a 
significant number of small families have migrated into 
Bajua and have taken up employment in the fish factory 
or have started some petty business such as procuring fish 
from the area and selling to the factory, or shop-keeping 
in the village bazaar. On the other hand, the exceptionally 
low percentage of landlessness in Biddya can be understood 
by the fact that a large number of small families, especi­
ally the landless families who cannot usually share-crop 
as they do not have the means to do so (not having bullocks,
r 1
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for example) and only have their labour to sell, moved out 
of the village in view of the decreased employment oppor­
tunities* Most of the landless peasants had in the past 
worked as contract labourers for the surplus farmers. But 
when these farmers, or at least a large number of their 
family members, started to move out of the village, oppor­
tunities for contract labour naturally'declined.
The figure of 30*4- per cent which represents the landless 
peasants in Jamira, the northern village, is closer to the 
national average of 33 per cent. Here all the normal causes 
for landlessness may have been in operation* Population 
increase and market forces have led to the break-up of 
joint families and the concomitant further subdivision of 
land, making plots uneconomic to cultivate resulting in their 
eventual selling off. There are others who are driven off 
of their land when they fail to pay back loans taken from 
the village money lenders at usurious interest rates 
against a collateral of land.
It is interesting to note that although the percentage of 
landlessness varies a great deal between the three villages, 
for the below subsistence level (landless plus poor) taken 
as a whole, this variation is considerably less. The 
combined figures are 80 per cent in Bajua, 69.5 per cent 
in Biddya and 64..8 per cent in Jamira.
Before I introduce Table 3*1.5 explaining the polarisation
structure measured in terms of access to land, it would
be useful to point out that in both the southern villages
absentee ownership^" is very high being 47 per cent and 
31 per cent respectively for Bajua and Biddya. Whereas 
in the northern village, Jamira 69 per cent of land owned 
locally is actually outside the village (Table 3.1.4).
1. By 'absentee ownership' I mean only those who own land 
but do not live in the village and not those who do not 
cultivate their lands but may live in the village.
This is explained by the very high man-land ratio in the 
village. As land is scarce and outmigration is insignificant 
there is very little buying and selling of land. But even if 
a family moved out of the village, relatives or perhaps more 
frequently surplus farmers would be in a position to buy up 
their land. This would be possible because most holdings 
are very small. In the southern villages, on the other hand, 
when the landlords who were mostly absentee owners emigrated 
to India and when farmers with large holdings move out of 
the village and want to sell their property, preferably to 
one buyer, the villagers were not rich enough individually 
to buy the land. This naturally brought in ‘foreign1 buyers. 
Thus the structure of large holdings and absentee ownership 
which came about directly as a result of land reclamation 
and settlement in the Sundarbans, continues in the south.
The difference in land pressure between the northern and 
the southern villages is clearly demonstrated by Map 3.1.4- 
and Map 3.1.5.
I shall now turn to the question of polarisation. Table 3.1.5 
shows a highly skewed distribution of land. In Bajua 80 per 
cent of the households (below subsistence level) have only 19 
per cent of the land, whereas the surplus category (surplus 
plus rich) making up 3.5 per cent of the households own almost 
double this amount at 37 per cent. Similarly, in Biddya, 
over 69 per cent at the bottom level own 22,9 per cent and 
8.2 per cent at the top own 4-0.8 per cent of the land. In 
Jamira, about 65 per cent own 12.4- per cent as against 7.2 
per cent who own around 4.5 per cent which is almost four 
times the share of the bottom category. The share of the 
subsistence and surplus farmers seems fairly consistent across 
the three villages.
The pattern of polarisation in the distribution of land 
in the three villages can be seen from Table 3.1.6. It 
shows both from the distribution by ordinal groups, which 
has been used in drawing up the Lorenz Gurve in Figure 3.1.2 
below, and also from the calculated Gini concentration
1 4 7
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Table ; 3.1.4-
Local and Absentee Land Ownership
Area
(Acres)
Water- 
Body + 
Homestead
Agri­
cultural
Land
Local
Owner­
ship
-% Absentee
Owner­
ship
%
Baj ua 304-8 *366 2682 14-25 53 1257 4-7
Biddya 860 **103 7 5 7 523 69 234- 31
J amira 4-58 55 4-03 682 169 -279 -69
* worked out at 12%; 6% water-body; J^ % homestead and 
2% embankment.
## worked out at 12%; 8% water-body; 4-% homestead.
worked out at 12%; 1 0 % homestead and 2% roads and water­
body ,
Source ; Area: Village Population Statistics. Bangladesh 
Bureau of Statistics.
Figures for Local Ownership : Field Work 1977.
ratios that Bajua is the most and Biddya the least polarised 
of the three villages.
Thus, broadly, the following features emerge from the 
land distribution tables (3 .1 .4- and 3 .1 .5): (a) a signi­
ficant proportion of the land in the two southern villages 
is owned by absentee owners; (b) the majority of rural 
households except those in Bajua, own land; (c) a large 
proportion own only very small areas of land and (d) there 
are few large owners although they control a sizeable 
amount of the land. However, until we have seen what 
proportion of the households depend on the land for their 
livelihood, how the land is cultivated and on what basis
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Table : 3.1.6 DISTRIBUTION OF FARM AREA BY ORDINAL GROUPS 
BAJUA
Cumulative $ of Farms_______________ Percentage of Area Owned
Bottom 52$ 0$
Bottom 80$ 19 ® 2$
Bottom 91.7$ 4.3 ol$
Bottom 96.6$ 63.0$
Bottom 99.3$ 83 *0$
Bottom 100$ 100$
Concentration ratio .78
BIDDIA
Bottom 20.4-$ 0$
Bottom 69.5$ .22.9$
Bottom 81,3$ 37.4-$
Bottom 91.7$ 59.2$
Bottom 98.1$ 87.2$
Bottom 100$ 100$
Concentration ratio .59
JAMIRA
Bottom 30.4-$ 0$
Bottom 64..8$ 12.4-$
Bottom 80.8$ 31.2$
Bottom 92.8$ 55.3$
Bottom 98.1$ 78.6$
Bottom 100$ 100$
Concentration ratio .67
(owner operated, share-cropped or using wage-labour), and 
how their differential access to land predetermines the 
production process, it is.not possible to say how important 
land is an an analytical factor. Simple land distribution 
among the rural population can give us only a superficial 
understanding of the process of differentiation and does not
bring out the inner conflict and dependence between 
different classes within the broader exploitative mechanism 
of the social formation. All this will be brought into 
focus at a later stage.
5. Forms of Tenancy and Tenurial Relations
In the selected villages the various forms of cultivation 
are :
(i) Self-Management, where land is cultivated by the owner
by using family labour only, by hiring wage labour in addition 
to family labour during the peak season or by using hired 
labour only. The choice will largely be determined by the 
availability of family labour, size of holding, non- 
agricultural occupations (teaching, clerical work and 
factory work, for instance) and extra-economic conditions 
such as position and status of the family,
(ii) Renting. There are various forms of renting, the 
most common form being share-crooning. The other forms 
are fixed renting, leasing, ekrat and usufructuary mortgage 
all of which will be explained below.
The amount of land rented in or out depends on the availa­
bility of rented land on the market, adult members and land 
holding ratio, non-agricultural employment opportunities, 
accessibility and size of various plots and ownership of 
the implements needed to cultivate land, i.e. bullocks and 
ploughs. A poor peasant, for example, may own a few tenths of 
an acre of land but may find it uneconomic to own the imple­
ments and thus may be forced to rent out his land and work 
as a wage labourer. On the other hand, if his family consists 
of one or two additional male members old enough to cultivate 
he may be able to justify owning these implements and instead
of renting out his small piece of land may rent-in more land 
so that his man and bullock power can be put to optimal 
use* Whether or not he rents in more land than he can 
cultivate using family labour only will depend on the 
existing wage rate. If the wage rate is high, the cost of 
the wage labour may not justify share-cropping or any other 
form of renting-in land. Poor peasants however, usually 
rent-in land because of the high rate of uncertainty in 
alternative sources of employment.
(a) Share-cropping : This is the most widespread method
of renting-in land. In the most common form of share- 
cropping the tenant gives 50 per cent of his produce to 
the owner, the tenant paying all the inputs. However, 
it is also possible for the owner to demand a share of 
66 per cent of the produce in return for sharing the 
inputs. In some areas, the tenant gets two-thirds of 
the aus crop as production of aus involves more labour 
than aman. The period of tenure may be fixed, normally 
between 1 and 2 years, but an indefinite period of 
tenure is not uncommon.
There are two traditional practices that accompany 
share-cropping in the two southern villages : (i) the 
tenant must pay to the landowner a deposit of TK.100 
Per bigha^ of land he rents which the latter will 
return at harvest time, (ii) in addition to this, a 
sum of money called salami, fixed at 1 maund or Tk.100 
per bigha of land rented, has to be paid to the owner 
by the tenant in addition to a half share of the produce. 
These deposits are paid at the beginning of the season and 
are invested by the owner either in money lending or In 
petty business. Although he is technically supposed
A bigha is usually one third of an acre i.e. .33 of an 
acre, Hox^ever, the size of a bigha varies from village 
to village. Thus a bigha may be .4.2, .50 or .52 of an 
acre of land.
to return the salami at, harvest time, the landowner seldom 
needs to do this. In fact, the tenant rarely wants the owner 
to pay back this sum as it acts as a guarantee that the land 
will be rented out to him again the following year. The 
point is that the system prevents most poor peasants from 
renting-in land as they cannot save enough to be able to 
pay these deposits. However, the system seems to be on the 
wane. There is no such system in the northern village,
Jamira. However, a practice that is common to both southern 
villages and to the northern village - and in fact to most 
villages in Bangladesh - is that under the system of share- 
cropping, tenants are tied by an extra-economic bond in 
which not infrequently, the tenant or any of his family 
members may have to render 'services1 to the landowner gratis. 
This, however, does not usually occur if the tenant owns 
more land than the owner.
(b) Fixed renting : In this form of renting, a fixed 
amount of crop is demanded by the landowner as a precondi­
tion, irrespective of total output. The amount stipulated 
is usually half of what would be produced in a normal 
year. The usual practice is also to dictate the crop.
The system is preferred by non-cultivating landowners 
especially absentee owners, in order to ensure a minimum 
return from the land, failing which the tenant is subjected 
to extra-economic pressure. Fixed renting is discouraged 
by poor peasants in order to avoid the risk of a possible 
crop failure. However, in the southern villages a few 
middle peasants have been seen to prefer renting-in land on 
a fixed cropping basis in which case they separate a fraction 
of the rented land for the production of a high yielding 
variety of rice in order to meet the landowner's require­
ments. On the remainder of the land they produce trad-
itional aman, mostly for their own consumption.^ In
the northern village the system of fixed renting is almost
non-existent.
(c) Leasing : This is a form of fixed renting in which
the land is rented for a fixed period normally 1 to 5 years, 
against a fixed sum of money, paid in advance. The system 
is preferred by absentee landowners but not widely practiced 
in the southern villages. In the northern village, there is 
only one absentee owner and she rents out her land on a 
lease basis.
(d) Ekrat : This is a practice in which a debtor transfers 
the use of his land to his creditor which is returned
only upon repayment of the loan. In other words, it is 
a form of mortgage in which land is the collateral. There 
are, of course, other forms of mortgage in which the use 
of the land is retained either entirely or on a share- 
crop basis by the debtor/owner. The system of ekrat is 
quite common in Biddya and is least practiced in Jamira.
(e) Usufructuary Mortgage : Complete usufructuary mortgage 
is a legal system which is exactly the same as ekrat but 
the land is automatically cleared after a period of 12 
years and is returned to the owner/debtor even if the loan
has not been repaid. However, in order to avoid the eventual
1. Given a choice, most peasants, especially middle peasants 
prefer aman rice to any other rice for family consumption 
and are usually reluctant to change their rice habits.
For poor peasants such choices do not exist.
2. In 1974» the period of 12 years was reduced to 7 years 
however the point was questioned in Parliament on the 
grounds that 7 years was not enough to raise the money 
lent through the use of the land. In a High Court 
Judgement, the Government lost and subsequently appealed 
to the Supreme Court. Until the decision of the Supreme 
Court is heard, therefore, the minimum period for 
complete usufructuary mortgage must be as previously,
i.e. 12 years.
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return of the land to the debtor, the creditor sometimes
gets the (illiterate) debtor to sign in advance a 'deed of
sale'1 to the effect that the land has in fact been sold
to the creditor for the sum of money advanced. This is
done to prevent the debtor from going to court to establish
his rights to the land under Usufructuary Mortgage. In
the unlikely event that the debtor succeeds in repaying
his debt, the land is returned to him. A more frequent
practice is to avoid this 'deed of sale' which "looks
like an official document" and to get the debtor/owner to
sign at the bottom of a blank sheet of paper "which looks
perfectly innocent". The content of this sheet of paper
is decided and filled in later according to the motive of
the creditor. This is done in order to avoid suspicion
and to preserve the trust "which is the key to village
2
power and politics".
Of the various forms of renting, share-cropping is the most 
prevalent and area under share-cropping is second only to 
that under self-management. This is most obvious in the 
southern villages, especially in Bajua where absentee owner­
ship is 4-7 per cent. These absentee owners usually depend 
on a middle-man or an agent to fix their land with dependable 
share-croppers. This middle-man may sometimes be the original 
agent who assisted the owner in buying his land from a 
departing Hindu landowner. Usually the owners do not visit 
the village to arrange agreement but the potential share­
cropper normally visits the owner (shaheb) in the city and 
there the terms and conditions of tenancy are discussed.^
1. Otherwise known as kabla dalil.
2. Discussion with villagers in Jamira, 1977.
3* It is alleged by the vilagers that these terms and condi­
tions are determined by the willingness of the tenant 
to procure 'gifts' for the shaheb which include women.
At harvest time the share of the absentee landlord is 
secured in one of three ways ; either the urban landlord 
sends his agent to check the harvest and transport his share 
to the city, or the tenant himself takes the landlord's 
share of the produce to the city. In some cases, the land­
lord visits the village and collects his share personally.
The landlord's share of the produce is either sold in the 
village market or taken to the city to be sold at a higher 
price. However, almost all absentee owners arrange to take 
their annual consumption requirements to the city. Some 
absentee owners as a condition of rent demand that the tenant 
use part of the land to produce enough 'quality' paddy to 
meet the needs of the urban based landowner and his family.^
The crop is usually shared out in the fields or in the 
tenant's house with the prior permission of the landlord. 
However, if the landlord is a resident of the village, 
then the crop is as a rule, transported to his house where 
it is shared out. Hay and other by-products are usually 
shared in the case of a resident owner or entirely retained 
by the tenant in the case of an absentee owner. This is 
one of the reasons why tenants seem to prefer to rent absentee 
owner's land rather than a resident landlord's land.
Cost Sharing Practices
As has been explained, output is shared in most cases 
equally between the tenant and the owner. Variations on 
this however, depend on who pays what proportion of the 
inputs. A major portion of the costs, such as labour 
(including hired labour that may be required in the peak 
season), bullocks, manure and fertilizer are entirely paid 
for by the tenant. In the southern villages, hardly any 
fertilizer or manure is used for the local variety of
1. I was told by the villagers that quality paddy producing fine 
grain rice has a lower yield.
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paddy although high yielding aman is frequently grown and 
fertilizer is either shared at the outset or provided 
entirely by one of thetwo parties, usually, but not neces­
sarily by the owner, the cost is then adjusted from the 
harvest before the produce is shared. If it is a winter 
crop, and the crop involves pump irrigation as is the case 
in Bajua where several acres of pooled land are intensively 
cultivated by owners who have formed a society and taken a 
loan from the local CSS Cooperative, then the landowner 
gets only 25 per cent of the crop."*-
In the northern village, Jamira, fertilizer is normally 
used in addition to manure even on local varieties of rice, 
the cost being borne by the tenant although the produce 
is still shared equally between the owner and the tenant.
'    ' ft ' r’f
1. For a discussion of the CSS cooperative see pp. ^^
Section II
Occupational Structure
This section deals with some of the important occupations 
of villagers. The various occupations are elaborated in 
Table 3.2.1 which shows that in all three villages, owner- 
cultivation is the major occupation.^ The figures for owner- 
cultivation are 21,3 per cent, 30.9 per cent and 31.5 per 
cent respectively for Bajua, Biddya and Jamira (column 2).
In Bajua, owner-cultivators as the majority of the house­
holds are closely followed by factory workers at 20.1 per 
cent and agricultural labourers at 18.6 per cent of house­
holds. In Biddya, owner-cultivators are followed by share­
croppers at 26.8 per cent and fishermen at 18.6 per cent.
In Jamira, on the other hand, in terms of occupation, after 
owner-cultivators, coir-makers are the most dominant group 
with 20 per cent of households.
It is not necessary to describe all the various occupations.
Of the major ones owner-cultivation and share-cropping have 
been dealt with in the analysis of the modes of production 
in the three villages in Chapter 5, and agricultural wage 
labourers will be taken care of in Section III of this 
chapter. In this section, I would like to examine some of 
the primarily non-agricultural occupations. In the southern 
villages these are fishing and the fish factory, and a range 
of local occupations, and coir-making in the northern 
village. My choice in this has been dictated by the dominance 
of these particular activities in the occupational structure 
of the villages and also because ecology seems to have made 
a significant contribution to the way in which these occupa­
tions have evolved.
1. ’Owner-cultivators1 includes those who cultivate pre­
dominantly with wage labour and also those cultivating 
with family labour.
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1. Fishing and the Fish Factory
Some distinct occupational and employment features charac­
terise Jamira, the northern village, and Bajua, one of 
the southern villages. In Bajua this is due to a Government 
programme in which in the mid-sixties, the Government decided 
to set up a fish factory in the village. But this decision 
itself was determined by economic and ecological character­
istics in that Bajua has the biggest market and is the most 
central and accessible of the predominantly fishing villages.
The Bajua fish factory started operating in 1967 when it 
obtained fish especially shrimps, prawns and frog-legs, 
processed and exported them directly or through their head- 
office in Khulna, However, the factory went out of operation 
in 1969 and did not re-open until 1974-• Since then, however, 
production has increased every year. Between 1974/75 and 
1975/76, production increased by 30 per cent and between 
1975/76 and 1976/77 by 75 per cent respectively. The mini­
mum wage however, which is a standard rate for unskilled 
workers has not increased during this period and has 
remained at Tk,5.96 per day, although the wage rate for 
skilled labourers has increased from Tk.12.00 in 1974/75 
to Tk.15.00 in 1975/76 and further to Tk.20.00 the following 
year
Nor has the salary for permanent staff, whether skilled or 
unskilled, increased over the same period. There are 53 
employees engaged in production and 26 technical staff 
working in the factory as permanent employees. Their work 
is supervised by 10 supervisors and 2 officers. A significant 
proportion of the permanent staff are brought in from outside. 
The percentage of outside employees is 42 in the supervisory
1. It seems that Government enterprises are just as keen on 
maximising the extraction of suplus labour and exploiting 
the economic weakness of unskilled labour and the unskilled 
labour market (in that they can always be replaced) as 
any private enterprise.
ranks, 50 in the technical area and 15 in the production 
force. Understandably however, all the unskilled workers 
are hired locally.
The factory itself does not obtain fish directly but leaves 
the job of the fish supply to the fish traders, who are 
the middle men between the actual fishermen and the factory. 
The traders live on the margin between their price to the 
fishermen and the price they get from the factory, this 
margin can be substantial. The factory price is determined 
daily, depending on the fish supply and the handling 
capacity of the factory including manpower available on 
the day. The greater the supply, the lower the price, 
thus the price varies between Tk 4-0*00 and Tk 50.00 per 
pound of prawns to the traders and the price to the actual 
fishermen is between 10 and 20 per cent less than this 
depending on the bargaining power of the trader.
The price of fish increased from Tk 3*00 per pound of 
prawns in 1973 to Tk 4-5*00 in 1977 and this in itself has 
had a significant impact on the socio-economics of the region. 
,fIf they catch half a dozen medium sized lobsters weighing 
about 5 lbs they can sell them for Tk 200,00 which is the 
price of 4- maunds of paddy; and going by the yield in the 
past couple of years, it takes about a third of an acre and 
365 days before you can produce that sort of money. So 
where is the incentive for growing more crops ?n.^ Naturally 
the equation is against crop production.
Bajua and Biddya are ideally suited for fishing especially 
for prawns and shrimps. The innumerable creeks and feeder 
canals that run into the fields are shallow and have no 
fast running water and thus are ideal breeding ground for
1. Interview with the fish factory manager, February, 1977.
prawns. Prawns usually breed between late February and April 
and when the rains come and the fields become puddled within 
the artificiallly put up field bunds, the pratras move into 
the fields and grow faster in the fresh rain water free 
from direct tidal flow. Thus, the ’salinity "of.. the • region 
necessitates the artificial field bunds in order to protect 
the crops which then transforms the area into an ideal 
ground for fish culture.
However, not everybody is free to catch the fish. The 
canals running through the fields are khas (Government 
owned). The Government, in order to save any expense 
that might result from litigation arising from fishing 
rights in these canals and also to obtain a lump-sum revenue, 
leases out these canals either to a village appointed 
committee or to a committee appointed lessee, who, in exchange 
for exclusive fishing rights, puts up field bunds and main­
tains them at his own cost. As a result of this arrange­
ment, small peasants many of whom have plots inside the 
field bunds, are deprived of fishing rights on their own 
land. It is claimed, on the other hand, that the man who 
leases-in the canals and subsequently obtains the fishing 
rights in the fields, makes a substantial profit. The 
minimum lease period is five years. In 1974 the cost of 
putting up the field bund round Biddya was approximately 
Tk 30,000 and the return from selling fish in that year 
alone was Tk 150,000.^
In Bajua, on the other hand, since it is embanked, the 
canals are leased to independent lessees, and no committees 
are involved as the lessee does not have to assume the 
additional responsibility of putting up and maintaining 
field bunds round the paddy fields. Consequently, he does
1. Interview with the Chairman of the Union Parisad, January, 
1977.
not have any exclusive rights to fishing in the fields 
but his rights are limited to a well-defined part of the 
canal only, a right which he can sub-let to others, usually 
for a fixed number of days in a specified part of the canal*
Thus, salinity which continues to limit the cropping pattern 
especially in Biddya and the region further south, while 
creating a fishing potential, itself denies access to the 
opportunity created especially for the poor,
2• Local Occupations
There are other distinctly seasonal occupations which are 
characterised by ecological factors especially by the 
proximity of the Sundarbans* One such occupation involves 
visiting the Sundarbans once a year in order to collect 
goal-pata (a kind of durable thatching leaf), wood (mainly 
garan and sundari) and honey to sell usually in Khulna,
The Divisional Forest Office allows a party of two men, 
one opportunity every year to cut and collect wood or goal- 
pata. The party is allowed to spend between thirty and 
forty days in the forest and to collect a maximum boa.t-load 
of 200 maunds of wood or 250 maunds of goal-pata. This 
cargo is taken to Khulna and sold to local traders who may 
re-channel some of it to different parts of the country,
The whole operation takes between six and eight weeks and 
results in a profit of approximately Tk 1,000,00 if it 
involves wood and about Tk 1,500,00 in the case of goal-pata.
Others in the village, usually the low-caste munchis (cane- 
workers), make a living off the ships that anchor in Chalna 
port. They carry daab in their small boats and exchange 
them, instead of selling them, for foreign cigarettes,
6 7
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Plate 3» 1Go1-pata1 - thatching leaves.
Plate I4. 'Bundh* - traditional embankment and irrigation 
in Biddya.
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soaps, jam, powdered-milk, canned orange juice, beer and 
sometimes other alcoholic drinks which they sell in the 
local market at high prices* The usual exchange rate is 
between two and four daabs (a daab costs about 50 paisa) 
to a packet of cigarettes, two daabs to a beer or a jar 
of jam, or between 30 and 50 daabs for a bottle of spirits.
Their 'selling' prices in the Bajua Bazaar are between 
Tk 15 and 20 per packet of cigarettes depending on the brand 
Tk 10 for a beer, Tk 8 for a jar of jam and between Tk 150 
and Tk 200 for a bottle of spirits, depending on the brand.
In Khulna the^e■ eommo-dlties sell srt a 3 0 'par-cent and in 
Baeea, about a 50 per cent higher price.
These goods are not sold in the open market but 'pushed' as 
it were. Although selling in the open market (except alcohol) 
would not be illegal, I am told that if they are seen to 
be sold, the police or some self-proclaimed representative 
of the police will come and sieze them for personal consumption, 
claiming that they are black-market goods, and harass the 
seller. The buyers are usually fish factory officers, the 
CSS Cooperative personnel, the few rich farmers especially 
their adult sons, and the upper-class passengers of the 
motor-launches which shuttle between Chalna, the port and 
Khulna city.
The above therefore is a selection of some ©f'th© nan- 
agricultural occupations in the southern villages which in 
addition to the usual work of cobblers, potters, tailors, 
barbers, iron-smiths, boatmen and various other professions 
which are usually handed down from father to son are stabi­
lizing factors against the forces of polarization and diff­
erentiation.
The point is that these occupations are determined by the 
ecology of the particular region and I have therefore, in
16 9
the next section where I introduce the ecological variables, 
called them 'ecologically based diversification'. Of all 
these occupations, perhaps fishing and employment at the 
fish factory are the most important sources of steady income.
In the northern village fishing is not as important an 
occupation, nor is there a fish factory offering steady 
employment to some of the villagers. There are however, 
some jute mills along the Khulna-Jessore road most of which 
are within 15 miles of the village. Increasing numbers of 
landless peasants are seeking jobs in these factories, 
some have in fact already been employed as factory workers 
for some time and are more or less settled in these areas.
There are others who work for the factories seasonally and 
return to their villages at weeding time and again at 
harvest time, however the economics of the situation would 
appear to work against this practice. They have to bribe 
the officer responsible for recruitment everytime they 
want to go home and also to pay a commission to the middle­
man who recruits workers from the village. Most workers 
have to work for over a year before they can make up for 
their losses incurred in terms of commission paid to the 
middleman and bribe to the Personnel Officer. It is not 
until they are well into their second year that they can 
start saving, working overtime or extra-shifts. The reason 
they continue to shuttle between the village and factory 
instead of settling down near the factory is also basically 
economic. Settling down would involve renting 'proper' 
accommodation for the family and would also deprive them 
of their income from coir making. Besides there are 
sociological reasons for not wanting to be "uprooted" 
from "home" and live like "refugees" in the "towns".
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3. Coir-Making
This process is unique to Jamira and adjacent villages in 
the north* Almost every landless and poor household who 
can somehow save or borrow Tk 150 in order to buy a set of 
equipment is involved in coir-string making. In fact 
coir making is so widespread and the quality of Jamira 
coir-string is so good that it sells at a higher price 
than coir from other villages.
Coir-string making was introduced to the village some twenty 
years ago by one Ammer Ali Sardar, now a shop-keeper in 
the village bazaar. Following a visit to India, he brought 
back with him a machine system made out of wood blocks, 
panels, nuts and bolts the whole set consisting of three 
sections•
The set costs only about Tk 150 which is very cheap for a 
set of machinery that is capable of providing subsistence 
for a family. Most poor and landless peasants however, find 
it beyond their means to buy one. Often three neighbouring 
peasants possess the three parts of a set between them which 
they interchange and share.
This occupation demands no additional skill other than the 
ability and perhaps more importantly, the energy to hammer 
coconut husks for prolonged periods of time and the easily 
learned art of spinning and string-making. Naturally, 
most of the family members, including women and children 
can participate at some stage of the process of production. 
As one walks through the village, the continuous thudding 
coming from all directions indicates how widely the occu­
pation has been adopted. Frequently the whole family 
including three generations may be seen occupied in the 
final stage of coir making in the public pathway in front 
of their small hut.
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The only raw material that is required is coconut husk and 
coconuts are produced abundantly in the area. However, 
with widespread adoption of coir making, the villagers 
cannot depend on the village alone for their material but 
have to travel to different market places to procure it. 
Fifteen years ago, when coir making was just beginning to 
be adopted by some poor peasants, coconut husks used to be 
thrown away, now they are sold for a quarter of a taka.
Next to paddy, coconut is perhaps the most treasured 
produce, A mature coconut tree produces about a hundred 
coconuts every year in two crops, provided the trees are 
cleaned twice a year and well looked after. However, 
villagers are seen in increasing numbers carrying daabs 
in hundreds on their bicycles to Phultala Bazaar, the 
nearest market some six miles from the village. This 
market has metalled road-links to the city, and here the 
villagers sell daabs to the traders, who sell them to 
retailers in the city for consumption by middle class city 
dwellers. It is a status symbol to drink daab-water in 
the cities. A daab costs about 50 paisa in the village, 
one taka in Khulna city and about Tk 1.75 in Dacca. A 
coconut sells for about Tk 1.00 in the village, Tk 1.25 
in Phultala Bazaar, Tk 1,75 in Khulna and Tk 2.50 in Dacca. 
Coconut is not an essential commodity and therefore the 
demand is limited, consequently it is mostly used for 
making oil. Oil pressing, has moved from the village to 
places such as Phultala Bazaar, where machinery has taken 
over from the bullock power used in traditional oil-presses.
EconomicsTof Coir-Making
A single coconut husk costs 25 paisa in the village, one 
hundred cost Tk 22,00 and a thousand which can be procured 
only from the Phultala Bazaar, cost between Tk 180 and
1, They tie daabs in pairs and hang them on the crossbar, 
pushing the bicycle instead of peddling it.
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Tk 190 depending on the size and quality of the coconut 
husks* Twenty husks, costing Tk 5*00 at the local market, 
produces two pounds of coir at the end of one labour day 
and sells on an average for Tk 12.00. In Jamira Bazaar, however, 
two pounds of coir sell for only Tk 10,00,
As previously stated, whole families can participate in 
the production process and at least three people are needed 
in the final phase of making the finished goods. Therefore 
it is difficult to quantify the amount of labour that 
actually goes into making two pounds of finished product.
It seems that the profit margin for 2 pounds of finished 
coir-string is Tk 5.00 if sold in Jamira Bazaar and Tk 7.00 
if sold in Phultala Bazaar, Most peasants therefore, go 
to the Phultala Bazaar once a week when they will probably 
have made some 10 or 12 pounds of finished coir-string.
On their way home from Phultala, they buy coconut husks 
and other necessary industrial products that they need for 
consumption such as ; kerosene, soap, matches and most 
important clothing for the family. These commodities are 
cheaper in Phultala being closer and more easily accessible 
to Khulna, than Jamira Bazaar, In fact except for paddy, 
which is marketed by small farmers in small quantities 
following the harvest, almost everything else, coconut, 
betel-nut (which grows abundantly), vegetables, gur (date- 
palm molasses) daab and most important of all, coir are 
carried to Phultala Bazaar for a better price with the 
added benefit of obtaining industrial produce for consumption 
at a lower price. This not only prevents surplus drain from 
the village, but also strengthens the position of the poorer 
sections of the peasantry against the forces of polarisation.
Thus it seems that in Jamira two factors, the ecologically 
based diversification of the region, and accessibility to 
the market, have played a very important part in the lives 
of the villagers. The average family in Jamira has 5.2
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Plate 9. Road link "between Jamira and Phultala/Naopara.
Plate 10. Small producers carrying their produce to 
the market in Phultala/Noapara.
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Plate 11. •Van* - the most common form of transport 
between Jamira and Phultala/Noapara.
Plates 12, 13 & 11+. 3 stages of coirt’inanuf^ c1}\i©ing.
members and 176 acres of farm area although according to 
the national average they need at least 2.5 acres of land 
for subsistence. That the village has managed to support 
3850 persons to the square mile and that it in fact seems 
to be generally less polarised than the southern villages 
is, one could argue, principally due to these two factors.
There is little in the literature which describes the process 
whereby the ecological diversity of a region provides the 
basis for non-agricultural or agriculture connected employ­
ment for the poorer peasants and how this additional income 
source ultimately restricts the forces of differentiation 
in the region of ecological diversity. With regard to 
accessibility, the usual assumption as seen in the literature 
is that commercialisation or penetration by the market 
economy leads to increased polarisation (Lenin:196l£71-90; 
Shanin:1972;109-119)• In Jamira, however, it appears 
that proximity to market has enabled very small producers 
of what agricultural or non-agricultural commodities there 
are, to come into direct contact with the market. This 
has prevented the emergence of traders in local produce 
as a specialised activity and thus has served as a check 
on polarisation in so far as trading factors are a very 
important source of polarisation. In the southern villages 
on the other hand, limited accessibility has given rise to 
funnelled commercialisation depriving the poor peasants 
of the possibility of by-passing the trading class and 
obtaining a higher price from marketing their produce.
This creates the opportunity for outsiders to step in 
as traders and to siphon off the village surplus which in 
turn weakens the poorer classes and helps accelerate the 
pauperisation process. This point of proximity to market, 
in other words, market accessibility and its effect on 
polarisation and differentiation will be elaborated later.
Section III
The Market
There are two sub-sections here. (l) The Bazaar, which is 
the market centre, and (2) The Labour Market, The first 
describes the centre itself, focusing on what happens on 
a haat-bar, the day of the week when the bazaar sits, 
and analyses some of the forms in which exchange takes 
place and the surplus of the village is siphoned off.
The Labour Market, on the other hand, looks not only into 
the different types of labour and forms of payment but also 
at how labour use is mediated by the ecology of the region.
1. The Bazaar
The Bajua Bazaar is a conglomerate of some three hundred 
stalls. Most of them stand on four bamboo posts and are 
left unoccupied for six days a week until the haat-bar 
when sellers from different parts of the region flock in, 
in their 1 thousand boats1 as O'Malley has described it, 
with whatever agricultural and non-agricultural produce 
they have to sell or exchange. There is the poor peasant 
who is trying to sell a small basketful of sweet potatoes 
or perhaps a chicken in order to buy wheat, as well as the 
surplus farmer who is trying to get a higher price for his 
grain surplus from the urban trader; there are in addition, 
hundreds of retailers, small and large, trying to earn 
either a living or large profits.
Most villages have a bazaar with its grocery shop, barber 
shop, tailor shop, sweet shop, a self-styled chemist 
selling aspirins and entero-viaform tablets and perhaps 
a post office. Most villages have a haat-bar, when buyers
Plate 7. Bajuna bazaar - paddy market.
Plate 8. Bajuna bazaar - general stall.
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and sellers from the adjacent villages meet and the actual 
exchange takes place, but the haat-bar in Bajua is quite 
different, being the largest bazaar in the area.
This is the day when the surplus of the village is siphoned 
off in terms of food and cash crops. In the middle of 
June (1977) which is half-way between harvests, our survey 
showed over 206 maunds of paddy being sold to traders at 
between Tk 82.00 and Tk 85.00 per maund. The comparative 
figure for Jamira was 15 maunds selling at Tk 90.00 per 
maund. Haat-tax in Tk 2,00 per maund in Bajua and 50 paisa 
per maund in Jamira, The tax is extracted by the agents of 
the lessee of the haat (bazaar ground) who is virtually 
free to impose any rate that h© feels he can get away with 
without serious protest from the villagers. The haat is 
leased, as are the canals and rivers, to the highest bidder 
by the Government. Thus, the surplus labour of the wage 
earner and the share-cropper in agriculture is shared 
between the landowner who appropriates the bulk of the 
surplus; the Government in terms of bidding price for the 
lease of the bazaar which enables the lessor to extract a 
higher profit from the buyers and sellers in the bazaar; 
and the trader who keeps the margin between the rate he 
pays to the surplus farmer and the rate he obtains from 
the urban traders and thereafter by various middlemen up 
tp the retailer who ultimately sells to the urban consumers. 
The rate to the consumer is the actual market price of the 
labour process of production.
One interesting feature of the market is the cattle market. 
On the three consecutive haat-bars during which the haat 
was surveyed, an average of 220 cattle, mostly bullocks, 
were brought in two-thirds were sold by the end of the day, 
Haat-tax extraction appeared to be highest in the cattle
market, the rate being 6.25 per cent and 4. per cent of 
the price respectively from the personal buyers and the 
professional buyers. Some were selling their bullocks to 
buy buffaloes so that it would be easier to cultivate as 
the land was getting harder following the erection of the 
embankment. The price of buffaloes was about four times the 
price of a bullock and obviously the buyers were surplus 
farmers. There were others who bought in order to accumulate 
and then to deal for profit. This was a new trend which 
started following the embankment. "Now that we have grass 
for a greater part of the year when we are not growing a 
crop, naturally the cattle get good feed and breed regularly",
I was told by the villagers. This was not possible before 
the embankment was erected as the fields used to be flooded 
with saline water. The villagers added, that "before the 
cows gave birth every two years because they did not get 
enough food, but now they get plenty and breed every year",
Jamira bazaar is much smaller about one-quarter the size 
of Bajua bazaar but the haat sits twice every week. There 
are about 250 bamboo stalls but unlike Bajua, there are 
some good stores selling everything from groceries to saris.
There are as many as five dispensaries supervised by self- 
styled village doctors and purveying homeopathic and 
allopathic medicines. This, however, reflects more than 
competition for the village market; it gives an impression 
of the general ill-health of the villagers« The typical complaints 
are tummy ache, heart-burn and fever. The temporary cures 
range from aspros to antibiotics according to the quack 
doctor's prescription,
Bajua is much better off in this respect. There is a clinic 
run by Save the Children Fund which is open twice a week.
They do not prescribe anything more useful than the ordinary
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analgesic tablets and sulphur drugs but at least they tell 
the patient what is wrong with him and where to go for 
further treatment. The patients here are charged Tk 1.00 
towards the medicine.
2. The Labour Market
The traditional monsoon rice technology is dependent mainly 
on timing, depth and distribution of rainfall which in 
turn determine such operations of cultivation as sowing, 
transplanting, weeding and finally harvesting. These 
operations force even some of the small farmers who are 
otherwise unemployed or under-employed, to hire casual 
workers for at least a few days of the year to meet the 
compulsions of monsoon rice technology. It is therefore 
quite common to find small farmers who would normally hire 
themselves out, hiring-in labour at peak periods. The 
amount of casual wage labour use and to a lesser extent 
the number of days for which such use is required is, 
however, a function of the size of farm, the quality of 
the soil and the number of permanent workers who include 
both family and hired labourers on the farm.
The other operations, especially putting up or repairing 
field-bunds, levelling land, threshing and to some extent 
ploughing are functions which are relatively independent 
of ecological constraints. Consequently, the farmer can 
do most of these himself - unless restricted by health 
or reasons of family status - over a period of time 
without being compelled to hire labour to complete an 
operation within a given period. The large farmers
1. To the extent ploughing cannot be started until after 
the first rain, it is dependent on ecology.
for this sort of operation, generally engage permanent 
workers otherwise known as 'attached workers' who are 
hired for a fixed period of time, usually for six months 
or a year after which the term may be renewed.
Thus, broadly, there are three different kinds of labour: 
family labour, mostly used by the small and middle peasants 
casual wage-labour, hired by most of the family farms and 
managerial farms on a daily basis; and finally, attached 
wage labour which is hired mostly by the surplus farmers 
on a semi-permanent basis. However, in the south, contract 
wage labour may be further divided into two types: those 
who are hired on a yearly or six monthly basis and who 
do a variety of work for the employer in addition to normal 
field work, and those who are hired during the peak season 
usually more in terms of weeks rather than months and who 
work exclusively in the fields in the production process. 
This latter category mostly consists of immigrant labourers 
who flock to the south periodically having done their own 
production work in the north of the district or in the 
adjacent northern districts. This migration is made 
possible by the difference in the timing of peak periods 
at different phases of production such as transplanting, 
weeding, and harvesting, between the northern and the 
southern regions.
Following family labour-use, casual wage-labour use, is 
most widespread in the northern village, Jamira. In the 
south however, contract (short-term, migratory) labour 
use is more widespread than casual labour use. This is 
for two reasons; firstly, although the proportion of 
landless peasants is highest in Bajua, a significant 
percentage are absorbed in occupations other than agricu­
lture, and secondly, the remaining landless peasants
themselves work more often as short-term contract labour 
than casual labour during the peak periods in order to 
avoid competition from the influx of immigrant labourers 
and the consequent depression in wage rate and/or unemploy­
ment during this period.
At the beginning of May the immigrant labourers start 
coming in and by the middle of the month their numbers 
have risen significantly in the bazaar where they hire 
themselves out. However, they show some reluctance to 
be hired for more than a couple of weeks during these 
early weeks of May as they want to be free to secure the 
best possible price from the market by the end of May 
when hardly three weeks are left before transplanting 
must be completed and the demand for labour will easily 
surpass supply and farmers in their panic will yield to 
the bargaining powers of the wage labourers. During the 
final peak weeks more than 500 wage labourers meet in 
the bazaar every haat-bar to hire their labour out and 
wage rates shoot up from Tk 15.00 to Tk 90.00 per week 
plus meals and tobacco. The rate, however, varies 
depending on which village the labourer is hired for.
For a village which is naturally flooded and not embanked, 
the rate is lower; for embanked villages, Bajua, for 
example, the rate is significantly higher as the soil is 
harder and transplanting is more difficult.’*' On the other 
hand, transplanting is easier and faster in a naturally 
flooded and silted village.
That the degree and type of labour use is significantly 
determined by the ecology of the region is clearly
1. On some land, to transplant each seedling involves 
hammering a wooden spike into the ground.
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Table 
; 
3.3.1 
COST 
OF 
PRODUCTION 
AND 
LABOUR 
USE 
(Per 
Acre)
demonstrated in Table 3*3*1* This table shows that average 
labour use varies from 32 man-days in Biddya to 52 man-days 
in Jamira with Bajua at 44 man-days per acre of land.
The corresponding costs of production per acre are Tk 269#
Tk 384 and Tk 4&0 respectively for Biddya, Bajua and Jamira.
Although open labour markets similar to the one in Bajua 
are common in the major bazaars such as Noapara, Shahpur 
and Phultala in the north of the district, such markets 
are considerably smaller and the basis for hiring is 
different. The average holding size being considerably 
smaller, more labour is hired on a casual basis rather 
than on a contract basis,. This means that there is greater 
competition for jobs among the labourers which naturally 
depresses the wage rate. In Jamira, which is extremely 
densely populated and landholding si.ze is very small, 
there is no such labour market. Hired labour is taken 
only on a casual basis and the landless labourers who 
hire themselves out during the peak season are contracted 
beforehand by the landowners. The practice of swopping 
family labour, commonly known as bodly or baegar kishen 
is widespread. During the height of the peak season of, 
say, harvesting this cannot be done as each household is 
usually occupied with their own harvest work and therefore 
labour has to be hired. Labour rates, however, do not 
vary significantly and remain usually between Tk 6.00 and 
Tk 8.00 per day plus a meal. Sometimes, of course, the 
option is given of accepting an additional Tk 2.00 in 
lieu of the meal. Although a peasant is said to eat 
much more food than could be bought with Tk 2,00, in such 
cases, the peasant chooses to take the extra money. The 
logic of this, I am told, is that with Tk 2,00 he can 
buy about 3 pounds of wheat flour which would be enough 
to support a family of five for a day, depending on how
it is prepared*^
Thus the ecology of traditional monsoon rice technology 
by determining the time and extent of certain production 
functions, controls the degree of different kinds of 
labour used (casual wage, contract wage and family labour), 
labour movement and wage rate. Labour mobility, however, 
is itself made possible by the difference in the timing 
of some of these production functions between regions.
The other obvious factors affecting labour use are farm 
size, population density and soil type.
1. Common practice among the landless and some poor peasants 
is, instead of making bread, to stir a quantity of 
wheat flour into boiling water which helps to see them 
through a longer period.
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Section IV
The Politics of Power
It is possible to trace three major sources of power in 
the three villages : (l) Power by means of control of 
land, (2) State Power and (3) Institutional Power.
1. Land-based Power
By controlling the means of production the rich farmers, 
whether landlords primarily renting-out to share-croppers 
or capitalist farmers producing by hiring wage labour, are
1in a position to control the labour market in the villages.
The share-croppers are dependent on their landlords for
access to land unless of course the landlord is a poor
peasant who is renting out all his land either because
his holding is too small to justify cultivation and/or
because he wants to free himself for other, more financially
2
rewarding occupations. Similarly wage labourers are 
especially dependent for their employment on the capitalist 
farmers who are the principal hirers of labour.
The relation of dependence is also established through a 
separate function of the differential access to land, in 
terms of the money lending relation. In so far as the 
money lenders are the rich farmers themselves, their 
power is a direct function of their greater access to 
land. A fourth form of dependence can be traced in the 
trading relation but this depends on the kind of access­
ibility the village has to the (national) market. Where 
accessibility is restricted and only the large traders 
are in a position to arrange the transfer of village 
surplus to the market, the poor peasants who must sell
1. Of the two methods of production - through wage labour 
use and through share-cropping#- whether or not either
form affords greater power to the landlord is discussed 
in chapter i, section III.
2. This is in fact, quite common especially in the northern 
village where average holding sise is very small, see
Table 3®1®5 and Wafr 3'.1.5 .
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in small quantities are dependent on the big traders. To 
the extent, again, that the rich farmers have themselves 
gone into trading, their power is substantially increased. 
This is often the case in Bajua and Biddya. In Jamira, 
however, the market is easily accessible to the village 
and the small peasants are themselves able to take what­
ever agricultural on non-agricultural produce they have 
to sell, to the market without having to go through the 
traders.
The structure of dependence and servility is particularly 
manifest In the two southern villages, Bajua and Biddya, 
where both share-cropping for the largely absentee land-
i
lords and contract labour use are widespread. This sense
of dependence and servility may be expressed in different
ways. Free labour and political support for the landowner,
or for that matter, the employer are two of the many
2
ways such dependence is demonstrated.
Table 3*4*1 shows that in all the three villages the 
better off farmers dominate the Union Parishad (UP), 
the elected local Council. In these 12 member Councils,
1. Contract labourers are usually paid in kind which 
restricts market involvement and therefore capitalism. 
For data on cash and kind payment for wage labour, see 
Table 5.3*3*, Chapter 5.
2. For details of free labour given to landowners by 
share-croppers, see Table 5*4-,8 (col.7), Chapter 5.
3. The number of villages in a Union varies depending on 
the size of the village(s) but there are three Wards 
in each Union and three members are elected from each 
Ward, Every Union has an elected Chairman and two 
Government nominated women members. The Chairman gets 
a remuneration of Tk 300 and the members Tk 100 per 
month. The election of the Union Parishad is held, or 
supposed to be held every 5 years.
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AND 
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PARISHAD 
ME
M
BE
R
S
one member is the Chairman and 2 are nominated women 
members, and 7, 9 and 6 members respectively from Bajua 
Biddya and Jamira come from the self-sufficient classes 
and above.^
Table 3*4-*2 demonstrates that of these members the rich 
and the surplus farmers in all the three villages over­
whelmingly use wage labour. Although no clear pattern 
emerges from their land renting behaviour, it is clear 
that in the two southern villages, especially in Biddya, 
rent relation is quite important to these members.
Although I do not have data on the voting behaviour of 
the wage labourers and the share-croppers, it would not 
be unjustified to assume that the element of dependence 
of the employee on the employer in a labour surplus economy 
and of the share-cropper on the landowner in a land 
shortage situation, has contributed significantly to 
the election of members from the better off classes who 
now dominate in the Parishad.
2. State Power
This is manifested primarily through the functions of the 
Union Parishad, the police and the leaseholders of the haat
The Union Parishad has the power to take decisions in 
local affairs, te execute the decisions of State officials, 
to mediate in disputes, to distribute grain if this is 
available from the Government, to organise Food for Work 
Programmes and to liase with the Government in any matter.
1. Although Table 3.4-.1 details- the relationship between 
the political party affiliatian and the economic back­
ground of the Council members, it is not directly rele­
vant to this discussion, The structure and class base 
of the major political parties is discussed in Chapter 1 
Section II.3.
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Thus it is not the remuneration that attracts people to
contest the election but the prospect of benefits at
each level of their operation that draws them into politics
In 1977, for instance, most of a truck load of Government
rice to be distributed among the poor peasants in Jamira,
was sold on the black-market and the proceeds shared among
1the UP members and the Chairman,
As shown in table the better-off peasants dominate
the UP in all three villages. Their membership of the 
Parishad strengthens and institutionalises their power 
base as the hirers of labour and renters-out of land,
"Their power lies" explained the Imam of the village 
mosque, "on the one hand in the fact that they are elected 
members, and on the other in the assumption that anything 
they do has the sanction of the State."
The power of the police, on the other hand, lies not in 
their responsibility in enforcing law and order in 
the villages but in their ability to create conditions 
for extracting surplus from the middle peasants who are 
neither too poor, nor influential enough to be able to 
stand up to the police. The police have, in practice, 
the power to arrest anybody at any time without having 
to give any reason let alone have a warrant from the 
Court, and to keep him in their custody for any length 
of time.
The type and degree of their operations vary depending on 
the potential of the area. For instance, in the south 
the police were alleged to have helped black-marketeers
1, Only some 30 families were given any rice and then 
no more than 2 pounds per family.
and UP members in unloading imported grain from Government 
barges in transit from Ghalna Port to Khulna, When this 
was reported the police rounded up half a dozen landless 
labourers and charged them with allegedly working for 
a 'notorious gang' and transferring a few tons of Government 
rice in the middle of the night, A few bags of wheat 
were stacked in front of the Chief Officer’s room and 
confessions were obtained to the effect that the peasants
■j
had been caught 'red-handed1. Once the defenceless 
peasants are in police custody, confessions are obtained 
easily by promises of release or torture.
In the northern village, Jamira, the police picked up 
one member of a notorious gang in 1975 and made him 
burn, approver * This man gave names to the police
alleging that they were his 'mates'. The names were in 
fact all of respectable middle peasants with no criminal 
records but the police picked them up one by one and made 
them pay to be released. Three of these peasants had to 
sell their land in order to have themselves set free.
Two members of the Union were the go-betweens who nego­
tiated the sum of the bribe for their release and are
2
said to have had their share in the deal.
The link between the police and the UP members is crucial 
to both. The police need the support of the Union Parishad 
in their strategy of extracting money from the villagers, 
and the UP members need the police to condone their 
appropriation of Government aid and other benefits.
1. Interviewing local people revealed that at least i 
out of these six people worked the day before in the 
fields and were in their houses asleep throughout the 
night,
2. Having learnt this I reported the matter to the higher 
authorities who said that this was not uncommon and 
assured me that, should they be innocent they would be 
released. The innocent peasants were finally released 
in March 1978.
Thus, in land based power the big farmers through the 
instruments of rent relations, wage-labour relations , 
usury and trade relations tie the poorer sections of the 
peasantry into a structure of dependence and servility 
and through these relations control the local council. 
This not only strengthens the basis of their power but 
also draws them closer to the different organs of power 
such as the police and the bureaucracy. The ultimate 
power of the rich farmers is seen in the alliances that 
emerge from interactions between themselves, the police 
and the bureaucracy. The ecological basis of this 
power structure lies in the fact that the big farmers 
in the south are not the product of a natural process 
of polarisation over the years but a direct result of 
the settlement schemes which were dictated largely by 
the ecology of the Sundarbans.
* Q ^-a. e jt %J)
3. Institutional Power
This is, in a way, restricted to Bajua, one of the 
southern villages, and the elements here are the fish 
factory, the bank and the cooperative organisation called 
the Christian Service Society (CSS),
The power of the fish factory management rests on its 
ability to offer or terminate employment in the factory.
The factory employs, as mentioned previously, over 300 
workers from the village mostly unskilled labourers.
There is no union to look after the interests of the 
workers and their wage rate has not increased in the past 
three years (1974--1977) , These workers are employed 
for most of the year in the factory and naturally they 
owe allegiance to the management especially since there 
is no workerfs union. It was not possible to interview 
all the workers individually but a few did claim that the 
subject of who they might vote for had been discussed 
but casually. This is not to suggest that there was 
some alliance between the management and a particular 
candidate, but one could say that an interested party 
might make use of the situation, in which case the manage­
ment would wield considerable power.
The bank extends loans of all kinds to 'deserving' clients 
but most of these loans run into hundreds rather than 
thousands of taka. The bank's two principal clients 
are the fish factory and the CSS. It is this tripartite 
'alliance* that forms the basis of institutional power 
in Bajua. The bank and the CSS both extend credit at 
the same interest rate but the CSS gives credit exclusively 
to its IRRI blocks and normally not to individuals. The 
point is that should the IRRI block manager fall out of 
favour with the CSS and decide to borrow money from the
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bank he would put the bank manager in a difficult situation as 
he could not lend him money if this were going to make the 
CSS authorities unhappy. Similarly, if a landlord disagreed 
with the CSS and refused to rent his land out to the CSS 
IRRI block he could find himself in the same sort of difficulty 
if he were to seek a loan from the bank. After all, it is 
the capital of the CSS and fish factory which made this 
bank possible. Therefore, it is not easy, nor is it necessary 
for the bank to do anythink that might identify it as a 
rival institution.
It is however, difficult to see any one component or the 
alliance as a whole serving the interests of the landed 
class especially if the interests of the latter was in 
conflict with the interests of any one component in the 
alliance. The strength of the alliance lies primai'ily 
in its ability to virtually monopolize investment and 
cash capital and these over-riding interests seem to be 
self-perpetuating as long as the three components continue 
to function.
Thus, it seems that of the major power bases in the three 
villages, land-based power, State power and institutional 
power, the first two are linked in that they are virtually 
inseparable. The institutional base on the other hand, 
must maintain its separation to avoid capitulation. The 
only broad based link that exists is perhaps that although 
the three sources have different levels of power they 
share the some class culture.
The ecological basis of the institutional power base, 
is difficult to see. The point is, however, that the 
institutional structure depends on the success of each 
of its components which are themselves ecologically 
based. The fish factory, for example, is dependent
on "the availability of fish in the area and the CSS and 
the bank on their ability to continue to extend loans.
Whether or not the CSS continues to operate depends on 
the success of IRRI cultivation in the area. Extension 
of loans against other crops would not be justified in 
that the low productivity of other crops does not guarantee 
repayment. Therefore it could be argued that the basis 
of these two components within the institutional power 
structure is ecological. As for the bank, as has been 
argued earlier, its viability is entirely dependent on 
the success of the CSS and the factory.
So far in this chapter I have outlined the ecological 
differences between the three villages, their demography 
and the agrarian structure, the occupations of the villagers, 
the market, particularly the labour market, and finally, 
the structure of power politics.
In terms of ecology, the northern village, Jamira, seems 
to be the most productive of the three villages. However, 
this does not mean that Jamira is the most fertile of the 
three villages. Soil fertility depends not only on average 
production per acre but also on factors such as labour and 
fertilizer inputs.
In terms of cropping pattern we have seen that while Biddya 
is strictly a mono-crop area producing one aman crop only, 
Bajua has been, at least theoretically$ transformed into 
a multi-crop area although rice production has fallen 
drastically due not so much to ecology as to the disregard 
of the importance of ecology in the process of enforcing 
technological advancement; in other words, disregarding 
the elevation factor of the village in the construction 
of the embankment. The embankment has not only caused a 
drastic fall in production in Bajua itself, It has also
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as a result of greater water pressure and over silting 
significantly reduced yields in Biddya. Jamira, on the 
other hand, produces a mixed aus-aman crop on most of 
its cultivated land which is low lying and there is 
rabi crop production, water melon, til etc. on the higher 
land •
The effect of this cropping pattern, especially in the two 
southern villages has been very significant. There has 
been substantial out-migration especially of the landless 
peasants from Biddya. It is not certain how many of these 
people left the village directly as a result of the fall 
in production but this certainly was mentioned as one 
of the reasons.
In Bajua, on the other hand, landlessness has increased 
dramatically over the past few years. The poor and even 
some middle peasants who have been thrown into confusion 
by the drastic fall in production have increasingly been 
seeking support from subsidiary occupations primarily 
from fishing and fish trading which owes much to the 
salinity of the area. The salinity of the region necess­
itated field bunds to protect the crops which in turn 
helpd pisciculture. However, while the field bunds offer 
the potential for greater ecological diversification 
allowing villagers greater income sources, the conditions 
under which the field bunds are built and maintained 
themselves deny the people the right of fishing.
In Jamira, we have seen that most of the cultivated land 
is low-lying beel which does not dry up early enough to 
allow a winter crop. Pressure on the land is increasing 
rapidly, causing greater fragmentation which in turn 
forces more and more people to turn to coir-making. Although
coir-making is the most important single occupation 
especially of the landless and the poor peasants, they 
also produce gur, betel nut and coconut and sell them 
directly in Phultala or Woapara market which are directly 
linked to the national market. Thus Jamira offers a much 
greater degree of ecological diversification and 
unlike the southern villages the opportunities created 
by this which benefit especially the poorer sections of 
the population are not offset by other factors. This 
helps arrest the process of differentiation.
However, another ecological variable, accessibility to the 
market has a direct bearing both on ecological diversification 
which strengthens the.position of the poorer peasantry, and 
other market forces leading to polarisation betx^een 
the poor and the rich. This finally ©merger as one 
of the most important findings of this study. While in 
the case of Bajua and Biddya their lack of accessibility 
to the market has caused a situation that I have called 
funnelled commercialisation where the small peasant is 
prevented from participating in the market; in Jamira, 
we find a situation where the relative accessibility makes 
it possible for the small peasants to take their commodities 
to the market themselves without having to go through 
trading intermediaries. This I have called blanket 
commercialisation.
I have also traced the major sources of power in these 
three villages as (l) land-based power, (2) State power 
and (3) institutional power and have explained how any 
one of these can affect the voting behaviour of the people.
It has been argued that of the three components the 
first two are directly and the last indirectly affected 
by ecology.
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The big farmers of the south who derive their power from 
tying the poorer peasants through the instruments of rent, 
wage and other relations, themselves emerged as a result 
of the ecological compulsions of land settlement in the 
south. As for State power, it has been argued that control 
of the organs of State power is a direct function of 
access to land.
Thus, at an empirical level there is evidence to suggest 
a broad correspondence between ecology and the way in 
which rural societies are structured. However, this 
does not explain the precise nature of the relationship 
between ecology and class relations in rural areas. In 
order to do this, it is necessary to select a set of 
ecological variables and a set of social variables and 
from these to formulate certain hypotheses which can be 
tested against our data. In the next section the ecolo­
gical variables will be introduced. However, before the 
social variables can be examined and seen in relation 
to the ecological variables, the mechanisms of production, 
distribution and circulation in rural areas through which 
a part of the product of agriculture is appropriated from 
the direct producers, in other words, the relations of 
production must be understood. Without this it would be 
impossible to identify the classes which are 'related 
through a nexus of exploitation* and are located in 
different modes of production (Alavi:1973; Abdullah:1976; 
Djurfeldt and Lindberg:1975:118-173)•
Section V
The Ecological Variables
Originally it was planned to look primarily at three 
ecological variables : natural soil fertility, accessibility 
to market and cropping pattern. However, eventually the 
last of these three variables had to be dropped as there 
was no significant difference in the cropping pattern so 
far as the principal crop i.e. rice, was concerned.
The second of the ecological variables, accessibility to 
market is measured in terras of distance, time and cost 
of transport to and from the market and this is shown in 
Table 3*5.1 which is discussed later. Real difficulty 
however, was encountered in trying to measure natural 
soil fertility. It proved impossible to isolate with any 
degree of statistical significance, those variables which 
were directly and functionally interrelated. In the event 
much simpler and cruder measures such as average labour 
productivity and average land productivity had to be 
adopted. The first is a measure of the units of output 
per man-day of labour in each village'*' and the second, 
the units of output per acre of land. Admittedly these 
have their problems as they are only partial measures 
that do not take into account the variation in other 
factors so that, for instance, where there is a difference 
in land productivity between two villages we cannot 
immediately say that this is due to any intrinsic quality 
of the soil. It could equally well be that more labour is 
used in that village and therefore more is produced per 
acre.
1. In fact this represents the total output for the village 
divided by the total labour input.
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In Table 3.5.2 we see that Jamira has the highest land, 
productivity, followed by Biddya, then Bajua (col.4).
This table also shows that Jamira has the second lowest 
labour productivity so that one might argue that the high 
land productivity in Jamira is due to a high labour input.
The same however, would not hold for Bajua where labour 
input per unit of produce is also very high - higher than 
Jamira in fact because the labour productivity coefficient 
is only .31 compared to .37 in Jamira (col.3) - but land 
productivity is the lowest of the three villages at only 
10.2 maunds per acre. Given the observed similarity in 
agronomical practices between the three villages, differences^ 
in land and labour productivity figures are almost certain 
to be due to basic soil properties.
In addition, I have used, as a measure of the pressure on 
land, a composite index of what I have called 'land in 
efficiency units' per household. If the amount of land 
available per household was calculated this alone would 
not give any real idea of the pressure on land. Clearly, 
if for instance, in one area each household has, say 2 
acres of land, and in another each household also has 2 
acres of land but in the first village the land in twice 
as productive, then in fact the pressure is twice as high 
in the second village. Thus, what actually matters is 
not so much the extent of the land as how much produce it 
will give. Land in efficiency units therefore is calculated 
by multiplying the average land per household in each 
village by an index of land productivity. For this index 
Bajua(the least productive village) is taken as the base 
i.e. land productivity of 100. The result is a single
1. The difference between the villages in land and labour
productivity has been tested and found to be statistically 
significant. See Appendix IV.
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measure incorporating both land available and .land productivity 
per household.
On the basis of this composite index of the pressure on 
land of the three villages, Bajua ranks lowest at 2.36 
acres per household; Jamira second at 3.36 acres and 
Biddya highest but only marginally higher than Jamira at 
3.37 acres of land in efficiency units per household.
As regards accessibility, it can be seen from Table 3.5.1 
that Bajua and Biddya are almost equally accessible or 
more appropriately inaccessible to the market and they 
are both less accessible than Jamira which is very close 
to two large and important centres connected to the 
national market.^ Bajua and Biddya are both relatively 
distant from a market although Bajua has a local haat of 
some importance. Therefore, in Table 3.5.2 they are ordered 
as s Jamiras high accessibility $ Bajua and B±ddyap low 
accessibilityo
In the final analysis I have added another variable and 
have called it 1 ecologically based diversification1.
This variable is not so much agricultural as horticultural 
or perhaps one might say an agriculture connected non- 
agricultural activity which may be made possible or impos­
sible as the case may be by ecological factors (Table 3.5.2; 
col.7).
While Biddya and Bajua are almost entirely mono-cropped 
areas, Jamira, although mono-cropped from the rice crop 
point of view, does have certain other commercially 
valuable products such as coconuts, date-palm especially 
its juice which is made into gur and chewing nuts.
1. The two market centres are Phultala and Noapara, which 
are 6 and 7 miles respectively from the village.
Coconuts are, of course, the most valuable. They sell 
as daaba as well as narkel. In the latter case, the coconut 
flesh is removed, dried and processed into oil and the 
husk is made into coir which is in fact the primary raw 
material for a very important domestic industry in Jamira.
In this sense of diversification there seems to be some 
ecological constraint in the other two villages largely 
due to the very high salinity of the water for the greater 
of theyear* The fish factory in Bajua, however, provides 
employment which could in fact be expanded because of the 
increasing demand for fish abroad. Fishing, as described 
earlier is a source of income for independent, poor and 
landless peasants who fish, and sell their catch to the 
factory. This might be described as a source of income 
which has a moderate degree of dynamism. This of course, 
could be said to be due to ecology only in so far as the 
location of the factory is dictated by the availability 
of fish.
If therefore, we take ecologically based diversification 
as a variable, then we can say that in this sense, Jamira 
ranks high and Bajua and Biddya both low, there being no 
significant difference, in considering this variable, 
between the two southern villages.
Thus, our original ecological variables have been altered 
to (i) Land in Efficiency Units; (ii) Labour Productivity; 
(iii) Accessibility; and (iv) Ecologically Based Diversi­
fication,
These are the indices of ecological difference between the 
three villages, Jamira in the north and Bajua and Biddya 
in the south. It may now be possible to ascertain whether
these variables are in some way involved in determining 
the differences in class structure in the three villages.
However, before this is done, in other words, before we 
examine how and under what circumstances ecology might affect 
class relations, it is in order to examine the objective 
of this study in the broader context of the man-nature 
relationship.
CHAPTER I
ECOLOGY AND RURAL CLASS STRUCTURE : SOME THEORETICAL ISSUES 
Section I
Ma.ior Concepts and Themes of Ecology
The question of man’s relationship with nature, or more 
specifically the influence of the environment or the 
natural setting of a habitat on social life, has been a 
question that has exercised some of the great minds of the 
social sciences. These have included biologists, geographers, 
ecologists and most of all social anthropologists. Some, 
especially the geographical determinists, have been rightly, 
if more ruthlessly than is strictly necessary, discredited, 
while others who in fact have not committed themselves one 
way or the other seem to have survived.
They have broadly put the question in terms of nature and 
culture, or human society in general in its natural setting 
in the environment. In the first part of this chapter 
I shall discuss their approach to the notion of society 
in relation to environment and follow this by an analysis 
of some of the well-known and widely taught approaches by 
various eminent non-Marxist scholars. Finally, I shall 
present an alternative option in terms of the Marxist 
conceptualization of society.
1. The Importance of the Ecological Approach
While at the present time the discussion relating to the 
importance of nature, environment and more specifically, 
ecology has died down somewhat, the presumption seems to 
be that it is settled though one does not quite know in
what direction. However, many social scientists, especially 
social and economic anthropologists, implicitly assume that 
eco-system variables are of really fundamental importance.
Thus, Nicholas states
the chief value of an ecological approach in the 
analysis of village life in the Bengal delta is that 
it takes the investigation beneath some of the processes 
of migration, settlement and village formation to 
underlying causes ... Migration, settlement and village 
formation are 'processes* - ordered, repetitive actions 
of human groups deriving their livelihoods from parti­
cular natural environments (Nicholas, R.: 1962:4-).
Nicholas makes what is essentially a comparative and 
contrastive study of two villages located in two different 
ecological zones of the Bengal delta and tries to determine 
patterns of social life attributable to the environment 
by holding what he calls the 1 technological-economic 
component1 of ecology constant.
Similarly, Bertocci, follox^ing Nicholas and Geertz, attempts 
to show a postulated relationship between the elaboration 
of social structure - class and power relations - and an 
ecologically adaptive mode of subsistence. The relation­
ship between a population of a certain size and density, 
its productive technology and a monsoon climate in a 
deltaic terrain is seen by Bertocci as a constraining, 
not a determining factor.
The diachromic interaction of population, environment 
and technology [in the villages studied] have contri­
buted to an economy of scarcity which has had a pri­
mordial influence on the pattern and quality of social 
life in these villages. Firstly, the relative recency 
of settlement and a limited range of variation in the 
size of land-holding have resulted in surprisingly 
little differentiated occupational structure in the 
villages. Secondly, this occupational pattern has 
been maintained and in turn affects the pattern of 
social stratification in that population densities
have affected land ownership and thus the accumulation 
of wealth; and finally, competition for land has 
rendered conflict endemic to the area (Bertocci:1970:37)•
In the Soviet Union, Shanin suggests that the impact of 
natural factors reinforced by a relative rigidity in 
crop rotation (which itself may be due to ecology) make 
for 'bad' and 'good1 agricultural years (Shanin:1972:112). 
Thus for any serious study, a budget for example, repre­
sentative samples are drawn from the main ^agricultural 
regions which are : (i) the Grain-Deficit Zone, (ii) the 
Grain Surplus Zone, and (iii) the North Caucasus (lbid:113). 
'The considerable social and economic differences between 
the various regions of rural Russia were the consequences 
of vastly different geographical situations and diverse 
histories' (Ibid:122),
Many social science scholars especially in rural study 
programmes in the LDCs, instead of taking a village 
from every administrative unit or as a random special unit, 
have emphasised the need for studying representative 
villages from different ecological settings without 
questioning their criteria for doing so* This shows 
that their validity is taken to be self-evident and 
that these researchers have accepted the hypothesis 
that the eco-system is a major determining variable in 
the social system of a village,
2. Concepts of Ecology
The study of the ecosystem is the explicit elucidation 
of the structure and functions of a community and its 
environment with the ultimate aim of the quantification 
of the links between the components (Stoddart:1965;
Ackerman:1963; Hall and Fagen:1956), In other words, a 
study of environmental relationships.
Man continually finds himself in situations where a 
number of different choices or strategies may be available 
to wrest a living from his environment. One way would 
be to alter or change the environment to meet his needs.
The degree of change is related to the degree of techno­
logical development and manpower mobilisation. The former 
(technology) and in some cases the latter (mobilisation) 
however, themselves initially depend on environment.
The widespread interest in ecology not only in the field 
of geography but throughout the social sciences has been
encouraged ever since Tansely introduced the term in the
1thirties by the flexibility and elasticity of the
o
definition of the term. Although it is not necessary 
to go into this, it should be noted that the difference 
between a sociological approach - the study of the spatial 
and temporal relations of human beings -as affected by 
environmental forces (Park:1936j Mckenzie:1926; Hawley:1950) 
an anthropological approach - the processes by which 
society adapts to its flocal! environment (Steward:1955); 
and an (eco) systems approach in which it is defined 
as the study of man living in and interacting with his 
environment (Fosberg:1963; English and Mayfield:1972) 
must be arbitrary.
But whichever way ecosystems is defined, points of contact 
between man and environment, interactions between cultural 
systems and their surroundings have stubbqrnly remained 
at the centre of the ecological discipline. By extension, 
similar definitions of ecology find a place in the lit­
erature of anthropology, psychology, political science
1. Tansely, A.G.!1935:"The Use and Abuse of Vegetational 
Concepts in Terms", Ecology, Vol.l6 (1935) pp.284-307.
2, See Steward:1955; Ackerman:1936;also Sprout^H, and M e:1965 
for an excellent survey of the literature on ecological 
studies. The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs,
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965.
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and geography. In geography, there have been two major 
thrusts, one towards cultural ecology and the other 
towards ecosystems.
Ecology explained away from its biological connotations 
(living organisms etc.) and seen more in the context of 
man and his environment, must involve the study of all 
the dynamics of human environmental interactions and there 
is no need to segregate these. Ideally, the entire 
range of social and natural phenomena are comprehended 
in a single eco-system, thus disposing of the artificial 
separation of man and nature.
In the absence of a broad theoretical framework, however, 
it seems understandably to have been extremely difficult 
for most cultural ecologists, ecosystem analysts and 
indeed anthropologists to handle this mass of material. 
Consequently they have concentrated on explaining specific 
forms and sets of relationships with the intent of expanding 
the investigations in other components and ultimately 
gaining insight into the total man-environment system.
As a result most of these studies tend to stress process. 
to articulate what is happening in a system, rather than 
its content or more appropriately its internal structure© 
Consequently theory building has become difficult.
In the following pages I shall discuss the works of some 
of these scholars in the context of the man-environment 
relationship emphasising specific correspondence between, 
for example, the distribution of ethnic groups and fspecific 
ecologic niches1 (Barth;19f>6), diversity of environment 
and trading specialization (Flannery:1965)* land-use and 
family structure (Sahlingsl957) and population pressure and 
agricultural pattern (Dumond:196l; Geertz:1963; Boserup:1970).
I shall however, begin by expounding the position of 
Julian Steward one of the best known exponents of cultural 
ecology, with regard to the man-nature interaction.
Since cultural ecology is not generally understood it 
it necessary to begin by showing wherein it differs 
from other concepts of ecology and then to demonstrate 
how it must supplement the usual historical approach 
of anthropology in order to determine the creative 
process involved in the adaptation of culture to its 
environment (Steward:1955:30).
Orthodox ecological studies have centered on the inter­
action of physical, biological and cultural features 
within a locale or unit of territory and have been 
essentially descriptive. While biological ecology emph­
asises the interaction within the community of plants 
and animals in a given environment, social or human ecology 
focuses on the human community as the unit of study. If 
therefore, the nature of human communities is the object 
of social or huma'n ecology elucidation will be possible 
by means of cultural historical concepts. Steward main­
tains however, that historical methods alone are inade­
quate.
Cultural ecology, for Steward, differs from human and 
social ecology in seeking to explain the origin of 
particular cultural features and patterns which characterize 
different areas rather than in deriving general principles 
applicable to any cultural-environmental situation. It 
differs from the relativistic and neo-evolutionist con­
ceptions of culture history in that it introduces the 
local environment as an 'extra-cultural' factor.
Thus reacting to the emphasis which other scholars have 
placed on specific cultural histories or unique cultural 
patterns as explanation for the origin of cultural features 
and cultural change, Steward stresses the processes of
adaptation to local environments as a source of change in 
social institutions and human behaviour. But he is not 
an environmental determinist. For him man by virtue of 
his cultural capacities is a causative agent in environ­
mental change. But no broad generalisations can be made 
concerning man-nature relationship; detailed specific 
investigation of these interactions must be the basis for 
theory building. Thus cultural ecology presents both a 
problem and a method. The problem is to ascertain whether 
the adjustment of a human society to the environment 
requires a particular mode of behaviour or whether it permits 
a certain range of possible behaviour patterns. Steward's 
'methods', of cultural ecology stresses the analysis of 
the relationships between the environment and exploitative 
technology, those patterns of human behaviour involved in 
environmental exploitation, and the relationships between 
these behavioural patterns and other aspects of culture.
By his limited definition of what he calls the 'culture 
core', by which he refers to that part of culture 'closely 
related to subsistence activities and economic arrangements', 
denoting the rest of the culture as 'secondary', indeter­
minately determined by random innovations or by diffusions 
(lbid:37), Steward avoids the gross generalizations that 
previously placed similar research in disrepute.
As for ecosystems analyses, Stoddart suggests four advantages 
(1) they treat man and environment within a single frame­
work; (2) they are structured in a rational way; (3) they 
analyse the functioning of systems, not simply their form; 
and (4) they are a special type of general systems with 
all that implies (Stoddart:1965). Stoddart's suggestions 
however, remain rather general. Consequently, despite the 
wide applicability of the ecosystem approach to topics 
of geographical concern there have been few specific 
studies which can be said to have demonstrated its poten-
tiality. One exception is Clifford Geertz, whose work 
is discussed below.
Some of the better known geographers such as Huntington 
and Semple who suggested that environment had a causative 
influence on the evolution of human civilizations, have 
been discredited as 'environmental determinists'. Their 
critics, believe that the role of environment in influencing
human behaviour is prohibitive and permissive but not
creative. It allows man to carry on some kinds of activities 
and prevents others (compare with Hawley:1950; Forde:1919; 
Bates:1953)* Here, in common with the work of other human 
ecologists, who are for the most part more anthropologists 
than geographers (or ecologists), there is a characteristic 
emphasis on 'culture'. It is suggested that virtually 
everything (perhaps other than crude environment) is 
culture. Therefore, nothing can determine culture except 
culture itself, A lower level of culture through inter­
action, produces a higher form of culture. As for the
environment, this may or may not affect culture0 The 
important point to note here is that those who have, in 
fact, observed some positive correspondence between 
environment and culture as noted earlier, have not been 
discredited as environmental determinists. Others while 
discussing ecology and culture have tactfully avoided 
the debate by avoiding the crucial questions and have 
chosen to slip into the relatively non-controversial 
arena of cultural anthropology.
Forde in summarizing their views, states that
between the physical evnironment and human activity 
there is always a middle term, a collection of specific 
objectives and values, a body of knowledge and belief ; 
in other words, a culture pattern. That the culture
1, Huntington, E: 1959: Mainsprings of Givilization, Mentor 
Books, The Hew American Library and
Semple, E.C.:1931 : Geography of the Mediterranean Region, 
Henry Holt, New York.
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itself is not static that it is adaptable and modi­
fiable in relation to physical conditions, must not be 
allowed to obscure the fact that adaptation proceeds 
by discoveries and inventions which are themselves in 
no sense inevitable and which are, in any individual 
community, nearly all of them acquisitions or impositions 
from without (Forde ; 194-9 :4-63) ,
If geographical determinism fails to account for the 
existence and distribution of economies, economic 
determinism is equally inadequate in accounting for the 
social and political organisations which may be found 
in the cultures based on those economies. Indeed the 
economy may owe as much to the social and ritual pattern 
as does the character of society to the economy. The 
possessions of particular methods of hunting or cultiv­
ating, of certain cultivated plants or domestic animals, 
in no wise defines the pattern of society. Again there 
is interaction on a new plane. As physical conditions 
may limit the possibilities of the economy, so the 
economy may in turn be a limiting or stimulating factor 
in relation to the size, density and stability of human 
settlement, and to the scale of social and political 
unit. The tenure and transmission of land and other 
property, the development and relations of social classes 
the nature of government, the religious and ceremonial 
life - all these are parts of social superstructure, 
the development of which is conditioned not only by 
the foundations of habitat and economy, but by complex 
interactions within its own fabric and by external 
contacts, often largely indifferent to both the phy­
sical background and to the basic economy alike (Ibid:90)
Thus Forde describes both the permissive and prohibitive 
influence of environment and economy and does not clarify 
his position further.
The importance of ecological factors in the form and 
distribution of cultures has usually been analysed by 
means of a culture area concept which refers to a construct 
of behavioural uniformities which occur within an area of 
environmental uniformities. It is assumed that cultural 
and natural areas are generally coterminous because the 
culture represents an adjustment to the particular envi­
ronment (Steward:1955:36). However, with regard to Asia 
such attempts at analysis have met with difficulties
(Bacon:194-6» Kroeber: 194-7) • Thus the environment of any 
one ethnic group is on the one hand, defined by natural 
conditions, and on the other by the presence and activities 
of other ethnic groups on which it depends* As Kroeber 
emphasises 'culture area classifications are essentially 
ecologic; thus detailed ecologic considerations rather 
than geographical areas of sub-continental size, should 
offer the point of departure' (Kroeber:1947:330)•
Similarly Barth in his study of the Pathans, Kohistanis 
and Gujars, the three major ethnic groups in northern 
Pakistan, suggests that their distribution is controlled 
not by objective and fixed 'natural areas' but by the 
distribution of the specific ecological niches which the 
group, with its particular economic and political organ­
isation, is able to exploit (Barth:1956:1088) ,
Barth points out that a single valley system might be 
occupied by three distinct ethnic groups, each of which 
occupied only a portion of the total resources, leaving 
the rest open for other groups to exploit. Thus the 
sedentary agriculturalists practiced intensive irrigation 
agriculture on the river flood plain, growing two crops 
a year and never moving to higher elevations; the second 
group raised one crop a year on the same flood plain but 
migrated annually with their flocks up through the five 
seasonal camp-sites to high mountain meadows; and finally 
the pastoral nomads who were assimilated into the society 
of the intensive agriculturalists as a special 'herder 
caste' contributing milk and meat in exchange for grain 
and were permitted to use prime grazing land not needed 
by the sedentary farmers (Ibid).
Barth does not however, pose himself the critical questions. 
Why, for example, did the second group migrate annually 
to higher elevations ? Why was the third group, the
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pastoral nomads, permitted to use land not needed by 
the farmers ?
His culture and natural area concept does not seem to 
answer these questions nor explain the situation. Clearly, 
it was the ecological constraint in that there was either 
no adequate agricultural land on the river flood plain 
or the fertility of the soil did not produce enough to 
support all three groups round the year.
The only possible explanation for the situation is that 
the first group, who were obviously the dominant class 
(being the only group having access to agricultural land 
and military power) needed the help of the second group 
during the period of 'intensive cultivation' and shared 
their surplus grain with this group. The remaining surplus 
was bartered against the product of the third group. Thus 
it was the ecological constraint (not being endowed with 
sufficiently fertile land to support its population) 
that produced this situation in which there was a dominant 
class - 'militarily more powerful', and two dependent 
classes who eked out their livelihood through a distinct 
pattern of division of labour, which itself was made 
possible by the diversity of the environment.
Flannery basing his arguments on a study of greater 
Mesopotamia, broadly the area drained by the tributaries 
of Shatt-al-Arab, argued this point and states quite 
categorically that the 'diversity of environments made 
village specialization in certain commodities the best 
means of adapting to the area'1(Flannery:1965s1256). 
Elsewhere he argues that by 4-000 B.C. the redistributive 
economy had produced regional temple-and-market towns 
which regulated the produce of a symbiotic nature of 
agriculturists engaged in intensive irrigation and perhaps
even traders who dealt in copper, salt, asphalt, fish 
and regional fruits (Hole et al:1965:1Q5-106)•
An interesting correspondence between both managerial 
function and the development of a leadership role with 
ecology has been argued by Anthony Leeds. Leeds based 
his study of the ecological foundations of chieftainship 
on the Yaruro Indians of Venezuela. He points out that 
the absolute size of work groups, achievable in the 
Yaruro habitat, is limited not only by the dispersed 
locations and temporal harvest patterns of resources, 
but also by the low absolute productivity of the ecology. 
Leeds suggests that the dispersive habitat, the low- 
level of technology and the lack of clear harvest surpluses 
together preclude any continuing managerial function
(Leeds:1960:378-392)•
In a similar vein, Sahlins has analysed the pattern of 
organisation itself with regard to land-use and produ­
ctivity. By comparing family organization and patterns of 
land utilization in two regions of Fizi, Sahlins has 
argued that the patterns of land-use are necessary deter­
mining conditions of family structure. He suggests that 
the maintenance of the traditional extended family is 
dependent on strategic exploitation of productive lands 
distant from the village site and puts forward two prin­
cipal reasons for this practice : (a) slash and burn 
agriculture requires land rotation so that that the forest 
has a better chance of regaining its former density and 
the soil has an opportunity to be replinished with organic 
materials; (b) as a result of differences in the soils, topo­
graphy, rainfall and irrigation facilities, yam yields 
and food gathering possibilities vary in different areas 
of the island. Naturally, it is to the advantage of a 
village to hold land in different areas of the island in
order to gain access to soil of high potential for a 
number of crops and to a number of natural food resources. 
Sahlins points out that the extended size of the family 
makes it possible to release some members for work on 
distant fields without hardship for those left in the 
village.^ One could argue therefore, that it is the land 
use pattern that in fact determines the family structure.
Thus, attempts have been made by different scholars to 
establish some sort of correspondence between ecology 
and different aspects of what they call 'culture*.
However, no clear pattern seems to have emerged out of 
these studies. One could argue that an all embracing 
culture concept which does not allow theory building, 
makes formulation of a clear structure in the relation 
between environment and society difficult. Steward, of 
course, himself said that the objective of cultural eco­
logy is not formulation of broad generalizations but 
detailed specific investigation of man-nature interactions. 
While one cannot deny that these investigations are them­
selves invaluable the point is, however, that the domin­
ation of the culture concept in the social anthropology 
approach makes an understanding of the precise nature of 
the relationship between ecology and the way in which 
human societies are structured, tenuous.
It is generally agreed that a precondition for the rise 
of civilisation is a degree of efficiency in the production 
of foodstuffs, whether stated in terms of economic surplus 
or of harnessing of energy. This precondition has custo­
marily been met through some form of agriculture, and it 
may be argued a priori that in a pre-capitalist society 
the higher the level of civilisation the greater is the 
need to produce an agricultural surplus. In a given area
1. The idea however, is not original. See Chayanov,A.V.: 
The Theory of Peasant Economy;1966.
the higher the need for surplus, the more intensive the 
agriculture.
Thus it has been argued that civilization has not devel­
oped where intensive agriculture did not exist - especially 
in cases where the only form of subsistence was some form 
of shifting cultivation, Swidden or shifting agriculture 
has been criticised on the grounds of low productivity per 
unit of land (Dumondt 1961:307) labour employed (Meggers: 
1954*815; Barrau:1959:55) and wastefulness (Childe:1951:64) 
also in terms of the destruction of timber and of forest 
cover (Leach:1959 * 64). The FAO concludes that under such 
a backward system, no concentartion of population and hence 
no urbanisation, is possible (FAO:1957:9). These criticisms, 
however, have been rejected by case studies in Mexico 
(Lewis:1955* 155» Morley:1947sX54)» in Southeast Asia 
(Geddes:1954*65; Gourou:1956?342) and it has been asserted 
that swidden farming is just as capable if not more so 
of producing a surplus. Leach has argued, with evidence 
from North Burma, that shifting agriculture is preferred 
in areas of very low population density with plenty of 
land and when population density is high and land is 
scarce, terraced agriculture is standard (Leach:1959* 64). 
Dumond suggests that such practices of extensive agri­
culture are normally adhered to until (a) population 
pressure increases and the system ceases to be viable 
through lack of sufficient land for rotation, (b) soil 
fertility diminishes after continued cultivation and 
the system does not operate and (c) where the use of 
draft animals makes intensive cultivation easier in terms 
of labour. Obviously here the critical factors which 
determine the transformation from extensive (shifting) 
to intensive agriculture are population pressure and the
man-land ratio (Boserup:1970:41-75). As for soil 
fertility, it must diminish with continued cultivation 
subject to cropping pattern, cultivating techniques and 
the replenishment of soil fertility from external sources. 
Regionally, differences in soil fertility will of course 
be offset over time by migration and differential fertility 
mortality schedules. Dumond's third factor i.e. use of 
draft animals must be preceded by the fulfilment of the 
first two.
The striking differences in population density, modes of 
land-use and agricultural productivity can be understood 
only in the light of the discrimination of different sorts 
of ecosystems, explains Geertz. Geertz discusses two 
forms of agriculture - swidden or slash and burn farming 
in which a natural forest is transformed into a harvestable 
forest, and sawah, or wet-rice agriculture - and links 
these to the ecological contrasts in two different parts 
of Indonesia, Java and the Outer Islands. The charact­
eristics of these two forms of cultivation are clear :
on the one hand a multicrop, highly diverse regime, 
a cycling of nutrients between living forms ... on the 
other, an open-field mono-crop, highly specialized 
regime, a heavy dependency on water-borne minerals 
for nutrition, a reliance on man-made waterworks and 
a stable equilibrium (Geertz:1963*37) ,
It is in terms of these diverse but distinct character­
istics of the two forms of farming that the striking 
differences in population density, modes of land-use and 
agricultural productivity can be understood. In swidden, 
farming is marked by a lack of tillage, less labour inputs 
than other methods of cultivation and the absence of a 
concept of a private ownership and the minimal production 
of crops of commercial or trading significance. Sawah
agriculture, on the other hand, is marked by opposite 
characteristics.
Geertz's brilliant work concentrates on population 
density and land-use pattern but none of the studies 
mentioned here seem to attempt any investigation in the 
relation between ecology especially seen in terms of its 
effect through agriculture, and the way a given population 
is structured. How, for instance, does a particular form 
of agriculture affect the way the population interacts in 
the process of production ? To what extent does it influenc 
the different conditions of access to land; family farms, 
the wage labour relation and the patterns of tenancy for 
example ? The present study is an attempt in that direction
3. Critique and an Alternative Theoretical Approach
What emerges clearly from these studies and their approach 
to different aspects of 'civilization1 is the domination 
of the rather generally applied term 'culture1.
Cultural anthropologists tend to gather together under 
the heading of 'material culture' systems which range from 
subsistence devices in primitive societies including 
instruments for production (hunting and fishing) and 
articles for use, and agricultural and herding techniques 
in more advanced societies to money capital and the 
trading system in an industrial world. On the other hand, 
demography, settlement pattern, kinship structures, land 
tenure, land-use and the like are labelled the 'key culture' 
factors. It is argued that all these are adaptive and 
that this process of adaptation is determined by the 
pre-existing form, or a lower form of culture.
Analysis in cultural anthropology is usually directed 
towards one of two objectives. Either, as explained 
earlier, to establish that a level of culture is preceded 
and determined by a lower level of culture, i.e. that it 
is history rather than adaptive processes that explains 
culture. In other words, cultural differences are not 
directly attributable to environmental differences and are 
merely representative of divergences in cultural history, 
and of the tendencies of societies to develop in unlike 
ways (Steward:1955:35)• Or that 'culture area is a 
construct of behavioural uniformities which occur within 
an area of environmental uniformities' and 'it is assumed 
that cultural and natural areas are generally coterminous 
because the culture represents an adjustment to the 
particular environment' (Ibid).
Steward writes
over the millenia cultures in different environments 
have changed tremendously and these changes are basically 
traceable to new adaptations required by changing 
technology and productive arrangements (Ibid:37).
Steward does not pursue the matter further and does not 
pose himself the questions the answers to which would help 
in developing an analytical understanding of any given 
social formation. How, for example, does a change in 
technology affect the production arrangement ? How do 
changes in technology transform a subsistence economy 
(culture) into a surplus economy (higher culture) ?
How is the produce distributed and the surplus exchanged ? 
Such questions and the like relating to production, distri­
bution and exchange are crucial in understanding a social 
formation.
Steward explains at a later stage that,
it makes a great deal of difference whether a community 
consists of hunters and food gatherers who subsist 
independently by their own efforts or whether it is 
an outpost of a wealthy nation, which exploits local 
mineral wealth and is sustained by railroads, ships 
or airplanes# In advanced societies the nature of the 
culture core will be determined by a complex technology 
and by productive arrangements which themselves have 
a long cultural history (lbid:39).
The difference between a pastoral community and a capitalist 
society is clear but what is it that characterizes this 
difference ? What is the inner law which keeps a system 
going and advancing ? What are the forces that explain 
the 'evolution1 of different types of society and how 
do these forces interact ?
There seems to be little in terms of an analytical frame­
work in the traditional social anthropology approach to 
explain the internal structure behind the visible functioning 
of a social system. Banaji highlights this weakness in the 
social anthropology approach by describing it as a 'hand­
book of practice disguised as a theory' (Banaji;1970:72).
Terray goes further and, following Banaji suggests that 
it is necessary to
annex the domain of social anthropology to the field 
of application of historical materialism ... the aim 
is to replace social anthropology by a particular 
section of historical materialism consecrated to socio 
economic formations where the capitalist mode of 
production is absent (Terray:1972:18l),
Before going into an alternative method of analysis 
however, it is in order to see what the social anthro­
pological approach to cultural ecological studies suggests 
in terms of a methodology and in this we may refer to
Steward again. He suggests an analysis of (l) the 
interrelationship of exploitative (of nature) or pro­
ductive technology and environment; (2) the behaviour 
pattern involved in the exploitation by means of a 
particular technology; and (3) lump 1 and 2 together i.e., 
as Steward puts it, instead of treating the key cultural 
factors like demography, settlement pattern, kinship 
structure, land tenure, land use and so forth separately, 
their interrelationship must be grasped (Steward'il955:39“4'2) .
The problem is that this is strictly a methodology of 
a series of step-wise functions useful for a descriptive 
analytical understanding of a given situation. Steward 
does not offer a theoretical framework of inner laws 
which explain not only the 'interrelationship of exploi­
tative or productive technology and environment ' but also 
why they inter-relate the way they do. Steward himself 
says that he is not interested in deriving laws but in 
the study of concrete situations* But it. is not really 
possible to study concrete -situations without the help 
of some laws under which all societies are subsumed„
The alternative i.e., the Marxist, method of analysis 
that Banaji and Terray suggest is a theoretical frame­
work of the following inter-locking components : (a) Forces 
of Production which refers to the mode or technique of 
appropriation of 'nature', that is, to the labour process 
in which a 'determinate raw material is transformed into 
a specific product', (b) Relations of Production which 
defines the various relationships people enter into in 
the social process of production. The relations are the 
ways in which the union of the means and the instruments 
of labour and labour itself is accomplished for production
and the specific manner in which this union takes place 
is what distinguishes one mode of production from another. 
Relations of production form the basis of social division 
into classes with conflicting interests such as slave­
owners and slaves, landlords and tenants (or serfs), 
and wage-labourers and capitalists. (c) Mode of Production 
which is a ’determinate articulated combination of relations 
and forces of production1 (Hindness and Hirst:1975s9)•
The forces and relations o$ production in a given mode 
of social formation form the basis of ’infrastructure1 
which determines the ’super structure’ i.e., kinship, 
marriage, and family, customs, eating and clothing habits, 
literature, leadership and all that comes within the scope 
of cultural anthropology.
The forces and relations of production locate the 'contra­
dictions’ in a given mode and explain the 'evolution* 
of one mode of social formation to another, for instance, 
the classical, the feudal and the capitalist.
However, bearing in mind the scope of the present study
and its principal hypothesis - that ecology does play an
important role in the way rural societies are structured
and evolve over time - it is necessary to explain this
(Marxist) approach particularly in the context of the
man-nature relationship and in the context of class relations.
I shall begin, in the next section, with the question
2
of 'class' in Marxist doctrine.
1. This is elaborated and explained contextually later.
2. For the benefit of those who are less familiar with 
the Marxist theoretical frame work, it is briefly 
discussed in Appendix III.
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Section II
Class and Ecology in Marxist Literature 
1. Class in Marxist Doctrine
Considerable controversy exists about the theory of 
social class. Most American sociologists seem to avoid 
the use of the term 'class1 and prefer the broader term 
'stratification' which refers to any hierarchical ordering 
of social groups or strata in a given society. Generally 
speaking there have been four approaches to the concept 
by sociologists : caste (Srinivas:1959)» estate (Bloch;196l), 
status group (Weber: 194-8), and social class (MarxsCapital Vol.3)*
It should be emphasised that we are not here concerned 
with the different theories of social classes nor with 
their related forms.^ My purpose is to explain the concept 
of class in Marxism and its central role in explaining the 
inner structure and functioning of a given social system.
This will help in an understanding of the Marxist analy-’ 
tical tools that have been introduced earlier and in 
addition, their strength in analysing the inner laws and 
structuring of a given social formation, will be laid 
bare.
The concepts of social class is one of the fundamental
concepts of Marxian doctrine. Broadly, for Marx, 'the
whole of previous history is a history of class struggles'
and 'in all the simple and complicated political struggles
the only thing at issue has been the social and political
rule of social classes' (Marx & Engelst Selected Worksp Vol IIsl49)
More specifically, the concept of social class clarifies
1. For Weberian view, see Runciman,W.G.,"Glass Status and
Power1' in Jackson, J.A, Social Stratification, Cambridge,
1968; also see Dahrendorf! 1959» Aron,R.;1968; Ossowski, 
S..-1963.
the relationship between capital and labour and lastly, 
the concept is bound up with the entire Marxian conception 
of culture as the superstructure of class interests.
Despite this critical role, the concept does not have any
1formal definition in Marxism, Instead, its given and 
latent meanings are explained contextually. However, 
broadly, the sharing of permanent economic interests, in 
other words the economic basis of classes and the anta­
gonistic relations between them, are the two particularly 
important characteristics of social classes in Marxian 
doctrine. But although they are a necessary condition, 
they do not constitute a sufficient condition for a valid 
definition of social class (Ossowski:1963:VI).
It was, in fact, Lenin who first provided a formal defini­
tion flexible enough to be applicable to all shades of 
meaning found in the term 'class' as used by Marx and 
Engels. Classes are
large groups of people differing from each other by 
the place they occupy in a historically determined system 
of social production, by their relation (in most cases 
fixed and formulated in law) to the means of production, 
by their role in the social organisation of labour, 
and consequently, by the dimensions of the share of 
social wealth of which they dispose and their mode of 
acquiring it. Classes are groups of people, one of which 
can appropriate the labour of another, owing to the 
different places they occupy in a definite system of 
political economy (Lenin: Collected Works, Vol, XIX:42l).
The basis of Marx's class classification is a dichotomic 
division between various oppressor and oppressed classes 
in history but he could not overlook the 'mass of the
1, Marx left his chapter on class uncompleted, see Capital, 
Vol.Ill, p a886 ,
nation ..• standing between the proletariat and the 
bourgeoisie1 (MarxrThe Class Struggle in France, 184.8-1850 
137). This intermediate class (petit bourgeoisie) is 
determined by the simultaneous application of two criteria 
and each of these criteria taken separately forms the 
basis for a dichotomic division. One criterion is the 
ownership of the means of production which divides society 
into propertied and propertyless classes. The second 
criterion is work which divides society into working 
classes and idle classes.
There is also an economic gradation that corresponds to 
this scheme. Thus
the capitalist class is that class which owns large 
scale means of production or at least sufficient to 
make possible the employment of hired labour; the 
petit bourgeoisie consists of those who dispose of 
the means of production on a modest scale; while the 
proletariat is in principle the class that owns no 
means of production whatsoever (Ossowski:1963:78)
In this functional scheme, however
it is not the degree of wealth that determines the 
boundaries between classes but the social roles, 
namely their relations to the means of production, 
work and their relation to the hiring of labour (Ibid).
Thus, in this classical Marxian scheme, the two principal 
classes are divided against each other by more than one 
criterion to which correspond class groupings of varying 
extensions and the intermediate class is determined by 
the boundaries of the two basic antagonistic classes.
The distinctive features of Marx*s class theory are, 
the conception of social classes in terms of the system 
of production and the idea of social development through 
class conflict. ' ... the whole of what is called world
history is nothing but the creation of man himself by 
human labour',^ Marx maintains,
in the social production which men carry on, they enter 
into definite relations that are indispensable and 
independent of their will? these relations of production 
correspond to a definite stage of development of their 
material powers of production. The totality of these 
relations of production constitutes the economic struc­
ture of the society - the real foundation upon which 
legal and political superstructures arise and to which 
definite forms of social consciousness correspond.
The mode of production of material life determines the 
general character of the social, political and spiritual 
processes of life (Critique of Political Economy:1970:Preface).
Thus, one of the most crucial features of Marx’s theory 
of class is.
that it attempts to take account of the interplay 
between the real situation of individuals in the 
process of production, on the one side, and the con­
ceptions which they form of their situation and of the 
lines of social and political action which are open 
to them, on the other (Bottomore:1965:20-21).
In the process of production the workers are a class 
in itself against capital determined by its place against 
capital and a class for itself (when united) in its 
political struggle against the capitalist class (Marx:The 
Poverty of Philosophy, 1975:150).
Marx’s analysis of social classes never refers simply 
to the economic structure (relations of production) but 
always to the ensemble of the structures of a mode of 
production and social formation, and to the relations 
which are maintained there by the different levels. A 
social class can be identified either at the economic 
level, at the political level or at the ideological
1. Letter to Weydemere, March 5, 1852.
level and can thus be located with regard to a particular 
instance. Yet to define a class as such and to grasp it 
in its concept, it is necessary to refer to the ensemble 
of levels of which it is the effect (Poulantzas:1975s63-64-) •
We now have a general idea of the class concept in 
Marxist doctrine and the various contexts in which it 
may be understood. I have also tried to provide some 
underpinning of the theoretical position but it is not 
necessary to go beyond this at this stage,^
1.Abdullah suggests three procedures for an economic 
identification of classes: Step 1 : identify the 
typical ’enterprise1 i.e., unit of appropriation of 
nature, the locus of the labour process; Step 2 : 
identify the means of production that are brought 
together in this labour process and Step 3 : on the 
basis of the above, identify the following categories 
of agents : (a) labourers, (b) controllers of the 
labour process, and (c) effective possessors of the 
means of production. The number of classes is the 
number of distinct categories of agents identified 
in this way - distinct not just empirically but 
distinct by a logical necessity inscribed in the 
structure of the labour process. Thus, he concludes 
fwe have two kinds of class relations : (a) the 
relation between the labourers and the controllers of 
the labour process (who are also the effective controllers 
possessors of some means of production), and (b) 
relations between the controllers and the possessors of 
other means of production. Depending on the mode of 
production, there may be no class relations, or class 
relations of type (a) only, or type (b) only, or 
both1 (Abdullah: 1978:104--105).
Having explained the structural basis of the concept 
of class in Marxist theory we can look further into 
the man-nature relationship in order to establish the 
basis of this study, I have earlier looked into the 
balance of opinion on the subject of, primarily, the 
social anthropologists, environmentalists and ecologists.
Here I will draw on Marxist literature especially on 
the works of Marx, Engels and Plekhanov.
2• Man and Environment in Marxist Literature
Montesquieu said that once the geographical environment 
is given, the characteristics of the social union are also 
given. In one geographical environment only despotism 
can exist, in another - only small independent republican 
societies, etc, Voltaire disagreed, maintaining that in 
one and the same geographical environment there appear 
in the course of time various social relations, and 
consequently geographical environment has no influence 
on the historical fate of mankind.^ Marx explained this 
apparent contradiction in terms of interaction of the 
productive forces (Dialectical Materialism).
While Darwin explains the origin of species by the adapt­
ation of the organism to the conditions existing outside 
it; in other words, not by the nature of the organism but 
by the influence of external nature, Marx explains the 
historical development of man not by the nature of man 
but by the characteristics of those social relations between 
men which arise when social man is acting on external 
nature.
If this world were to remain unchanged, human labour 
power would always achieve the same type and degree of
1. See Editor's note, Plekhanov:1956:217.
development. According to Marx, 'neither nature object­
ively nor nature subjectively is directly given in a 
form adequate to the human being' (Marx: Manuscripts,1844s158). 
In order to meet his needs, man is forever remoulding 
nature. The direction this productive activity takes, 
its immediate and basic aims, can be traced to the demands 
that nature makes on the individual.
The link between work which maintains life and merely 
reproduces existing conditions, and work which goes 
further and alters these conditions is the social divi­
sion of labour. The degree and level of the social divi­
sion of labour is determined by whether or not nature is 
'adequate' to maintain life. The more 'inadequate' nature, 
the greater is the social division of labour as specia­
lization amongst individual workers results from man's 
attempt to satisfy his basic life needs in an 'inadequate' 
nature. In other words, it is the differentiation of the 
soil, the variety of its natural products, the changes 
of the seasons which form the basis for the social division 
of labour. This, in turn, by bringing about changes in 
the natural surroundings spurs man on to the multiplication 
of his wants, his capabilities, his means and modes of 
labour (Marx: Capital, Vol.1:513-514)
Thus, it is not nature as such, but variations in nature 
which force the individual and, in the last analysis, 
enable him to- develop his powers. 'With nature viewed 
as an incentive, as well as a limitation on activity, 
the natural features of each locale assume a special 
significance* (011man:1976:100),
1. Marx believed that their different climates gave the Irish 
more wants but less imagination than the Indians (Marx & 
Engels: On Colonialism. Moscow:74). Without knowledge of 
what in the Indian climate engenders imagination, this 
would seem to contradict his view that the more wants a 
people have, the speedier their development (see Notes: 
Oilman:1976:296-297).
This division of labour serves Marx historically as the 
exit by which men leave primitive communism, sociologically 
as the root cause of the division of society into classes, 
economically as the fount of private property and psycho­
logically as the means of anchoring their distinguishing 
characteristics in the people of different classes (lbid:158).
Man according to Marx, was originally a social and tribal 
being and he became an individual only through the process 
of history (Marx: Grundisse:496). An isolated individual 
could do no better than derive his subsistence from 
nature. But the real relation to the earth as property 
•is mediated through the peaceful or violent occupation 
of the land and soil by the tribe, the commune, in some 
more or less naturally arisen or already historically 
developed form1 (lbid:485).
Marx points out that the different forms of commune or 
tribe members' relations to the tribe's land and soil - 
to the earth where it was settled - depend partly on the 
natural inclinations of the tribe, and partly on the 
economic conditions in which it relates as proprietor 
to the land and soil in reality, i.e. in which it appro­
priates its fruits through labour, and the latter will 
itself depend on the climate, the physical make-up of the 
land and aoilP the physically determined mode of its 
exploitation, the relation to the hostile tribes or the 
neighbouring tribes, and the modification which migrations, 
historic experiences, etc., introduce (Ibid:486).
Primitive communes, whether Germanic, Slav, ancient or 
classical, continued to exist until the process of pro­
duction and the increase in population gradually modified 
the objective conditions and these various communities 
were transformed introducing more complex economic
formations. These new economic formations also, especially 
in the early stages, when their productive forces are still 
of too low a level to emancipate them - develop according 
to environmental conditions,
Marx sees the division of labour arising in society as 
part of a complex which includes private property, exchange 
and class divisions, so that to speak of an individual doing 
only one kind of work is already to assume a society where 
man's activity and its product are not his own. One of 
the ways in which Marx defines 'property' is as a man's 
'relation to-the natural prerequisites of his production 
as his own' (Marx;Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations;87-88). 
His thesis seems to be that when there was just enough 
wealth for people to exist property was held in common.
When a little more was produced, especially with the 
appearance of agriculture, those individuals who were 
able to take it for themselves did so and defended it 
with every means at their disposal, which included devising 
a claim to private ownership (011man:.1976:l6l) . Thus, 
agriculture reinforced private ownership of property. 
Naturally, with agriculture, private property enters into 
contradiction with the more ancient mode of social appro­
priation.
What is critical for our purpose is to be able to see the 
logical link between environmental differences, division 
of labour and private ownership of property. Private 
ownership of property causes division of society into 
classes, but the forms taken by private property alter 
with developments in the division of labour, the level 
of which is determined by the 'adequacy' or 'inadequacy' 
of the productive forces. While the degree of develop­
ment of the productive forces determines the measure of
the authority of man over nature, the development of the 
productive forces J,s itself determined by the qualities 
of the geographical environment surrounding man. In this 
way nature itself gives man the means for its own subjection 
(Plekhanov:1956:216-217).
Plekhanov in fact goes further and suggests that social 
structure 'is determined in the long run by the chara­
cteristics of the geographical environment, which affords 
men greater or lesser possibility of developing their 
productive forces' (Ibid:2l6). This has been seriously 
questioned. Geographical environment is a constant and 
indispensable condition for the development of society 
but it has been suggested that geographical influences
do not make the possibility 'greater or lesser1 butq
'accelerates or retards' social development.
What the critic seems to have overlooked is that Plekhanov 
in fact, makes it obvious that environmental influences 
afford men a 'greater or lesser possibility of developing 
their productive forces' until such time as definite 
social relations have arisen when their further development 
takes place according to its own inner laws. The operation 
of these inner laws
accelerates or retards the development of the productive 
forces which conditions the historical progress of man. 
The dependence of man on his geographical environment 
is transformed, from direct to indirect. The geographical 
environment influences man through the social environ­
ment .
Plekhanov makes his point clearer when he says
the relationship of man with his geographical environ­
ment becomes extremely changeable. At every new stage 
of development of productive forces it proves to be 
different from what it was before (lbid:217).
1. Editor's note in Plekhanov:1956:130.
Plekhanov1s view was certainly no deviation from Marx's. 
According to Marx only capitalism constituted a real 
quality jump in the process of man's historical develop­
ment, by breaking the stronghold of nature.
In all forms in which landed property is the decisive 
factor, natural relations still predominate; in the 
forms in which the decisive factor is capital, social, 
historically produced elements predominate (Marx:
Critique of Political Economy:213)•
To Marx, there is in every social formation a particular 
branch of production which determines the position and 
importance of all the others, and the relations obtaining 
in this branch accordingly determine the relations of all 
other branches as well. Landed property being the source 
of all production, with agriculture, the first form of 
production began. Certain types of agriculture existed 
among the pastoral tribes and this determined land owner­
ship, among the settled agricultural people agriculture 
predominated as among the societies of antiquity and the 
feudal period; society in fact retained a specifically 
agrarian character through the period of manufacture, being 
completely dependent on it as in the Roman period, or 
as in the Middle Ages. And as long as landed property 
continued to be the decisive productive force, natural 
environment i.e. soil fertility, accessibility to water, 
rainfall, drainage etc played a determining role in the 
way society was structured.^
1. A specific example would be the case of the rise of 
state and bureaucracy in Asia.
In Asia, unlike in Europe, the state was born at a 
time when the commune still worked the land collectively, 
or at most leased the land for a time to various 
families, and as a result private property had not 
yet taken root (Engels.F:Frankische Zeit:1882:/i.75 in 
Melotti:1977:43). The state was born out of the need 
to meet the basic requirements for drainage and 
irrigation networks, dams and other major hydraulic
Section III
Rural Class Structure in Marxist Notions of Modes and 
Relations of Production
In the last two sections I have surveyed the balance of 
opinion on man's relationship to nature and, in view of 
the limitations of some of the well known and widely 
taught approaches in grasping the essence of this relation­
ship an alternative theoretical option in terms of the 
Marxist conceptualization of society has been suggested.
I have, in this context, drawn on Marxist literature in 
order to see the position of the various exponents on 
the nature of the relationship between man and his
1. Continued from previous page.
engineering works necessitated by local geographic 
and climatic constraints. Without these networks 
no agriculture was possible. These original, functional 
powers of the state machinery were transformed into 
political domination and exploitation.
To Engels, the absence of private property was 'due to 
the climate, taken in connection with the nature of 
the soil, especially with the great stretches of desert 
which extend up from the Sahara straight across Arabia, 
Persia, India and Tartary up to the highest Asiatic 
plateau' (Selected Correspondence, Engels to Marx:76).
However, while the nature of these public works 
(irrigation and waterworks principally) explains the 
absence of private ownership of land, making the state 
a despot, absence of private property itself encouraged 
only fixed, limited division of labour. As a result 
we find in India a structure of dispersed and isolated, 
but self-sufficient, villages with a low-level of diff­
erentiation resulting in the stagnation of the oriental 
system or what Marx calls 'too low a degree of civi­
lization ' .
geographical environment
As has already been argued in the preceding section; at 
the very heart of the Marxist concept of society is its 
class theory. However, before we can examine how and to 
what extent the ecological setting of a village may 
affect its class relations, it is necessary to identify 
the various classes we would expect to see in a rural 
social formation. Classes, are determined by differential 
access to the means of production but are set in the 
various relationships people enter into in the process of 
production. Therefore, a class analysis must involve 
an analysis of the relations of production itself.
Classes are normally defined in terms of conditions of 
access to the means of production and the relations people 
can have to the means of production are basically those 
of possession' and 'separation1. Ownership is the legal 
way of looking at the same thing, but effective possess­
ion need not always be legally sanctioned or codified. 
Usually, in most societies there will be some body of 
written or unwritten law or custom which codifies existing 
practices.
The point is that since land is the chief means of produc­
tion in agriculture I shall try to define classes in terms 
of the ways in which people obtain access to land. In 
other words, the ways in which the union of the means, 
the instruments of labour and labour itself is accom­
plished is what distinguishes one epoch from another.
From what I have seen in the villages and from what we 
know in general from Bangladesh, it seems that there 
are basically three ways in which people obtain access
^4:1
to land. Firstly, through ownership which means essentially 
through ownership inheritance and therefore, kinship.
Land can also be acquired through purchase either outright 
or through foreclosure of mortgage and we will eventually 
see how important that is. To start with, however, we 
can retain the categories of ownership as one means of 
access. Secondly, there is the wage contract. This is 
where the owner of the land hires labourers and pays them 
a fixed amount on a daily, monthly, or yearly basis in 
cash or kind. This form of accomplishing a union between 
land and labour is of course typical of, though not 
necessarily identical with, a capitalist mode of production. 
Finally, broadly speaking, there is tenancy. This is 
where an individual or a household rents-in some land from 
a landowner undertaking to pay to the owner either a fixed 
amount in money or in kind or a stipulated share of the 
crop every year or every season.^
1. These, especially wage contract and tenancy, are some­
what different ways of accomplishing the union between 
land and labour and it is important to identify them 
with caution. But whether or not they really represent 
different ways of accomplishing the union between land 
and labour can only be understood after looking closely 
at the person who has rented-in, at his motives for 
doing so and what he is doing with the land once he 
has rented it in. There can be, for exapmle, capit­
alist renting-in of land which is the classic pattern 
in England that Marx discusses, where the capitalist 
did not own his land but rented it in from his landlord. 
This, of course did not make him a feudal tenant or for 
that matter, a peasant tenant. It made him what he was, 
that is, a capitalist farmer. This is because of the 
way he himself was at the next stage accomplishing the 
union between labour and the means of labour. He was 
not providing labour but only capital and organisation.
In the context of Bangladesh, however, by and large 
we find that when people rent-in land it is to cultivate 
it themselves. If they use some wage labour on this land 
it is not in order to make commodities. If however, 
they predominantly did so it would be capitalist farming 
in spite of the fact that the land is not owned. In any 
case we are likely to find that the dominant form of 
tenancy in Bangladesh is in fact share-cropping where 
the rent is paid in kind and stipulated not as a fixed 
amount but as a share of the produce.
,Al W. fit
So, broadly, we may distinguish between three ways of 
obtaining access to land and three ways of accomplishing 
a union between land and labour. This we might, as a 
first approximation, identify with three relations of 
production,
(i) In access through ownership the labour and the land 
are both provided by the same peraon or the same 
household. The great majority of household land is 
acquired through inheritance and the same household 
also provides all or most of the labour, and produces 
basically for family consumption. This we might
5 yfky, is the locus of the peasant mode of production. 
Here the two classes, the labourer and the non­
labouring owners of the means of production are 
collapsed into one class.
(ii) In wage labour relation, rich farmers produce almost 
entirely with hired labour and market most of their 
produce in order to maximise profit. Therefore the 
system presupposes some degree of dynamism. Here 
the wage labourers are dependent on the capitalist 
farmers for their employment especially in that 
Bangladesh is a labour surplus country.
(iii) Rent relations where the tenant does not own but 
only has possession of the land and is therefore 
dependent on the capitalist farmer. This dependence 
may be manifested in many forms, in terms of giving 
free labour or voting for the landlord during elections 
for instance. In rent relations, production and with 
rare exceptions, organisation is carried out entirely
1. Except during peak periods.
by the tenant and the owner, the landlord, appro­
priates the surplus in terms of rent. Although the 
form of rent and the conditions of tenancy are 
different from European Feudalism, in the sense 
that the structure is based on rent relations this 
is identified with a feudal mode of production.
Thus, owner cultivation is associated with peasant mode 
of production or petty commodity production; the wage
labour relation with capitalist production; and share-
2
cropping with feudal or the semi-feudal mode of pro­
duction. This more or less corresponds with Hamza Alavi's 
early classification (Alavi:1973)*
There are, however, several kinds of problems with this 
kind of classification. Human society being as complex 
as it is, all people or households do not fall neatly into 
the classes we have indicated above in the three forms of 
production relations. For instance, most family farms 
do use some wage labour, so do the share-croppers. Does 
this make them capitalists ? Some of them also hire 
themselves out as wage-labourers; does this make them 
wage-labourers ? Some poor households hire-out land to 
free themselves to do other jobs; does this make them 
landlords and is this a feudal relation ?
Let us take a more difficult situation. A large owner's 
choice between renting-out his land to share-croppers or 
cultivating it with wage-labour is a profit maximising 
choice, depending on whether labour is cheaper to acquire
1. See Bloch, M. Feudal Society (London 1961) Part VI,
2. Share-cropping being the dominant form of rent relation 
see Hossain:1977.
through the mechanism of share-cropping, which is in fact 
indirect labour, and whether prices in general and prices 
of agricultural products in particular are rising or not.
But the point is, the landowner who hires wage labour may 
not be in any way, in the technique he uses or in the 
proportion of the produce that he markets, very different 
from the owner-cultivator or even from the man who share- 
crops out a large part of his land. In that case is there 
justification for suggesting that they represent different 
relations of production ?
The answer to this complex question and many others, can 
be sought in the theoretical position of the concept of 
relations of production itself.
Not all production relations are necessarily relations of 
production. Not all forms of surplus appropriation 
represent modes of production, and for a concept of mode 
of production to be viable it must be possible to fdeduce! 
the forces from the relations (Hindness and Hirst: 1975: 10-13), 
This would mean that share-cropping as a form of surplus 
appropriation must, in order to b© a separate relation 
of production, induce or logically imply a set of forces 
of production that are distinct from owner cultivation 
or wage labour relation. Empirically, however, in Bangladesh 
agriculture, share-cropping, wage labour and owner culti­
vation all by and large represent the same level of the 
forces of production. The point is, however, if this is 
the case empirically then one can hardly argue that 
logically, different forces follow from different relations.
It is further suggested that the three different instances 
of mode of production - owner cultivation, wage labour and 
share-cropping - have a relative autonomy so that even if
the relations of production do not make a significant 
difference at the level of the forces of production, 
they might make a significant difference at the political 
and the ideological level (Althusser: 1975) or in their 
market involvement.
It is possible to argue that production with wage labour 
and production by share-cropping need not make a significant 
difference at the level of involvement in the market‘d 
although the former could well lead to a higher level of 
commercialisation as the wage labourers, paid in cash,
themselves would be more directly involved in the market
which may have further long term dynamic implications 
in terms of polarisation. Share-cropping output, on 
the other hand, is a consumable output. There is however, 
no adequate data to test this argument but we can see
later how this position holds with respect to the data
in the three villages.
With regard to the political and the ideological level 
it is argued (largely by analogy with the feudal system) 
that share-cropping involves a higher degree of dependence 
and servility than wage labour relations. While wage 
labour relations involve a higher degree of class awareness 
or * class consciousness1, the share-croppers think of 
themselves as the object of benevolence or cruelty and 
passive recipients of whatever society may hand out to 
them rather than active participants in a society0
There is no empirical evidence supporting these assumptions 
nor is it possible to examine these hypotheses for no
1. The crop-share a landlord gets from renting-out his 
land is not likely to be very different from the crop 
he would retain if produced by hiring wage labour as 
he would have to sell part of it in order to pay his 
labourers. Thus, although total volume marketed would 
be significantly more than what would be produced through 
share-cropping, his marketed surplus may not vary much.
data was collected on these specific issues. However, 
it is difficult to see why, other things being equal, a 
poor man who receives a plot of land from his landowner 
should be more dependent than a man who receives a wage.
The argument that a share-cropper is more tied to the 
land than a wage labourer and is therefore not as free 
is invalid because the assumption that the share-cropper 
invariably or generally has a plot of land whereas the 
wage labourer is totally expropriated is unfounded, 
especially in Bangladesh. In fact a lot of wage labour 
comes from small peasant families (Bardhan, K.: 1973;
Rudra and Biswas: 1973; Muktada; 1975; Rudra and 
Mukhopadhyaya: 1976) • It may be argued that the landlord 
has economic reasons for using share-croppers - he has 
a source of occasional free labour and he is more sure 
that his share-cropper will not run off in the middle 
of the crop season, but in a economy which is by and 
large labour surplus, the risk a landlord runs in 
depending on wage labour cannot be high. As regards 
the political reasons for landlords it is difficult 
to see why a wage labourer should be less dependent 
than a share-cropper. The fact that the landlords do 
not try to tie their share-croppers down is clearly indi­
cated by their lack of willingness to formalise the 
relationship and their eagerness to harass them. This,
I feel, argues against the hypothesis that landlords 
also seek power through share-cropping relations. This 
is not to suggest that they do not wield power but whether 
the power they have over share-croppers is stronger than 
the power they might have over wage labourers is not 
conclusively demonstrated anywhere although it does tend 
to be assumed.
On the ideological level, indeed Marx has said peasants 
are a class in the sense ’potatoes in a sack form a sack 
of potatoes1 because their conditions of production isolate 
them instead of uniting them (The Eighteenth Brumaire of 
Louis Bonaparte: 105-106), Thus, one might observe 
what is sometimes called ’sturdy1 peasant independence, 
backwardness and superstition because of the dominance 
of the forces of nature, religion and almost certainly 
patriarchy. However, as has been said before, it is 
difficult to see whether and to what extent this attitude 
and aware ness is different from those under share- 
cropping relation or for that matter wage labour relation. 
The last however, if it assumes significant proportions, 
may have wider implications as it involves a higher 
degree of commercialisation. However, I do not believe 
that in Bangladesh wage labour relations have reached 
such proportions especially in the rural areas.
Obviously these arguments can be further developed but 
are not crucial in our attempt to identify the relations 
of production in the three villages. We will, therefore, 
notwithstanding the above reservations, start by 
maintaining Alavi’s distinctions. Is it possible to 
identify distinct groups of farmers who have different 
behaviour patterns ? To distinguish, for instance, 
between farmers who tend to use predominantly wage 
labour and to market most of their produce and farmers 
who use predominantly share-cropper labour and market 
most of the rent-share received ? One answer to this
problem of quantifying measures would be to use the 
conventional fifty per cent criterion.
As a preliminary, let us divide the three villages into 
three sectors : the peasant, the capitalist and the 
feudal. Thus, we would be identifying first of all, 
a total of five classes. In the feudal sector, the 
share-cropper and the landowner; in the capitalist, 
the wage-worker and the capitalist farmer; and in the 
peasant, the peasant.
This is not meant to be a class analysis but an analysis 
of the incipient forces towards class differentiation 
because the other classes do arise out of the bosom of 
and sometimes fall back into, the peasant economy.
In this sense, feudal landlords as well as capitalist 
farmers emerge from the peasant economy and a few 
fall back. At the other extreme, the peasant economy 
constantly reproduces, possibly at a growing rate, 
the landless. The peasant economy itself may be 
in the process of extinction. The reason for caution 
in the making of such predictions is that in the 
past, they have frequently proved premature.^*
1. An immediately obvious example being Lenin's 
insistence (Lenin Collected Works, Volume 3: 
175-186) although he did not set any deadline, 
that the peasant economy would soon be dominated 
by the capitalists. let Lenin himself revoked 
some of what he said
However, we need not go into these questions, although 
they are undoubtedly important issues, and for the moment 
I shall try to identify capitalist farmers on the basis 
of their employment of wage labour, feudal farmers on the 
basis of their engagement of share-croppers and the 
peasant sector in terms of its relative non-participatioa 
in the market for labour or land. This is, however, not 
to suggest that the peasant farmers do not supply or 
do any wage labour, or that they do not buy or sell 
anything at all, but the extent of their involvement 
either in the land or the labour market is not so deep 
that they cannot get out and still maintain their economy. 
Admittedly, a minimal degree of market involvement is 
implied for every household but on the basis of this one 
would not be justified in saying that they are all there­
fore part of the capitalist system. One could say, however,
1. Continued from previous page,
as early as 1908 when he wrote the Agrarian Program of 
Social Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, and 
stressed the persistence of what he called feudal 
elements. He also noted that while they were quite 
right about the trend, they had mistaken the moment 
and had over estimated the degree of capitalist develop­
ment. After Lenin, most of the discussion within the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was posed in terms 
of the peasants; the rich peasant, the middle peasant 
and the poor peasant. One may say that, together with 
feudalism, the revolution had also succeeded in abol­
ishing capitalism in the countryside. During the New 
Economic Policy Lenin himself said that it was a conces­
sion to capitalism and was bound to give rise to capi­
talism in the countryside (Lenin, V.I., The Agrarian 
Programme of Social°Democracy in the First Russian 
Revolutionc in Collected Works, Vol„13, Progress 
Publishers, Moscow, 1962)*
The arguments relating to capitalism and peasant 
economies, however, can easily lead to confusion. For 
instance, in European agriculture or as an extreme case 
American agriculture, are the criteria for capitalist 
agriculture met ? How much wage labour, for example 
is employed particularly since most of the farms are 
in fact run by family labour.
2 § 0
that this is a peasant economy which is clearly dominated 
by a capitalist mode of production although this does 
not make it a part of the capitalist mode of production.
I feel this distinction is reasonable and indeed important.'*'
1. The distinction between a capitalist mode of production 
and a mode of production that is dominated by capitalism 
but is not itself capitalist, raises the issues that 
figured prominently in the debate between Andre Gunder 
Frank and Ernesto Laclau on the mode of production in 
Latin America. Frank argued that Latin America is and 
has been at least since the l6th century, capitalist.
He supported this theory by showing that, in agriculture 
- which was dominated by a hacienda type system in 
which large plantations used bonded labour of various 
sorts - production was decided mainly by the market, 
and that this made for a capitalist mode of production 
(Frankil969» 1970s 1973)® Laclaup in this debate and 
afterwards (Laclau:1971 and 1972) suggested that the 
following distinction should be kept in mind. He argued 
that the fact that the surplus produce of a given system 
of production is sold on the capitalist market should 
not be taken to mean that that system of production 
itself thereby becomes capitalist.
This is largely a definitional issue. One could say 
that if a particular mode of production is significantly 
oriented to the market and the market is capitalist, 
then no matter what kind of labour is used or how the 
labour is paid for, it is part of capitalism. I think 
the way in which labour is exploited within a particular 
social system is important. It would make a difference 
to Latin America if the surplus produced which goes 
on to the world market was produced by free labourers 
with wage contracts rather than by bonded labour or by 
the hacienda system and it is important to capture these 
differences in definitions. But the expansion of the 
definition of capitalism, by saying that wherever a 
production system buys from and sells to the capitalist 
market it becomes part of capitalism, I find unacceptable 
For in that case, the whole world, including the socialis 
world becomes capitalist. America, for example buys 
and sells to the Soviet Union but this surely does not 
make the Soviet Union capitalist. An argument to the 
contrary would be rather simplistic.
In the rich peasant class therefore, I shall try, if the 
data permits, to distinguish between those who tend to 
depend more on wage labour and others who mostly depend on 
share-croppers. I can then compare the different villages 
and see if there is a difference that can be related, if 
possible, to the different ecological variables.
In the middle range, it would be reasonable to classify 
most of the households as being part of the peasant economy. 
It may be necessary to set up more or less arbitrary 
criteria, such as a fifty per cent criterion for example. 
Thus, if a peasant household gets more than fifty per cent 
of its household income from providing wage labour then 
it should be classed as semi-proletariat rather than 
peasant. In this way, households can be distinguished 
according to whether they are mainly wage labourers or 
mainly share-croppers.
Rural society does not of course consist only of people 
directly involved in agriculture but here we need not go 
into a discussion of the people involved in other activities 
except perhaps peripherally. In the case of, for example, 
the artisans, one could probably apply similar criteria 
and concepts as those applied to agricultural production. 
While share-cropping is not heard of in, for 
weaving or pottery, production can be owner - petty 
commodity - or wage labour, a modified putting out system 
or market capital penetration where the artisan works on 
his own account but is totally in debt or his instruments 
of production are owned by the person from whom he has 
had to borrow money. So, to some extent, concepts similar 
to those in agriculture would apply except that a peasant 
mode is not really possibl© in the sense that the output 
is consumed by the producer, bacause no potter could consume
mainly pots or weaver mainly clothes. These people, by 
definition have to be deeply involved in the market. For 
this reason I am not looking at these groups except in 
so far as they provide means of livelihood to the peasants 
themselves.
The case of the other two important rural classes - the 
merchants and the rural money lenders - however, is 
different, the point being, should they be considered 
as separate classes ? Here again Hindness and Hirst 
provide a clue and what they have to say would suggest 
that if we can see that a peasant household economy is 
critically dependent for its own reproduction, for the 
renewal of the means of production and for the renewal 
of labour itself, on merchant capital or on usury, then 
these two constitute relations of production. And the 
two categories - money lenders and merchants in that case 
should be considered as separate classes.
Here again many considerations arise. The usurer, for 
example, is in fact, the rich peasant himself. There is 
of course, no reason why one individual or one household 
cannot fulfil the role of agent in two different modes of 
production or two different relations of production at 
least. After all, in neo-classical economics, the same 
individual can and must be a consumer in his capacity 
as such while at the same time he is a capitalist. 
Therefore, it is not contradictory to have the same house­
hold in different positions in the structure of production.
It is important to see how significant usury is as a 
source of surplus appropriation and as a source of renewal 
of the conditions of reproduction of peasant households.
In this we have little option except to depend on per­
centages. What percentage of peasant income goes, for 
example, in interest payments or in principal and interest ? 
How likely is the borrower to lose his land for failing 
to repay his loan ? These are some of the questions 
the answers to which will explain the structure of usury 
as a source of surplus appropriation as well as the critical 
dependence of the poor households on it. I intend to 
look into these questions in the next chapter in terms 
of the data.
For merchant capital, on the other hand, analysis is more 
complex since it is difficult to quantify the kind and 
the rate at which the peasant exchanges his commodities 
against industrial goods and to examine whether surplus 
is actually being transferred from agriculture to industry 
or from rural areas to urban areas through trade. ' To 
the extent this does involve unequal exchange, merchants 
do constitute a class.
There are of course, smaller merchants who are peasants 
themselves and many of them are not better off than middle 
peasants or even smaller peasants and they are not ideo­
logically or politically in a different category from 
the average peasant. The large merchants are a different 
case of course. Many of them are rich peasants and mer­
chants at the same time and they may be said to represent 
the sort of emergent rural bourgeoisie who increasingly
1, In principal one could calculate the labour content 
but it is difficult to see how significant these 
calculations would be for theoretical meaning even if 
it was possible to do so. Whether the fact that the 
peasant sells produce embodying 10 hours of his labour 
and gets back produce embodying only 6 hours of urban 
industrial labour, constitutes exploitation in any 
real sense, is something on which there does not appear 
to be any clear consensus of opinion.
make their voices felt in politics. To this extent, 
certainly, we should look at them, even if it is not very 
clear exactly what role they play in structuring the forces 
of production.
To summarise, we can identify seven categories of people
in the villages who overlap and who may or may not pro-
1liferate as classes in a rigorous Marxist sense. These 
categories are : (i) owner farmers? (ii) landowners who 
share-crop out their land whom 1 shall call 'landlords1?
(iii) rich peasants who depend primarily on wage labour 
rather than on share-cropping out their land and whom I 
shall call 'capitalist farmers'? (iv) wage labourers?
(v) share-croppers? (vi) merchants and lastly* . (..vii.) the 
money lenders. This classification can be justified in 
the terms I have already mentioned. The first five repre­
sent ways of uniting land and labour. The other two groups 
control not land but other means of production. One 
controls money and through money perhaps the purchase of 
inputs or the purchase of consumption goods essential for 
maintaining labour power. The other, the merchant class, 
might control something more intangible but perhaps 
equally important. In so far as the means of reproduction 
of the peasant households is dependent on the market and 
if and when the merchant monopolises the market, one may
say that the merchant does control one of the important
2means of production in an extended sense.
So these are the groups tentatively identified at the 
village level and probably the first five groups in parti­
cular should be stressed since my focus is mainly on agri­
culture itself.
1. Depending on the levels of analysis applied.
2. See Hindness & Hirst: 1977 :63-67? Lenin:1964.:175-192, 364.-382.
CHAPTER 5
Relations of Production in the Three Villages ; An Empirical 
Study
As has been argued earlier, in the context of Bangladesh 
and in particular in the three villages examined in this 
study, the different relations that farmers enter into in 
the process of production, overlap as can be seen from the 
data below. Therefore, to ensure that the classes are 
understood and identified clearly it is necessary to apply 
some of the ideas we have developed previously in the context 
of the sample villages. This will help to locate the various 
modes and particularly the dominant mode of production.
It will be possible to decide, for instance, whether the 
dominant mode of production, distribution and circulation 
is one of feudal, capitalist or peasant form. In other 
words, the examination of the data along the above lines 
will indicate whether the dominant structure of the rela­
tionships that people enter into In the process of pro­
duction is that of landlord and share-cropper, capitalist 
farmer and wage labourer or peasant (in which the labourer 
and the non-labouring owners of land are merged into one 
class)•
This is the pre-requisite to the testing of my hypothesis, 
i.e. that ecology plays a mediating role in the way class 
relations in the rural areas are structured and evolve 
over time. Only if and when we know that one village is 
dominated by a structure of capitalist farmer and wage 
labour relationship, for example, can we examine to what 
extent this difference in the class relation is due to 
differences in ecology between the villages.
Section I
Distribution of the Means of Production
In this section we may begin by describing an overall 
•relation of possession and separation' with respect to 
the principal means of production, land, and the distri­
bution of some of the other basic means of production such 
as bullocks and ploughs.
In Table 5.1.1, three basic means of production - land, 
bullocks and ploughs - appear to be distributed very 
similarly. Landlessness is highest in Bajua with 38.1 
per cent and lowest in Biddya with 23.7 per cent. The 
point to note is that Bajua which has the largest percentage 
of landless peasants also has the largest percentage of 
people with no bullocks and ploughs (20.21 per cent).
For these people, separation from the means of production 
is absolute. If we compare access to land and the other 
two means of production we see that in Jamira although 
73.10 per cent of households have, land, a much higher 
percentage have bullocks and ploughs which are hired out 
in peak periods. The pattern is different in Bajua and 
Biddya and, in fact, in Bajua not all landowners have 
bullocks and ploughs. So clearly these households either 
rent-out their land or hire bullocks and ploughs for 
cultivation under self-management.
Land is, however, the most important means of production 
even more so than money in the sense that unlike the 
latter it is not a means of consumption.
Whereas Table 5.1.1 gives only the breakdown between the 
landless and the landownersp Table 5.1.2 also shows how
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land is distributed : in all three villages a minority 
own much of the land and the majority own very little 
land. If the entire population of the villages is taken 
into account, it can be seen that in Bajua as much as 
66.5 per cent of households (consisting of the ’land­
less1 and the ’poor’) have only 12 per cent (col.4) of 
the land, whereas the top 7.3 per cent ('surplus' and 
'rich' together; col.2) own over 50 per cent of the land. 
Corresponding figures for Biddya are 63.7 per cent owning 
only 16.8 per cent and at the top 12.5 per cent of the 
peasants owning almost 50 per cent of the land and in 
Jamira as against the bottom 56.1 per cents' 10.6 per 
cent of the land, the top two classes who make up about 
11 per cent of the population own just under 50 per cent 
of the land. So it seems that although Bajua is the most 
polarised of the three villages as can be seen from the 
Concentration Ratio (col.5)» the land distribution 
pattern is similar in all three villages.
It has already been argued that the ecology of the 
Sundarbans played an important part in the differential 
access to land in the south (Chapter 2). The important 
point here is to see how this relative access to land, 
structures the relations of production in the three 
villages and whether these relations of production consti­
tute the same or different modes of production. In theory 
the mode(s), particularly the contradictions of the 
dominant mode articulated through the notions of relations 
of production, will define the class structure in the 
villages.
I shall try to identify these modes by examining the 
four different - sometimes overlapping - relations of 
production that have already been underlined in the last
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chapter : wage labour, share-cropping, market and usury, 
I shall begin with wage labour and try to establish 
whether or not there is capitalism in agriculture in 
any or all of the three villages.
Section II
Wage Labour
Table 5*2.1 gives the basic data by village and by class.
It can be seen that the extent of wage labour use is 
substantial in all the three villages and falls below 
50 per cent only in Jamira where it constitutes only
37.7 per cent of total labour use in farming the rest 
being family labour. In the other two villages, it is 
52 per cent for Biddya and 56 per cent for Bajua, So 
in any case a very high proportion of total agricultural 
labour use in these three villages is hired labour.
Therefore at least for the two villages - Bajua and Biddya - 
it cannot be said that production is mainly carried out 
by family labour on family land, and one might be tempted 
to say that this is an index of capitalism. But of course 
wage labour is not a sufficient definition of capitalism 
and in some circumstances it may not even be necessary.
To argue the incidence of capitalism it is necessary to 
look into the whole process of surplus generation and 
appropriation. This includes the circulation of commodities. 
Therefore at a later stage the circulation of commodities 
will be related to participation in the market by those 
who hire wage labour.
Wage labour is by no means used only by the rich and the 
surplus farmers though clearly they use more than the 
poorer farmers. This may be explained by the fact that 
they have more surplus land than can be cultivated using 
family labour and therefore they need to hire more wage 
labour. In any case the poorer farmers including the 
landless who of course do not have any land of their own
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but share crop-in, also hire some wage labour to cultivate 
their agricultural holdings. Thus, in the second village, 
Biddya, a substantial percentage (34.6 per cent) of total 
labour use by the landless, is wage labour use. In the 
other two villages, wage labour use as a percentage of 
total labour use, for the landless, is lower, especially 
in Jamira where the figure is 4,1 per cent, the correspon­
ding figure for Bajua being 22.5 per cent.
The point is, however, that in the first two villages,
Bajua and Biddya, all classes below the surplus class 
category use substantial wage labour in proportion to 
their total labour use. Therefore at least for the first 
two villages, Bajua and Biddya it is not possible to 
argue that wage labour is entirely a relation between 
rich hirers of labour and poor labourers. It, in fact, 
seems to be an intra-class as well as an inter-class 
relation.
The picture is clearer for Jamira where, compared with 
the other two villages, the poor use very little wage 
labour and the rich use substantially more of the propor­
tion of total hired labour in the village than in the 
other two villages. In this village the rich and the 
surplus together use 72.8 per cent of the total hired 
labour for the village compared to 54*1 per cent and
60.7 per cent respectively for Bajua and Biddya. Therefore 
in Jamira at least, one could say that wage labour is, in 
fact, primarily an inter-class relation between the rich 
and the poor.
Turning from the extent and prevalence of wage labour as 
seen from the users point of view, we can now take the 
alternative position and ask to what extent is there a 
class who depend either exclusively or at least, mainly
on wage labour. In Table 5.2,2 we find that, in fact, 
not even in the poorest class do all households depend 
exclusively on wage labour as a means of livelihood.
Even among the landless, the percentage of households 
doing wage labour varies from 57.8 per cent in Bajua to 
52.6 per cent in Biddya and 47,8 per cent in Jamira. 
Therefore, it seems that more than half the households 
in the first two villages and almost half in the third 
village in the landless category depend on wage labour 
for their livelihood while the remaining households in 
this category depend primarily on other occupations such 
as artisan work, petty-trades, fishing, weaving and other 
forms of self-employment which differ from village to 
village. So far as they are self-employed in these 
occupations, these landless peasants are not the classical 
proletariat in a Marxian sense.^
Thus, even with the present class divisions, wage labour 
does not seem to be an exclusive means of livelihood 
for any one class. The wage labourers, of course, could 
still be defined as a class of proletariat, cutting across 
this system of classification. Before we go into this, 
however, let us see in the first place whether or not the 
48 landless families in Bajua doing wage labour are exclu­
sively dependent on it.
1. Here unfortunately we are not looking at the total rural 
society and therefore not looking at the relations of 
production in the other sectors of production. It is, 
of course, possible, for example, that the coir manu­
facturer in Jamira does not own his Machine' and that 
it is in fact owned by the money-lender or the landowner 
who1s land he might be share-cropping. In that case, 
he is effectively part of the proletariat. He is in 
fact at the stage mentioned by Marx as immediately 
preceding manufacture proper i.e. a kind of putting 
out system.
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The right hand side of Table 5.2.2 may answer this question. 
Here we have a two way classification where the total 
number of families doing wage work within each stratum are 
classified in terms of the percentage of their total 
labour days spent in wage labour. Here we see that in the 
first village, Bajua, of the 48 landless families as 
many as 43 households spend 50 per cent or less of their 
total labour days in wage labour. Only for 3 households 
is wage labour as a percentage of total labour between 
50 and 75 per cent and for 2 households does it exceed 
75 per cent. For the poor, the picture is similar. Out 
of a total of 52, for instance, as many as 40 households 
spend less than 50 per cent of their total labour days 
in wage labour. Out of these as many as 22 households 
spend less than 25 per cent of their total labour days in 
doing wage labour and none spend more than 75 per cent.
This pattern holds more or less for all the villages. In 
Jamira in fact there is only one landless family out of 
a total of 22 doing wage labour that supplies wage labour 
for more than 25 per cent of its total labour days. None 
spends more than 50 per cent of its labour days in wage 
labour.
Thus, this again casts doubt on the existence of a totally 
expropriated class in the sample villages especially 
in Jamira. This, however, depends on why they are doing 
other kinds of work and more importantly what kind of 
return they are getting from this work.
Table 5.2.3 gives average work days and income per worker 
of the wage labour supplying households for the three 
major occupations in the villages.
VI 2* 6 7
Table 5.2.3
Average labour-davs worked and income received : per day, 
per worker.
Villages
OCCUPATION
Wage Labour Coir-making Fishing
Days Tk Days Tk Days Tk
Ba j ua 63 9.7 _ 18.4 7.9
Biddya 49 6.7 - - 35.0 9.5
Jamira 26 8.2 128 3.5 - -
Source : Field Work 1976-77
It seems that on average, with the exception of Biddya, 
in both Bajua and Jamira the rate of return is significantly 
higher for wage labour compared to the alternative occu­
pations available. We could, therefore, assume that wage 
labour would be preferred to other work but because wage 
labour is not available throughout the year wage labourers 
are forced into occupations which give a lower rate of 
return. Not doing wage labour, therefore, for them is not 
a voluntary choice and therefore they may in fact, be 
a class of proletariat.
Table 5,2,4- concentrates only on the main employers of 
wage labour, the self-sufficient, surplus and rich farmers. 
For these classes we shall see to what extent there is a 
variation in terms of the amount of wage labour used.
This table shows that in Bajua out of 31 farms in these 
categories 11 or 35.5 per cent (col.9 and 10) of the
households use more than 75 per cent hired labour and 
15 or 4-8.4* per cent use between 51 and 75 per cent hired 
labour. So if we made an arbitrary classification and 
said that farms which use more than 50 per cent hired 
labour are capitalist, then we might say that in Bajua 
the majority of the farms are capitalist in this particular 
restricted sense. Here only 4- out of 31 households in 
these three categories that is, only 12.8 per cent use 
less than 50 per cent hired labour. If surplus and rich
farmers oialy are considered, we find that no family uses
less than 50 per cent hired labour and in fact, in the
rich stratum all five households use over 75 per cent
hired labour.
In the two remaining villages, Biddya and Jamira, the 
picture is slightly different in that in both villages 
more than 50 per cent of the households in these three 
categories taken together (self-sufficient, surplus and 
rich) use less than 50 per cent wage labour. The figures 
for Biddya are 10 (col.3 and 5) out of 19 (col.l) and for 
Jamira 23 out of 4-0 households. However, if the self- 
sufficient stratum is disregarded and only the surplus 
and the rich strata are taken into account, then the 
wage labour use pattern for these two villages is not 
different from Bajua. In Biddya, when only these two 
classes are taken into account, only 1 out of 10, or 10 
per cent of the households fall into the 50 per cent 
wage labour use category and as many as 4-0 per cent in 
fact use between 75 and 100 per cent wage labour. In 
Jamira, on the other hand, as many as 16 out of 19» in 
other words, 84..2 per cent of the households hire more 
than 50 per cent of their total labour requirement.
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This, however, by itself is not sufficient information 
since clearly the surplus producers have to do something 
to cultivate their excess land and in this they have to 
choose basically between employing wage labour and share- 
cropping, So when comparing these two forms of disposing 
of surplus land we should be ablg to appreciate properly 
their relative importance. For the moment what we see 
is that the rich use more hired labour and the degree 
to which their use of hired labour is different in every 
village can be seen in the context of how they tackle 
the problem of cultivation; whether for instance, they 
are share-cropping. This will be discussed later. It 
is clear, however, that on the basis of an arbitrary 
classification of 50 per cent plus criterion, the surplus 
and the rich strata in Biddya and Jamira can be called 
capitalist just as we have considered the self-sufficient 
surplus and the rich, capitalist in Bajua subject to 
further investigation into other relations of production.
Table 5.2.5 represents an attempt to identify capitalist 
farmers.^ Rudra correlated four variables ; owner 
cultivation, extent of wage labour, use of machinery and 
extent of marketing. He collected data on these variable 
for farmers owning approximately 30 acres in the Punjab. 
He wanted to establish the existence of a systematic 
relation between these variables and in this way to 
identify the capitalist farmers. This analysis in fact, 
led to the Indian debate on the mode of production.
1. This is carried out in the manner of Ashok Rudra1s 
early attempt in which he identified the capitalist 
farmers in the Punjab, excepting that here we are not 
dealing with either as many variables or using such 
sophisticated techniques. See Rudra:197Q.
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This is an attempt along the same lines if in a simpler 
and cruder way, I am investigating the relation between 
use of wage labour and extent of marketing for paddy for 
the rich and surplus strata put together. On the face of 
it, the visual pattern of the table indicates that there 
is a reasonable correlation between the two variables.
If a diagonal is drawn, running from top left to bottom 
right most of the observations seem to be clustered 
slightly above the diagonal which indicates almost imme­
diately that there may be a correlation; that is house­
holds hiring more wage labour, market more. There is in 
fact a significant difference between those marketing more 
and those marketing less paddy in terms of wage labour use. 
In village terms it can be seen that the correlation is 
strongest in Bajua where 9 (col.6) out of 14- (col.2) or 
64 per cent of the surplus producing households hiring 
between 76 per cent and 100 per cent wage labour market over 
51 per cent of their produce.
This clearly shows that there is a capitalist sector in 
each of the three villages and that it is particularly 
strong in Bajua. Going back to Rudra, he observed no 
correlation among his four variables and therefore 
concluded that there was no capitalism in agriculture in 
the Punjab. Utsa Patnaik, however, disputes this 
on the basis that Rudra*s test would have held only if 
capitalism was the dominant mode in the Punjab agriculture.2
1. Significant at the 95% confidence level. For details 
see Appendix IV.
2, See Patnaik:1971a and 1971b. For further details on 
the Indian debate, see Patnaik:1972a, 1972b, 1972c; 
Chattopadhaya:1972a, 1972b; Rudra:1970 and 1974 and 
Frank:1973.
Otherwise, she stressed, one oould not expect any strong 
relationship between the variables. The point is, we 
have observed a clear relationship between the two 
variables we have been considering and this seems to 
suggest that there is a capitalist sector in these three 
villages. In fact, if Patnaik was right in saying that 
this correlation would hold only where capitalism was 
dominant than one might even be tempted to argue that 
capitalism is dominant in these three villages especially 
in Bajua which demonstrates a very strong capitalist base.
While it is quite true that not observing a correlation 
between Rudra*s four variables did not prove that there 
was no capitalism, I would in fact dispute with Patnaik 
that while observing this correlation particularly among 
the rich farmers certainly points to the existence of a 
sector that can probably be called capitalist at least 
in some sense of the word, it does not mean that capitalism 
Is dominant. To elaborate this of course, it is necessary 
to explain what is meant by dominance. Firstly, it 
involves a quantitative dominance, that is, how many 
farmers are there in these two categories (surplus and rich) 
compared with the rest of the farmers and more importantly, 
what percentage of the total produce do they account for ? 
Then there are questions of dominance in terms of wage 
labour use and marketing of surplus produce. It is only 
after these areas of dominance have been looked at that 
we can say that this sector which we have provisionally 
called capitalist is in fact the dominant sector.
Another criterion that Patnaik wanted to use was re­
investment in agriculture or dynamism. I do not have 
the data to show how intensive the surplus producers1
production techniques are compared to the other farmers 
but I have data to show what proportion of their income 
is spent on production. Table 5.2.6 shows that propor­
tionately the surplus and the rich farmers in all three 
villages invest a much higher percentage of their income 
in production than do the other farmers.
This is particularly the case in Bajua where the rich re­
invest as much as 25 per cent and the surplus farmers
22.1 per cent of their income in production. To the extent 
that re-investment is an indication of dynamism, the 
sector we have provisionally identified as capitalist is 
certainly dynamic especially in Bajua. In Bajua, in 
fact, re-investment in agriculture is the single largest 
overhead expenditure for the surplus producing farmers.
This also holds for the rich peasants in Jamira but neither 
for the surplus farmers in Jamira nor for any of the two 
surplus producing categories in Biddya is this true. In 
Biddya in fact, the surplus farmers spend as much as 18 
per cent and the rich as much as 32,9 per cent (col.8) on
'others1 which includes mainly ceremonial and childrens' 
educational expenses in the cities. They also spend a 
high percentage of their income on land purchases which 
includes urban property. The figures are respectively
31.2 per cent and 21.7 per cent (col.5). So it seems 
that in Biddya, the surplus of the big farmers tends to 
be siphoned off into urban property, childrens' education 
and various forms of ostentatious consumption for example 
and these are more feudal characteristics than capitalist.
With regard to ^dynamism' I think, however, that Patnaik 
was wrong in that she was deliberately restricting her 
definition of capitalism and that in a way is begging the 
question. Why for instance, should it be assumed that 
capitalism is always dynamic, Marx of course, did suggest
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5.2.6 
EXPi^DI?
this hut then he was referring more to European countries 
and he had a great deal of optimism about the constructive 
role of capitalism in the colonies. But this again becomes 
almost a verbal battle. Should a sector, for instance, 
be called capitalist if it shows all the other character­
istics of capitalism but no dynamism? If not what should 
it be called? There is, as yet, no definitive answer to 
this, however, I would be inclined to call it backward 
capitalism.
Another relationship we might look into, is between variations 
in marketed surplus and the extent of share-cropping. It 
is in fact, quite possible that large farmers who depend 
heavily on share-cropping also market a very large portion 
of their produce. If this is so, then of course the corre­
lation between wage labour and marketing loses some of its 
relevance. So in fact what we are observing is a correla­
tion between wealth and marketing and not really between 
one mode of appropriation of surplus and marketing. This 
will become clearer on analysis of share-cropping behaviour.
Of course it stands to reason that of two farmers who have 
the same amount of land, if one uses wage labour and the 
other share-crops, then the one who uses wage labour will 
in fact market more. This can be argued from two directions:
(i) because he is cultivating all the land under his own 
control and collecting the entire produce and he will have 
more to market. Whereas the farmer who cultivates his land 
on a share-cropping basis gets only half the crop so he 
will only have half the amount in the first place to market.
(ii) The man who hires wage labour has to pay his labourers
in money^ and to this extent he is in a way, forced to 
market. Therefore, in this sense one would indeed expect 
that rich farmers using wage labour would market more than 
rich farmers using share-cropping as a mode of surplus 
appropriation. However, although this seems to be logically 
quite unassailable we shall still look at the data below 
and examine the pattern more closely.
In Table 5.2.7 the total labour in agriculture in each of
these villages has been broken down into four components,
(i) Total wage labour (col.5) whether used on owned or
rented-in land; (ii) of the remaining labour, which is
of course family labour, family labour used on owned
land (col.2); (iii) family labour used on share-cropped
land (col.5) and finally (iv) family labour used on land
cultivated in forms other than share-cropping (col.8).
The last category, however, is very minor and therefore
o
we may disregard it for the moment.
1. Cash payment is the dominant mode of payment in Bangladesh 
(Government of Bangladesh - FAO/UNDP Mission:Agricultural 
Employment in Bangladesh:1977:14-17),
2. I do not have labour use figures under different cate­
gories of holding i.e. self-managed, share-cropped and 
other forms and in fact, no farmer was in a position
to separate their total labour use in this way. In this 
table it is assumed that both family labour and hired 
labour use are uniform under these categories of holdings 
so that each category absorbs labour in the proportion 
in which it stands to the total operated area. For 
instance, if the farmer operates 4 acres of owned and 
1 acre of rented-in land so that owned land is 80 per 
cent and rented-in land 20 per cent of total operated 
area, then it is assumed that the family labour supplied, 
as well as hired labour employed, is exactly 80 per cent 
to owned and 20 per cent to rented-in land. Admittedly, 
this estimate might tend to over-estimate total labour 
applied on share-cropped land.
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Taking family labour we can see that in the first village, 
Bajua, of the total family labour 22.4. per cent is used 
on owned land and 18,3 per cent on share-cropped land.
As the difference in labour use between the two categories 
is slight one might be tempted to say that as forms of 
appropriation, self-exploitation and share-cropping are 
almost equally important. In Biddya the situation is 
similar with 28.3 per cent of family labour employed on 
owned land and 17 per cent on share-cropped land. But 
the picture is very different in Jamira where as much 
as 52.6 per cent of family labour is employed on owned 
land and only 8 per cent on share-cropped land.
So, from this point of view Jamira seems to approximate 
more to a peasant economy type of village with considerably 
more family labour use on owned land than on share-cropped 
land and also with less wage labour use compared to the 
other two villages. On the other hand, it was seen earlier 
that in terms of the polarisation of hired labour use, 
in that the share of total wage labour use of the top 
groups was much greater (see Table 5.2,1), Jamira was more 
capitalist. In other words, the division between the 
owrkers and the employers is much sharper here than in 
the other two villages.
So in so far as wage labour use is an index of capitalism 
it seems that there is no good reason why we should not 
say that there is a capitalist sector in these three 
villages. The point is however, that although wage labour 
use is a necessary condition, it is not a sufficient 
condition for locating capitalist production. Before 
it can be said for certain that there is a capitalist 
sector in these villages ® this is seen in the production
behaviour of the top two surplus producing groups - 
it is important for us to show that these farmers are 
substantially dependent on the market. In other words 
that they use hired labour and sell most of their produce 
in the market in order to maximise profit.
This is the basis of the next section.
Section III
Market
Table 5*3*1 and Table 5*3.2 show respectively, marketed 
agricultural produce, paddy, and non-agricultural produce. 
The commonly marketed non-agricultural products are coco­
nut and coconut products, mainly coir (especially in 
Jamira), fish (in Bajua and Biddya), poultry, betel-nut, 
pan (chewing leaf), gur (date-palm molasses), and home­
grown vegetables.
Table 5*3.1 shows that in none of the three villages 
does the percentage of households marketing exceed 50 
per cent which is our arbitrary quantitative criterion 
for capitalism. In fact in each of the three villages, 
less than 4-0 per cent of the households market paddy. It 
is 39*4* per cent in Bajua, 4-0.0 per cent in Biddya and 
35*1 per cent in Jamira (col.l). At the village level, 
marketed produce as a percentage of total disposable 
produce is even less and this is 24-.6 per cent, 25.1 per 
cent and 30,7 per cent respectively in the three villages. 
So, on the basis of this, in so far as marketing is an 
index of capitalism, it would be difficult to suggest 
than any one of these villages as a whole is capitalist.
However, on analysis of the class level data, the situation 
changes. Oth^r'than the two poorest classes, in all 
other groups well over 50 per cent of the households 
market paddy with the exception of Jamira where the 
subsistence class does not meet this 50 per cent mark.
In the rich farmer class all households market paddy (col.l) 
and in all the three villages they market more than 50
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5.3.1 
MARKETED 
AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCE 
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A
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Y
)/paddy 
in 
naunds, 
value 
in 
taka
per cent of their produce (col.5). However, no other 
classes sell more than 50 per cent of their disposable 
produce (col.5)* and this gives us another interesting 
insight in that it shows that th? rich in fact, depend 
on marketed paddy for almost all their cash earnings.
The value of their marketed paddy as a percentage of 
their total cash earnings is 92.0 per cent in Bajua,
400 per cent in Biddya and 83*6 per cent in Jamira.
As regards marketed non-agricultural produce, it can be 
seen from Table 5.3.2 that for Biddya and Bajua neither 
at the village level nor at the class level does the 
percentage of households marketing exceed the 50 per cent 
mark. In Jamira, however, in the two poorest classes, 
landless and poor respectively, 63.0 per cent and 74.0 per 
cent of the households market non-agricultural produce 
(col.2). This is explained by the widespread practice of 
coir-making in Jamira and as can be seen from column 7, 
this accounts for 37.3 and 30.6 per cent respectively 
of their cash earnings. In other words, one could argue 
that in Jamira these two groups, in the absence of coir, 
would have been that much poorer and that much more 
dependent on the landowners either as share-croppers or 
as wage labourers. Coir-making, however, has been made 
possible by what I have called ecologically based 
diversification in Jamira and to that extent the economic 
stability of the poorer peasants and in turn their rela­
tively lower dependence on wage labour or share-cropping 
relations may be explained ecologically.
So it emerges from these two tables on marketed produce 
that although none of the villages can be said to be 
capitalist on the basis of a market criterion, there is 
a small but strong class of capitalists in all three
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villages which are identified with the rich and perhaps
to a lesser degree with the surplus farmers. The tables
also show Jamira as the most commercial village. This,
however, does not make Jamira more of a capitalist village as has
been seen in the analysis of wage labour use. In terms
of wage labour use it was seen that in Jamira, production
is in fact predominantly based on family labour (62.0 per
cent; Table 5.2.1, col.5). In addition, in Jamira each
class uses proportionately more family labour than their
corresponding classes in Bajua and Biddya. And as has
been explained earlier, family labour use is an indicator
of peasant or petty commodity production.
One reason for Jamira being the more commercial of the 
three villages, in other words being more involved in 
the market is, of course, its accessibility to the 
national market (Chapter 3). The other, however, is the 
form of payment as can be seen from Table 5.3.3. This 
table shows that 90 per cent of payments to hired labourers 
are made in cash as opposed to crop payment, which is 
normally paddy. Comparative figures for Bajua and Biddya 
are 59 and 29 per cent respectively.
As argued earlier (Chapter 4-)# wage labour paid in cash 
implies a higher level of commercialization because the 
labourers themselves then have to buy their rice and other 
commodities from the market. If, on the other hand, payment 
is made in paddy, which is consumable there is no need for 
the labourers to go to the market.^ To the extent that 
crop payment demonstrates a lack of dynamism, it could be 
seen as a feudal characteristic and in this sense Biddya 
with 71 per cent of its total payments made to wage labourers 
in kind, is more of a feudal village.
1. There is no evidence to show that labourers sell their 
crop wages although 17.2 per cent of Food for Relief 
Workers, paid in wheat, sell their share in the market. 
(Economic and Nutritional Effects of Food for Relief 
Work Projects" institute of Nutrition and Food Science, 
University of Dacca, March 1978).
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Having examined the marketing behaviour of the farmers 
in the sample villages we may now return to the crucial 
question. Is it possible to say that any of the three 
villages are distinctly capitalist? Or that there is a 
capitalist sector in these villages?
To the extent that wage labour use and marketing behaviour 
are indices of capitalism, it seems that the rich farmers 
and also to a large extent the surplus farmers in all 
three villages do constitute a component of the capita­
list mode of production in agriculture in Bangladesh.
This is, one would say, an extension of the national 
capitalism into the rural area. Even though, unlike a 
typical industrial enterprise, the families of the well- 
endowed strata participate to some extent in the production 
process, their dependence on wage labour is heavy. Secondly, 
their dependence on the market is also substantial in 
that a large part of the produce is sold.
However, we must hesitate before applying the capitalist 
label to this form of production since we do not know 
how stable these enterprises are, and to what extent they 
are still subject to divisions and partitions through the 
laws of inheritance and through demographic pressures 
which could mean transformation into something other than 
capitalist enterprises.
If it is still the tendency for an enterprise to stay 
dominant for sometime and then, due essentially to 
demographic pressures to be fragmented and become small 
peasant property and subsistence or semi-subsistence, 
then one might have some doubts about the reasonableness 
of calling this a capitalist form. Because it is expected 
that one of the characteristics of capitalist production
is that it reproduces itself at the same level at least, 
and even on an expanded scale.^
Although this argument has some force, I do not have
adequate data to be able to pronounce definitely that
these farms are bound to be fragmented on the death of
the current owner. However, it is possible that the current
owner is m  fact investing enough in (a) his childrens’
education and (b) in other forms of property especially
urban property and other forms of assets to ensure that
the property need not be divided when he dies and one
son may be able to take it over intact. Without
adequate information on this it is not possible to say
for certain whether this form of production is stabilizing 
or not.
The second reason for hesitation before calling this form 
of production capitalist, follows from the first. These 
enterprises even though they meet the two basic criteria, 
i.e. commodity production and wage labour, with the exception 
of the ones in Bajua, do not display another characteristic 
expected of a capitalist enterprise which is re-investment and 
expansion, a point that Dtsa Patnaik made much of and has been 
dealt with in some detail earlier. The question we need 
to ask m  this context is whether in fact, capitalism can
1. Against this of course, one can argue that even can!
is e s s e n t i a l l ^ r i f ?  banJ:ruPt and dissolve. But this 
m  i t • different process. Bankruntcv and
subsequent dissolution is a process that is H s e S
m a ^ a t r ?  by thS 2arket’ instance, a large farm
have to se!iaoff h i s h a n d ^ d  Pri°eS “ d the farmer woulda t m  h* ftii • ? land and move away. This would
fact that laWS 0f caPitalism. But theiact that sneer growth m  numbers can <3t-i*n ^i
dominant role would indicate that even if it ■+ t
it is not still stabilized or self-sustaining'capi^alismf
fulfil this historic Mission1 of dynamism (Lenin:196k: 
602-607) in the periphery.
It may be that the basis of underdevelopment rests on 
the fact that it cannot. In other words when capitalism 
takes root in a backward economy and in a backward sector 
of production, it cannot attain that sort of dynamism.
The reason being partly to do with the nature of the pre­
existing agrarian structure. For example, part of the 
reason may well be the nature of landed property especially 
the scattered form of peasant property so that it is 
difficult to consolidate; partly it is a question of 
available technologies and the extent to which farmers 
can depend on them, it takes time to acquire confidence 
in new techniques of production; and partly it is a 
question of the state of the national market - the limited 
urbanisation and industrialisation which leads to a 
limited and uncertain market. So it may be reasonable to 
say that stagnation is a characteristic of what I have 
called backward capitalism.
The third reason for questionning the characterisation 
of this particular sector as capitalist, is the relative 
immobility of the major means of production. While 
legally, land is indeed a commodity in that people can 
freely sell it, in point of fact it is still mainly 
inherited. It is not an area where one buys an enterprise 
and starts operating it; nor is it like buying a share 
in an enterprise. It does not depend for its financing 
on any organised capital market. This, however, probably 
says more about the stage of development of capitalism 
rather than whether it is capitalism or not. Land is a 
very special sort of property and it will always carry
with it some non-economic values which inhibit its 
becoming as freely transferable as shares in an industrial 
corporation. To this extent perhaps the tendencies 
towards the centralization of capital and the concentration 
of capital will always be less in agriculture than in 
industry •
There are of course, other purely technical reasons.
For instance, economies of scale are probably less important 
in agriculture and more so especially in rice cultivation 
than in wheat cultivation. So for all these reasons, 
capitalism in agriculture will always be different from 
capitalism in industry and this has in fact, been pointed 
out by Marx and especially by later writers such as 
Lenin and Kautsky,^*
On the whole, therefore, these reservations need to be 
kept in mind. So I would submit, on the evidence, that 
there is a capitalist sector in these villages and that 
in the case of Bajua this is probably the dominant sector. 
Therefore, these two top groups can be identified as local 
capitalists who are a segment of the national capitalist class. 
Politically, there may be differences of interest or a 
lack of awareness of the unity of their class position, 
but at the economic level they constitute a fraction of 
the capitalist class.
Corresponding to the capitalist class in these villages,
1. See Lenin, V.I.: The Development of Capitalism in Russia: 
Progress Publishers, Moscow: 186-190, 315-322, 373-388,
5 A 6-556; also Banaji, J.: Summary of selected parts of 
Kautsky's The Agrarian Question in Economy and Society 
Vol.5» No.l, February 1976.
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we may identify a class of wage labourers who are hired 
by the capitalist farmers to work in their fields. In 
the sense that they are Separated1 from the means of 
production, and the surplus value they produce is appr­
opriated by the class of capitalists, they are the de facto 
proletariat* So at this stage we have identified two 
classes•
The next question that logically arises is whether all 
the surplus producing farmers are capitalists ? If so 
does this mean there are no surplus producing farmers 
whom we can call feudal ? Is there an element of feudalism 
or semi-feudalism as some prefer to ©all it, in these 
three villages ? These questions are examined in the 
next section.
Section IV
Share-Cropping
This leads us naturally to a search for a feudal sector, 
identification of which must involve an analysis of rent 
relations•
Table 5.4-.1 gives a broad breakdown of the three villages 
at the aggregate level, in terms of the extent of pure 
owner operated, renting-in and renting-out households 
and area. Rent relations exist between the households 
renting-in and the households renting-out. On the other 
hand the first group, the pure owner cultivator may be 
identified with the pure peasant mode. This peasant 
sector varies from 29.8 per cent in Bajua to 33*7 per 
cent in Biddya and 38,6 per cent in Jamira in terms of 
the number of households and these households seem to 
own more land in proportion to their numbers than, say 
the owner cum tenants. The owner cum tenants are generally 
the dependent farmers who normally rent-in as much land 
as they can farm with their family labour. The house­
holds renting-out, on the other hand, own disproportionately 
more of the total land of the village which is of course 
what one would expect because, by and large, the renting- 
out households are the richer households. Although 
some poor households rent-out some land as we shall see 
later, on balance clearly it seems that it is the rich 
who rent-out the majority of the rented-out land. Thus, 
it is the differential access to land that determines 
the relations of dominance and dependance in rent relations.
Here of course, it should be noted that, even within the 
broad category of rent, there are different forms of having 
land cultivated by others, wage labour apart. The dominant
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form in Bangladesh, as is well known, is share-cropping 
and Table 5.4*2 shows the extent to which share-cropping 
is dominant. This table shows that, out of the rented-in 
land between 82 per cent (Jamira) and 87 per cent (Bajua) 
is share-cropped and if we take rented-out land then share- 
cropped land varies from almost 71 per cent in Biddya to 
as much as 98 per cent in Bajua. The difference between 
renting-in and renting-out figures, which occurs quite 
frequently, may be due partly to reporting error and partly 
to the fact that Bajua and Biddya are both areas in which 
absentee landlordism is fairly extensive. For instance 
one may deduce from the higher percentage of rented-out 
land in Bajua and in Biddya compared to rented-in land 
under share-cropping that share-cropping out is preferred 
to other forms by the absentee landlords. This would 
explain why share-cropping is more preponderant under 
renting-out.
Table 5.4*3 gives an idea of the importance of share- 
cropping. Because share-cropping is the dominant form 
of rent relation! have decided to limit this discussion 
to share-cropping
This table indicates the importance of share-cropping 
as a mechanism of surplus appropriation by showing what
1* However, it must be remembered that, as we shall see 
later, among the rich and surplus farmers the other 
forms of rent relations, especially from the renting- 
in point of view, can be quite important. But since, 
in any -they rent in very little land on the whole,
it is not very relevant. Therefore, I shall concentrate 
on share-cropping which is quantitatively dominant 
and is much more in accord with the concept of feudalism
as it is understood in the South Asian context.
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percentage of total produce is extracted as share-rent.
Here again there is a difference between the share 
reported as being received and the share reported as 
being paid. As before, part of the difference is un­
doubtedly due to the presence of absentee landlords.
In Bajua, for example, share-paid amounts to 17.1 per 
cent of the gross produce whereas share-received amounts 
to only 7.6 per cent. One may perhaps deduce that, 
reporting errors apart, the balance is what goes out of 
the village to the absentee landlords. Similarly in 
Biddya, share-received is 10.2 per cent of total produce 
and share-paid 14-*3 per cent. This also could well be 
because absentee landlords take away their share. In 
Jamira, on the other hand, the difference is much less.
As absentee landlordism is insignificant, this descrepancy 
could be explained by the apparently universal phenomenon 
that those who rent-out land tend to understate the amount 
of land that they have rented-out so that they will also 
understate the amount of the crop-share received.
In order to form an idea of the precise way in which 
share-cropping relates tenants and landlords and in 
particular whether this relation approximates to anything 
we might want to call feudal, it is necessary to look at 
the precise inter-class relations. These can be examined 
using Table 5 -4- • 4- and Table 5-4*5 which give data on 
households renting-in land and renting-out land respectively.
Here we can get some idea of the importance of share- 
cropping for different classes. It is important to 
point out, following our argument in the last chapter, 
that if share-cropping has to have a significant effect 
on the forces of production and broadly on the dynamics 
of reproduction, then the household which is only renting 
must be to an extent critically dependent on the rent 
relation. So let us say that households above subsistence
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level by definition can make do even without share-cropping 
so that for them rent is not a crucial factor even if 
they do rent-in land which as we will see, they do* But 
for those below subsistence one could say that they cannot 
do without share-cropping and therefore in their economy, 
rent plays an important role. We see, for example, that 
although the percentage of share-croppers in different 
classes varies somewhat from village to village by and 
large, as we would expect, few rich or surplus families 
rent-in land. In the second village Biddya, however, a 
sizable number of surplus and self-sufficient farmers 
appear to be engaged in renting-in land. One way of 
looking at this would be that 37.5 per cent of the surplus 
and 22.2 per cent of the self-sufficient farmers rent-in 
land (Table 5.*4.1; col.l). Another way would be to look 
at column 2 which shows that of all those who rent-in 
land, 17.6 per cent are from the surplus category and
11.8 per cent are from the self-sufficient category.
Whereas for Bajua only 1.7 per cent of all share-croppers 
are from the rich category and 3.4- per cent from the 
surplus category. Therefore, we can see that share- 
cropping is, by and large, mostly done by the poorer classes 
and especially by the poor category as defined here. The 
poor here are the modal class in terms of involvement in 
share-cropping in the sense that in every village, of the 
total number of share-croppers, the larger proportion 
comes from the poor class. The figures are 39 per cent 
in Bajua, 4-1.2 per cent in Biddya and 4-8.8 per cent in 
Jamira (col.2).
In terms of rented-in land as a percentage of owned land 
in every village it is the poor class who take in more 
land. In Bajua they take in 185.1 per cent of their 
owned area (col.3), that is, they take in almost twice 
as much as they own. So clearly if these households were
3 0 1
deprived of access to land, they would be considerably 
worse off and probably could not, in fact, survive. In 
terms of produce, assuming that the productivity of the 
share-cropped land and owned land is about the same, they 
get almost half their produce or paddy income from share- 
cropping.
In Biddya, the precentage of share-cropped land to owned 
land for the poor is 88 per cent and in Jamira it is 
only 55.3 per cent (col.3). So dependence on share-cropping 
seems to be lower in Jamira. One could say that if in 
Jamira the poor were suddenly denied access to land by 
the rich farmers for share-cropping, then they would 
lose only about one-sixth of their total income. Although 
the effect of this could well be catastrophic, they would 
probably not starve.
The other classes are not heavily dependent on share-cropping 
in any of the three villages except perhaps the subsis­
tence households especially in Bajua and in Biddya. And 
that not so much perhaps in terms of the number of families 
(col.l) as in terms of land rented-in as a percentage of 
owned land. The figures are 68,8 per cent for Bajua 
and 80,2 per cent for Biddya (col.3). So in these two 
villages one might say that the poor and the subsistence 
are critically dependent for their survival on share- 
cropping. And to that extent we can identify this with 
a feudal relation.
Another point that should be investigated is the source 
of this land that is rented-in. Does it, for instance, 
define a reasonably clear relation between the poor and 
the rich ? Table 5.4-.5 showing the distribution of rented- 
out land in the three villages indicates this to be so.
For the village as a whole, the number of households renting-
out (col.l) is 13.3 per cent in Bajua, 23.7 per cent in
Biddya and 13*4- per cent in Jamira. So they are not a
very small minority. As we would expect, the extent of
participation in renting-out land varies directly with 
extent of landholding, with fewer of the poor farmers 
participating in share-cropping out land and the extent 
of participation increasing as one moves up the hierarchy 
of strata. For instance, in Bajua 60 per cent of the 
rich farmers rent-out land (col.l) and they rent-out 
52.9 per cent (col,5) of their owned land. In other words 
a little more than half of their land is rented-out.
Although in terms of percentage of owned land, the poor 
seem to rent-out more of their land, it is because they 
have so little land that those who rent-out tend to rent- 
out all their land usually because they are busy doing 
something else, wage labour, fishing or coir-manufacturing 
for instance. In Bajua, in fact, all the households who 
rent-out in every stratum rent-out more than half their 
land.
In Biddya, on the other hand, 34*4- per cent of the poor 
rent-out (col.l) and they rent-out 89.1 per cent of 
whatever land they have (col.5). In the subsistence 
group only 1 household rents-out land and they rent out 
all their land. The percentage of share-cropped out 
area drops for the self-sufficient class and then rises 
again for the surplus and the rich, the figures for the 
last two classes being 62.4 and 46.7 per cent respectively 
(col.5).
The pattern*, however, is a little different for Jamira 
where 14 per cent of the poor rent-out some land (col.l) 
and this is 68.6 per cent of their owned land (col.5).
Below this stratum, the percentages drop considerably but 
percentage-wise the rich seem to rent-out a very small 
proportion of their land. Although 60 per cent, or 3 out of 
5 rich peasants rent-out land they in fact rent-out only 
13.6 per cent of their land. But this is probably due 
to the fact that in Jamira even the rich are not very 
wealthy in terms of land ownership so that they prefer 
to retain most of it for their own cultivation.
What can be deduced from the share-cropping relations 
in the rental market ? There seem to be two distinct 
sources for the land that is available for share-cropping. 
One, from the poor and the subsistence and the other, 
from the surplus and the rich strata. But clearly, the 
two rent-out for very different reasons. When the poor 
rent-out their land it is because they need to free 
themselves for other activities and it is hardly worth 
their while retaining a small part of their land, which 
is very small anyway, so those who rent-out land mostly 
rent-out all their land. It is also evident that their 
land is mostly taken up by richer farmers. The poor 
farmer's piece of land which may be contiguous with the 
richer farmer's plot of land, is usually taken up by the 
latter for obvious reasons.
So this certainly is not share-cropping as a feudal relation, 
it is the opposite in fact. On the other hand, we see 
the rich renting-out their land, not because they need 
to free themselves for other activities, though in excep­
tional circumstances this may well be the case, but 
because they have more land than can be cultivated by 
family labour. But of course then the question arises 
as to what are the decisive factors in the farmers' 
choice between cultivating surplus land with wage labour 
or share-cropping out. We have already seen that the
1. Field work 1976-77.
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rich are very large consumers of wage labour. The 
question is whether within the rich or the surplus 
farmers themselves it is possible to distinguish between 
those who mostly cultivate with wage labour and those 
who mostly depend on share-cropping. This has been tried 
but no clear distinction could be made between the two.
The rich farmers and the surplus farmers do not neatly 
fall into one or the other category, they depend both 
on wage labour and share-cropping.
However what we have seen in terms of a farmer's choice 
between share-cropping out his land and cultivating it 
with wage labour, is that partly it is determined by the 
dispersion and distance of his plots from the homestead 
and partly by the extent of market penetration in the 
sense that this presupposes less share-cropping and more 
wage labour use.
One might also argue in so far as the motivation of the 
surplus producer is concerned whether he chooses to have 
share-croppers or wage labour will depend strictly on 
economic calculations. In a way, therefore, he is acting 
as a profit maximiser. Because the options are available 
to him, he will choose between the two forms of payment for 
labour and will choose the one that is most advantageous 
to him. On could ask however, and this is something for 
which time series data would be necessary, whether these 
two modes of surplus extraction are fighting for dominance. 
Does one try to erode the other ? Does the situation 
get more polarised if, say, the rich get more land ?
Is the tendency for both these modes to grow at the same 
rate so that if a man acquires ten extra acres of land 
he would give approximately half of it over to wage labour 
and half of it to share-cropping so that the two forms of 
surplus extraction remain in the same proportion to each 
other ?
The question is, are we justified in saying that the two 
forms of surplus appropriation represent two distinct 
relations of production or are they just two different 
ways of adjusting to family labour and land in balance ? 
Under what circumstances does a relation of surplus 
appropriation represent a relation of production ?
It would perhaps be a little simplistic to say that just 
because the same household does both, it means that the 
two forms of surplus appropriation are not two distinct 
relations of production. This would be confusing differ­
ent levels of analysis - the empirical and the abstract.
At a theoretical level there is no reason why the same 
physical household should not belong to two different 
modes of production and when they are being distributed 
as agents in different modes of production there is no 
reason why the same household cannot participate in both.
The question, however, is not quite that. Basically, 
there are three criteria in identifying a relation of 
production which have all been raised earlier. These 
are, firstly whether it makes a significant difference 
to the forces of production, secondly whether it makes 
a difference to the degree of market penetration and 
lastly whether it makes a difference at the political 
and ideological levels. However, I do not have the relevant 
data to find out one way or another. Some data on free 
labour supplied by tenants, which will be discussed 
below does seem to indicate that the share-cropping 
relation has some personalised, paternalistic and 
dependence elements built into it which are absent in 
the case of wage labour. But at this stage it is not 
possible to know how important these are and, whether 
they justify talking in terms of a different mode of
production still remains to be seen. It is necessary 
to establish for example, whether this free labour is 
supplied in the sphere of production (Althusser:1977:232). 
If it is, that is, if this free labour is labour done by 
the share-cropper on the landowners land for cultivation 
then we can say that it has a significant effect oa 
production relation and is a relation of production.
But if the free labour consists mostly of odd jobs for 
the household then this particular line of reasoning 
cannot be followed through.
The part of the economy of the rich peasants which is 
based on wage labour and commodity production is clearly 
identified with the agricultural sector of the national 
capitalism. this mean the part of the rich
peasantfs economy which is based on share-cropping may 
be identified as representing in some way a vestige or 
an element of feudalism, or 'semi-feudalism' in the rural 
economy*
Semi-feudalism is a term which has not been properly 
defined anywhere. It is suggested that it is almost 
feudal but not quite; therefore it is necessary to specify 
in what way it differs from feudalism and indeed in what 
way it resembles feudalism. One might say that it re­
sembles feudalism in that the mode of surplus extraction 
is rent and in this context particularly rent in kind.
One might also say that it resembles feudalism to the 
extent that there are some personal ties of dependence 
between the share-cropper and the landowner in that the 
landowner gets some free labour from the tenant. But 
then, there is also a reverse flow, admittedly insigni­
ficant, of occasional gifts on ceremonial days etc.
What is however, most important is that there is no link 
between disputes and the'landlord-tenant relation* In
1, In Althusser, L and Balibar, E:1977: Reading Capital; 
London; New Left Books.
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other words, at the nucleus of frictions that may be 
observed in these villages there does not tend to be 
the landlord and his share-croppers. So on balance, it 
is difficult to say at this stage whether or not there 
is feudalism or semi-feudalism in any of the three 
villages.
As regards the argument that there was feudalism at one 
stage and that share-cropping is a remnant of a form 
that was once wide spread and may have been the dominant 
form (which is of course historically inaccurate ), I 
would argue that it is a myth that share-cropping was 
a widely prevalent form of surplus extraction in Bengal 
and that share-cropping today is a vestige of this 
feudalism.
Table 5.4* • 6 basically bears out what was demonstrated 
in the earlier table about the direction of the surplus 
flow through the share-cropping relation. Of course, on 
balance, it is the rich and the surplus classes (except 
in Biddya where it is the rich only) who are the net 
receivers (col.4) and the rest of the strata especially 
the poor and the subsistence are the net payers of crop- 
share.
1. There might have been share-cropping before or even 
during Moghul times because on the evidence(see 
Habib,I:The Agrarian System of Moghul India 1556-1707; 
London, Asia Publishing House:1963) in Bengal the 
peasants were paying rent in cash for a long time 
and certainly during the Moghul period. In fact it 
appears from some of the settlement reports that 
share-cropping or some form of rent in kind was more 
a result of market penetration and of zamindari* being 
taken over by money lenders, traders and such people 
who had an interest in getting produce in kind. In 
fact both Ascoli in Dacca and Jack in Khulna, especially 
the latter, mention the reverse commutation of cash 
rent into produce rent as one of the greatest scourges 
for peasants misery, Hot only the landlords, most of
> Pd 03 01 03 *"d Ch > PCI 03 01 GO >T> f Od > pa 03 03 co
H H* C (D c  O P > M H ‘ £ CD Q O p3 M M h * c: (D c  o p
M O * i M
*“*>
O4 O 
w H
a
a
s
hH
M O ^ M
*->
a* o  
w ^
o
Qi
o
t?
M o  »i M
»-D
O ' o
£/}
3
Qj
M 1 M M PO M 1 M M H H 1 m M
0 c Cn W CD >■ O C w CD P» O c 03 w CD
Q  C+
*“1 CD M> 3
P c+- 
CD HJ £j
M* O
O  CD H*
CD
C r*^ (D
01Oc*to
ct>
H*
CD
M
CL
s:
o
JV
M
nO<301
-VI
6836
M  M  M  M
M - O ^ f O v O H
r o f o u i N ^ o ^ o
0  0 “v ] U i  O  CO
Vo
^S.
VO
M
to  co no M
O D O O N U i N
to  no v \  no o  oo
NO
vn
-a
o
to  m  m  to  
V / i H M o O v O  
CO to On Vo o  vn 
O  NO vn  vn  vo  00
T
o
ta
l
D
is
p
o
s
a
b
le
P
a
d
d
y
pa
VO M  M - j to  to CD
O •vJvO^O A j -0  CO VO VO to to ON M  ON CO NO a
O o  O  M  V-h -P  ^ 1 to O  NO to  O  M  1 o vO vn  O  ^3 vn » CD o
M h
< o
CD n
Qj »
01
M
t r 1
P
VO M on M  H  to On M  Vo On > - TJ *1
VO 1 M  O  (> V ^  nO to 1 VO ONJ^ o  ^ Vo M  ON Vo to  <3 P CD
On o  > ^ v n  O to O  <3 VJ NO VJ to vn  o  to  vn  M  no H*
CL
1 t 1 1 t i j fB ■•+- CD <D1 1 M  1 M M  \ 1 M  1 1 NO to  M  to  Vn h , r C+00 -^ 3 00 VO ^  VjO nO CO v j  N  U  H  CO -s] o Vo M  1 P- to  O Qi CD00 O  O  H  M  M  QS o O  M  Vi VjJ 00 VjJ ON 4>- vn  to  00 ON NO »  »-
<
1 Qi (D
Cl
P0 *v
M VJ M M  M CD CD
V7l VM ON to  M o \J1 -O 4^ ^  to -o o  no vn  vn  js- O +1
• • t • * * i • • • • » | ■ • * * .  t CD O
vn D O N J O N to O Q n n J ON o  H  O  -O M CD
< a
CD M
Qi P
’ ’i
CD
M  ^ M m  to  to  to M m  vo  vn vd
Vn ^ ^ > 0 3  CD O  00 to  to  nO -O M  NO vn  NO M  o fo O
• I * « * * * ( • • • « » * * * * * * * p ‘ -^1
CO \ O H N  O V h Vo < ! O  O  -P- M VO -O VO Vo o  o CL
*^ 3
O
c+
P
M
Pa fe1 1 1 1 I 1 1 CD CD1 1 M  js- 1 VjJ 1 M  1 VjO 1 M l  M  to  vn Cl «+ * i
M Vn M b J  \ j0 00 **- vn  nO nO VO nO NO O  O  M  On o 0) o
• * » ♦ • • • ■ * * 4 1 * » M* a
Vo -O O'' M - f^  to  V I M Vo VO VO Vo On M  to  to  vo  vo  o < c
CD o
CL CD
’D
M to  vo  to M vo  to to M vo  to  M  M CD CD
O t o H 'O C t t v J O W O n J Q n n ] O no oo to vo <1 O  Mo * * • • • t O .........................  1 O ■ * * • * 1 CD M  O
nO 4N- -O to  00 vn  M  to  Oo O  ON VO O  M H* P CD
< M P
CD m
Q* P
CJtJ
CD
M M M  Vo to M to M  to VO M M to vo  to ia
O VJl --3 nO ^ O O  o  vo  VO M O to  ON vo  O  *VJ nO p cr
O 1 * « « - * O O • • • • • • H*
M  w o v * ^ nO 00 O  On <3 M  -O cops. 00 to CL
C*1
P
o
tr
to
VO
Vn
O'
-O
Oo
Table 
5.4.6 
CROP-SHARE 
AS 
A 
PERCENTAGE 
OF 
DISPOS
ABL
E 
PRODUCE/
pad
dy 
in 
m
a
u
n
d
s
The three villages appear fairly uniform in this table 
with only minor differences. For example in Jamira the 
net receivers are the three top groups whereas in Bajua 
it is the two top strata and in Biddya only the rich.
So they are the only ones who, on balance, rent-out land 
and the others, on balance, rent-in land.
If we take share-paid as an index of the importance 
of share-cropping (col.6) the figures of 17.1, 14*3 and
5.8 respectively for Bajua, Biddya and Jamira corroborate 
the trend in Table 5*4--4- (col.5). On the other hand in 
terms of percentage share paid by each stratum (Table 5.4*6; 
col.9) the figures clearly agree with the percentage 
share of total rented-in land figures (col.9) in Table
5 • 4* • 4 *
It is hoped that Table 5*4*7. will demonstrate how impor­
tant share-cropping is as a source of income for the 
rich and the surplus farmers and here I suggest a tentative 
dividing line at 50 per cent and see whether we can in 
fact call feudal those farmers who receive more than 
half their disposable paddy from the share-cropping 
relation as share rent. We find that in none of the 
villages is there a single farmer who receives more than 
half his disposable produce from crop share. In Biddya 
there are two farmers who receive between 30 and 40 per 
cent of their disposable produce from crop share and in 
the two remaining villages all the farmers who rent-out 
land receive less than 30 per cent.
1. Continued from previous page.
whom did not have the ryoti rights in land, collected 
rent in cash^but thepeasants themselves when they were 
renting land to what was called the under ryots, were 
mostly collecting rent in cash and not in kind (see 
Ascoli;1921:10-30; Jack:1918:72-73i Allen:1912:83, 87-88).
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One might of course say that this percentage of disposable 
produce received as crop share is a clear gain with no 
cost to the landlord whereas in other sources of dispo­
sable paddy, in wage labour for example, adjustment 
has to be made for the cost. So, if it is assumed 
that approximately half the produce is paid in wages 
then one might say that we are underestimating the impor­
tance of share-cropping by comparing gross produce from 
wage labour with gross produce from share-cropping.
In the case of share-cropping, what the landowner is 
getting is net of cost as the share-cropper pays all the 
cost. So in Table 5.4*7 in Bajua if for three households 
share-crop received is 30 per cent of gross produce 
(21-30 per cent category) then on halving the remainder 
of their gross produce, share-crop rent becomes nearly 
50 per cent of their gross produce. So in this sense share- 
cropping may play a very important role in the economies 
of these households.
Thus at least three out of six renting-out surplus house­
holds in Bajua and possibly a few more out of those who 
receive nearer 20 per cent (in the 11-20 per cent category) 
of their disposable paddy from share-cropping out, as 
this could be quite high when the remaining part is 
adjusted to wage payments and so on, would be sufficiently 
dependent on share-cropping. In Biddya, however, the 
rich and in Jamira, the rich as well as the surplus 
farmers receive no more than 10 per cent of their 
gross produce from share-cropping. So it can be said 
that, at the most, for eight households in Bajua depending
• •I i-X
on the cut.off point adopted, and for two households in 
Biddya, is share-rent an important component of income.
Table 5*4*8 gives details of terms and conditions of 
tenancy. Taking first of all the data on period of 
tenure, it seems that there is some variation in the 
pattern between the three villages, since one year contracts 
dominate in two of the three villages, especially in 
Jamira. Whereas in Biddya, two to five year contracts 
are more important. In Jamira, on the other hand, these 
longer contracts are insignificant in number at 4*6 per 
cent. In Bajua, one year, two to five year and indefinite 
contracts, the latter implying that there is no time 
limit on the contract, are more or less evenly distributed.
In the two southern villages i.e. Bajua and Biddya, both 
a deposit which is refundable, and salami which is the 
money farmers must pay in order to become share-croppers, 
are paid in a large number of cases, salami much more 
so than deposit. In Bajua 54*2 per cent and in Biddya
76.5 per cent of share-croppers paid salami whereas
30.5 per cent and 17.6 per cent respectively of households 
paid deposit. In Jamira, such practices are not found.
Very few of any type of contract are written down, and 
in fact it is surprising that any are at all since the 
share-cropping relation does not have to be registered.
In Jamira'however, fully 20,9 per cent appear to be 
written. This is difficult to explain since a written 
document gives the tenant proof that he is the share­
cropper. If at some stage the Government decided to 
take over land that was not owner occupied and to give 
it to the actual cultivators, then the landlords would 
presumably want to do what they have been doing quite
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successfully in West Bengal. There the landlord puts 
forward as his share-cropper not the farmer who is 
actually doing the share-cropping, but a relative. If 
he had given his share-cropper a document that had some 
validity, then of course this would be much harder to 
do. However, I am told that most of these written 
contracts are demanded by the poorer peasants who rent- 
out to better off farmers fearing eventual occupation 
by the tenant.
In so far as crop choice is concerned, there is, in fact 
no choice of crop in Biddya as it is strictly a mono-cropped 
area. In the other two villages, that is, Bajua and Jamira, 
apparently there are a few cases - 5.1 per cent in Bajua 
and per cent in Jamira - where the landlord decides
what crops will be grown. In cost sharing only 5.1 per 
cent of the households in Bajua appear to share some of 
the cost of production whereas none of the owners In the 
other two villages share any costs.^
The most interesting column in the table is perhaps 
column 7 showing free labour given by tenants to land­
owners, in man-days. It shows that in Bajua 52 households 
provide 24-1 man-days of free labour, in Biddya 12 families 
provide 73 man-days and in Jamira 36 households supply 
52 man-days of free labour. It should be kept in mind 
of course, that it is not on© individual only i.e. not 
just the share-cropper himself who provides this free 
labour but other members of his household as well. For 
instance, the tenant’s wife may do some housework or a
1. Ho data was collected on whether tenants could produce 
any variety of rice or !fdr that matter, whether 
landlords insist that some specific variety of rice 
had to be grown. In fixed rent situations in the southern 
villages however, It is reported that the crop is usually 
dictated, see’ p. i'J?
F 3 1 §
son or brother may do some fishing or fencing and so 
on. It is largely true, however, that very little of 
this work has anything to do with production except 
in the sense that if the woman comes and husks paddy 
that would be a part of the production process. So one 
might say that it does show a form of personalised but 
clearly unequal relationship between the landlord’s family 
and the tenant’s family. But in ray view there is nothing 
particularly feudal about this except in a rather literary 
sense. In fact this version of the landlord-tenant 
relationship where some free labour is given by the 
tenant which is, as I have said earlier, often followed 
by some kind of reverse flow of gifts especially on 
ceremonial occasions has perhaps more to do with the 
remnants of peasant values, than feudal values# of neighbour 
helping neighbour. This could be just as strongly argued. 
Admittedly, it has clearly become an unequal relationship 
but instead of calling it a feudal vestige one could just 
as well see it is a vestige of the days when one peasant 
household would help out another household, which in fact 
still happens. Two perfectly equal households often 
exchange labour in the field as well as in the home. 
Therefore, I think it is difficult to argue definitively 
from this that this is a vestige or a sign of feudal 
relations.
Table 5.A *9 is interesting in that it confirms a hypothesis 
that is sometimes found in the literature1 that the 
amount of land which a man rents out to some extent depends
1. See Hossain,M:1974 * In his article Hossain tests for
various other variables. He mentions this as a possible 
explanatory variable but does not take account of it 
because he lacked the appropriate data. This may be 
seen as a contribution to that particular discussion.
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depends on how far it is from his-homestead because this 
determines the supervision cost of wage labour. The 
further it is, the more trouble it is to supervise.
In this table it can be quite clearly seen that renting- 
out is positively correlated with the distance of the 
plots from the homestead. It shows that, of the plots 
nearer to the homestead, very few are rented-out and the 
further off they are, the more of them are rented-out.
This varies from 2.3 per cent of the area within half a 
mile (col.l) to 100 per cent of those over 2,5 miles from 
the homestead (col,4.) in Bajua. Similarly, for Biddya, 
from 10 per cent of those within half a mile to again 
100 per cent of the area over 2.5 miles away. For Jamira 
it varies from 3,6 per cent of the area within half a 
mile to 57.7 per cent of the area over 2.5 miles from 
home. Clearly, therefore, accessibility is a determining 
factor in deciding how much land is rented-out*
On the renting-in side, one would expect a reverse 
relationship to hold, in that farmers would prefer to 
rent-in land closer to their homesteads. Those renting- 
in however, are at a disadvantage in that they cannot 
decide which land they will rent, but have to accept 
what land they can get. However, the reverse relationship 
holds reasonably well for Bajua and Biddya where most 
of the plots rented-in are within a mile from the home­
stead. The figures are; 36,4- per cent of the rented-in 
area comes from within half a mile increasing to 39.1 
per cent between half a mile and one mile and falling 
rapidly with further distance from the homestead. For 
Biddya, the figures are almost similar and most of the 
rented-in land comes from the plots between one mile
3 1 8
and 2.5 miles from the homestead.
As has been argued ealier (Chapters 2 and 3) in Bajua 
and Biddya a very large percentage of rented-in land 
comes from absentee landlords who prefer to rent-out to 
farmers who live close to these plots to ensure better 
supervision. For local owners, on the other hand, in­
accessibility itself is often reason enough to want to 
rent-out. Therefore, in so far as absentee ownership 
is due to ecology (Chapter 2 ; Early Settlment in the 
South) it has, especially in these two southern villages, 
affected the conditions of access to land.
This point is highlighted in the instance of Jamira, 
the northern village. Absentee ownership is almost 
non-existent in Jamira, and the figures for land renting 
are very different from those of Bajua and Biddya,
Unlike these two villages, most of the rented-in land 
in Jamira (79.1 per cent) is over 2.5 miles from the 
homestead. This again, is primarily due to ecological 
factors in the sense that the village itself is highly 
densely populated with very little land available for 
renting-out and most of this is situated at some distance 
from the village.
Thus on the one hand, the extent of absentee ownership, 
and other other, the extent of dispersion of landed 
property determines to a large extent how much land is 
share-cropped and how much owner-cultivated or cultivated 
by wage labour. In this respect, therefore, it can be 
said that ecology plays an important role in the way 
class relations are structured.
However, the cause of the extent of dispersion itself is 
not clearly understood. The villagers themselves suggest
migration, marriage and buying and selling as the possible 
reasons. The point is that on the basis of the information 
available, it is not possible to argue that dispersion 
itself is the result of any pre-existing feudal order.
In the context of tenancy or more particularly share- 
cropping, another point I would like to investigate is 
whether, as the Chayanov theory of the peasant economy 
would imply, the amount of land rented-in is determined 
at least partly by the amount of labour available within 
the family. Of course, there are different ways of 
utilizing the amount of labour within the family but 
for farmers who have some land especially if they also 
have a plough and some cattle, it is logical that by 
extending their land (renting-in) they will not only fully 
utilize their family labour but also their ploughs and 
cattle which by and large cannot be used for any other 
purpose other than agriculture® Therefore, if a family 
happens to own cattle, which must involve some maintenance, 
the more land they can cultivate, the better off they are.
However, I have not gone into a discussion of cattle 
availability here, although in itself it would be an 
interesting study, but have tried to examine to what extent 
family labour availability in terms of adult members 
determines the amount of land taken in. Table 5.k *10 
shows that there is a reasonably clear relation between 
the amount of family labour available and the amount of 
land rented-in and this relationship in fact holds for 
almost every class that rents-in, in all three villages. 
Clearly, the amount of land rented-in depends both on 
how much land and how much labour there is available 
within the family, However, although the relationship 
also holds for the rich and the surplus farmers it is
jfN!<& U1
CO -f PP
0 H* >  PDc nv •< *
►1 c CD
o ►i P 1
CD CD P
fc. 03 Du tcj ID O
M d
P p w
M £ CD
CD O' B prM o* o
CD M
o *i a*
*; K 1 CO
o CD 0
fj c+ l-D
FV W
p
o*
M CO £vQ M3 M
*0 ►1 cf
On CD
1 03 B
<1 CD CD
-0 P a
c+ O'
CD
cf
O CO
C"fr"
» H>
M 0
fj
P
P* cf
c o
H cf
c* P
M
CD P*
B O
CT £
CD GQ
CD
W pr
o
ru C/j cn <J) ’ M trh- c (t) c o f»
C '. M I—1 O' O P
p ' * o  >-•» ta 1  &  
h-> i h- M
C a #  cr>
to p c+ cn
H , (ti (a ■-■i P- n
P CD
?J 1/1 tfl IT; rU f
H- C (D P O P
O P I-1 O’ O Pp"P >“*) cn P C- 1—1 I H1 M
C 01 V) CD
CO C c+ Cfl
I"*) CD C/1
►U P 
-  o
P CD
H i  Cji C /i O j •‘ U  1 ■
H - P  CP C  O  P
o *i i—  cr o a
E T 'O  *"1 v , •-> u .
CD
1
2
8
h h m w w  
o i vo vn no no
On rO H  
H  ro vn -“0 -O vn -*0
1
5
9
i—' ro vo on 
vo vn *o vO vn
plO  K
pr: i-*i o  ★ .
o
VJ V>J Vo vji s^  Vj Vo H VjJ O  CMV U  H  W a: >  o ^  >• p» * • • * ■ • » (D d h P  < o
VO VJ vn oo *n- 0n ro u i o o m ^ o o o ro p— o o  oo cjn 5 £ B CD p/-N cr M o* n CD
J X— J—V--*^ I— 1 CD ct* CD fo CQ
M VjJ nO Vn NO -0 O ^  vo ro <i ro 00 vo vn -vj od -o -o f| ^ an >
NO •s l^ s O O O N ) Vo -vj nO H* M vn no On -O 00 O  M O  O CO CD fjCD
P
pn 0 -  ' PC00 i i i ro 4  ^ ro 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 Vj i i i i m  ro PP hj O o CD* 1 P
ro NJ VO fO ro vo ro t< >  o ^  ^ vn CD1 1 1 * • • 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 • i i i i . * (D a -h )C  < P.
\o vn ro vn ON O  vn S C  B O P 1cr m  cr fi o t-i,— CD cf CD P fj P
ro U iH U i 00 VjJ vn fj fj crtr CD
VO wVO -w cn o GO■V_v P
O*1
W O K cc
H 1 I H  ^  H  1 1 I 1 1 t 1 1 i i i i ro ro PC M O • tooo VjJ *r • vn
VjJ VAWVjJ vo M  VjJ X  >  O > M| | . . .  I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 • t i l l * * CD Oj i-D C <
NO O  -0 NO --3 O  vn B C B <D Pcr h  o' *i n<^ l ^ , CD c+ CD P fj
^  H  vn M 03 <3 p *-s ctq CD
M U iV n H vn 1— ' CO CD to
”—■
W O K M
M 1 H U l W f N ^ VjJ ( 1 1 1 V0 | M 1 | h 'H J N lN pn Hj o i
CJn O *  » ro
On *0 On VO VJ ON CTN-M K > vn
! * * • « • • 1111*1 « 1 1 * * • (!) a  hj  d <
On O  Onnji -0 vn <J -0 vn o  o  ro o B C B CD pcr M CT* *1 o
M ,—s —, —r CD cf CD P fj
O ^-.Vo >vo M H  h-» 4>- *—v -^v M M h *-l Ok CD
ON *-0 Vo NO H  ON M H vn On On -O Qn W CD CO
"— — — , .
ro
W O K ; •
i 1 1 1 1 H ^  1 I 1 H  W  i M 1 1 VjJ rO Vn 4^ w i o vn
P- * 1vn
CO 03 vn vn vn vn vn vn On vn K >0 K > .a I 1 1 1 1 • I I I * .  I • I i . . .  * (L a  h  c < O
o O vn a  <i <1 -o o  ro vji B £  B CDcr* M cr ‘-i P \—^s, —n»—v>—v CD cf CD P °  i„ ..—* ro —  m 00 M M VjJ W p ft av fJ 1
CO 00 ro vn 'O o *o o  m  ro 03 CD a ;
’■—" **—^
M-l
M a: o w: frr j1 t 1 1 1 1 1 H  l O M N J H W ro 1 1 I oo M ON *-d O i i
O vn  ^ »
" !M
ON vn 00 vn On On -0 ps; 0 " o
i 1 t 1 1 I I 1 • . • » • . 1 I 1 • • . (D CUH)C <
^  O V h U \Q U l M -is. js. ro B £  BO) P«*—s. cr m  cr *-i o,--  ^ ------ .—s. M -—. y— CD cf <D P fj
ON M M  M *—* M -O vn Cu VjJ M JV CD
^  -0 -0 M On VJ 00 O M O W (D 0)
^  '-- -------------
Pl O K M l
i 1 1 1 t 1 t 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 VJ m  ro i i i i W f j  o a  !
Kj * -f- |
NO NO co p  !
I t I 1 1 1 1 1 I I 1 1 1 1 * • 1 1 1 1 CD PL Hj C < o
O  <J B cr 9 CD fj
O* M CT CD
CD cf CD P CO
ro NO M fj »-j av
on 0] o
"—" I
M M vn H M H H- H- W W H
VjJ 1 H CTCO HnJ o  i vj ro Vx) -o ro •vD H  W |n  H  VO 00 tt pt cd n: omi o *  cf
«f PJ 
!
<} VO VO .JS. vn vn vn oo vn r-- On On no co vn o o ^ S  >  O K  >
* ......................... ro a h c  *;
co O On On Vn Q\ -o *0 vn v*j co vn o O  vn O  CD H  0o B  a  B CD-— cr h  o*
M VJ <—■» >—> h-^  -^ (D cf CD P
O «— fu M vD Vo vO H H H V jJ H vn m  ro -q ^  oo f| m 0-.
oo I >43 NO Vn nO -O 1 O  O  w ro NO -'0 VjJ vn 1—1 *-0 to asw,^ . w w s - ' ---'•---*--* ' — -i-
'able 
5.4..10 
TS.VAMCY 
AND 
FAMILY 
LABOUR 
AS 
PER 
CHAYAffQV
important to point out that the surplus labour in these 
two classes do not generally work, let alone working in 
the fields and in fact, they cultivate their rented 
land by employing wage labour. But then, it is fairly 
clear that when a surplus or a rich farmer rents-in land 
his motivation is very different and has little to do 
with fully utilizing his family labour because in any 
case he does not use very much family labour on his land. 
In their case, the motivation behind renting land is 
capitalistic in that it is a desire for increased surplus 
produce.
For the smaller farmers, as can be seen, in all three 
villages there is a correlation between available family 
labour and amount of land rented-in. These results 
corroborate other findings, such as Hossain's for 
example
1. This is because manual work is socially considered a 
stigma and is associated with a poor and low class 
background. Giving up or not doing manual labour is 
in fact, a status symbol (see Hossain:1977:Chapter 2).
2. Hossain, however, uses family size rather than avai­
lable labour (Ibid:Ghapter 5).
Section V
Usury
Usury is considered to be one of the defining character­
istics of what is called in the literature 'semi-feudalism!. 
It plays a critical role particularly in the formulation 
of Amit Bhaduri, Bhaduri's case is that semi-feudalism 
is a combination of two major elements - share-cropping 
and usury. One of the aspects that he emphasizes is that 
the same person at the same time is the landlord and the 
money lender, so that each relation reinforces the other 
and in particular that the tenant is bound to remain a 
share-cropper and cannot become an independent peasant 
proprietor partly because of the amount that has been 
taken away from him in terms of interest. Another factor 
which he stresses is the extent of forced commercialisation 
due to indebtedness. The fact that interest payments or 
part of the principal payments fall due, usually around 
harvest time, forces the tenant to sell off his harvest 
immediately which means he gets a lower price for his 
produce. A third aspect of Bhaduri!s analysis is the 
the land alienation process. Here he suggests that it 
is in the interest of the lender that the borrower should 
default because he can then expropriate his land.
Bhaduri tends to think of usury as more of a dominant 
element in the agrarian structure, I have already 
discussed in outline, whether and under what conditions 
usury can be called a relation of production (Chapter 4-)» 
The general conditions it has to fulfil are the same as 
any other mode of surplus appropriation which are that it 
should make a difference to the (a) level as well as the 
rate of development of the forces of production; (b) level
1. Bhaduri, Amit, "A Study in Agricultural Backwardness 
Under Semi-feudalism", Economic and Political Weekly, 
Vol.83 (March 1973).
of political power and awareness and (c) the ideological 
level.
In order to look at this we shall see first of all how 
important usury is quantitively particularly in terms 
of the number of households who are indebted; secondly 
the amount to which they are indebted especially as a 
percentage of their Income which will give an idea of the 
burden imposed; thirdly, the extent to which being Indebted 
causes forced sales, fourthly how far the suggestion that 
for the tenant the landlord is the most important source 
of loans holds for these three villages; and lastly, to 
what extent money lending causes alienation from land.
The last, of course is difficult with a one year study 
as such alienation is a dynamic process extending over a 
longer period.
Let us first take some general data showing the extent 
of indebtedness.
Table 5,5.1 basically compares indebted and debt free 
households in terms of their family size and income.
It shows that in Bajua 38,1 per cent of the households 
are indebted against 61.9 per cent who are unindebted 
and the corresponding figures for Biddya are 23.7 per 
cent (indebted) and 76.3 per cent (unindebted) and for 
Jamira 19.3 per cent (indebted) and 80.7 per cent 
(unindebted).
It appears that the percentage of indebted households is 
always less (col.2) than unindebted households (col.8) 
at the aggregate village level, although a fairly large 
number of households are indebted in every village.
Although most of the indebted households come from the 
poorer classes, as would be expected, by and large,
W C/i C/i c/a 33 f
H- 3  tD C O ft
n 3 M o' o 3tr,a hm ft
pa c/a co c/a 33 t-* 33 C/a c/a c/a 33 tr
W- C f t  C O ft
O 3  M  O ' o  3tr3j i-o t/i 3 a.a 3 H o' o 3 3"0 3 B *1 ft
00 HWW
VO H a j v O H W Hvo m  vo fo o  •£-- 0
v«j ro ~o ^  ro vo ro
00 O  30 ~J 00 VO VIi
tr  tr  c+ o >
O O O *3  f t  
y~> a c+ ft (1 p> wO t " O M O O M  O - O N ' O M V i )
!-• M
Vo I—1 Cn -o Osvn tr tT35 w «—j ®O s  M  O  <J O V n  O '
o  n  ro is  is. m
vn M  os -o o  ro
v n  I— 1 £30 v n  I— 1 s O  Cl'M Vo Vo OssO s® M
Ct3 O <
s i  CO O ' i s -  K-J
co ro vn o  so O '
o  os o\ n  ro m  
M  f t  W f " £ )  O  
VO 0 0  M  v n  - 0  o
ro -o o  ro vn so vo vo 30 03 vn is
vo ro oo cn is- vo :v a. 3*0^ 3 0 0 
c+ ft !V B O
VO to M M so Vo
m  vo ro ro ro ro 
so oo -o vo ~o vn
M  ro ro H
vn Vo vn Co ro -J H 00
K-1 vo m  ro hjOaJs. O C M - 1 03
o  vn H  o - o  so
or-'dt' h  so
f t O  3  3  3  3
vo h  w  ro o
vn  VO O  -O so rooo M-'HO'tro
m M o o r - o  o o r o H  cts i>-
O  O  sO o  c s  o O  V O  O S  o  oo -o
t r  3 "®  tJ 3  » >OS OOOOUHS 0s vo co o  Os vn vn
o vnvnososors- o  i>- so ro vn vo o  ro -o os o  ro so
N O V O O i H O  
ro vn SO -O is. os
i -O H C P O sfO  H O  
j vn ro -vj vo m  as os
o  vn ro 3s o  vn O' 'O OJO-OsHHO
i s .  M  M  H  
VO O  O  O  VO M
o  so ro ro os oo oroor"Oo
vo M
O s  s o  v n  O s v n  v n  )— 1vn t—■ h-1 oo is. ro
vn so osvo ro JS'os ~0 ~0 Os t - 1 00 vn  vn
sO 0' CO VO VO OO too o o o r o w v u
O' -o vo vn rsQUHO • O' vo vn ro m  osvn 1 is o  o  m  o  vn voOs O VO O  OssO SO
V O  sO M  CJSis is sO
ro rs ^  vo vo vo 
M H a  cM ors
rsvnUiMs] is. sO ro is Qs <5
it is not the landless but the poor who are more heavily 
indebted in terms of numbers. In Bajua, only in the poor 
and in the surplus classes does-the•number of indebted 
households exceed that of - the. unindebted households but 
then in the case of the surplus class it is a different 
kind of phenomenon as will be seen later. After all, 
the concept of exploitation through usury capital 
usually involves the self-sufficient and the classes 
below (Bhaduri:1973). The surplus producers in addition 
borrow from institutional sources (Tables 5.5.2 and 5.5.4-) 
and for productive purposes, so that it is probably more 
in the nature of re-investment than as victims of exploi­
tation that they are borrowing, this aspect will be 
elaborated later.
In Biddya, it is in the subsistence class that the 
percentage of indebted households exceeds the percentage 
of unindebted households by 20 per cent and in Jamira 
in no class does the percentage of indebted households 
exceed the unindebted households. It seems that in 
Jamira, the most vulnerable groups, except the landless, 
that is the self-sufficient and the classes below, are 
least dependent on usury capital of all the three villages. 
The landless of course, do not generally qualify for 
loans since they are not able to offer any collateral.
Table 5.5.1 also shows that indebted households have a 
lower per capita income (cols0 4,5*6,10,11 and 12) and 
a lower per capita value for agricultural production in 
particular (col,4 and 10). This in fact holds for all 
classes and all villages with the exception of the land­
less class in Jamira.
In terms of average family size, the indebted households 
are to some extent smaller than the households free of
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debt and this holds for all classes in all three villages.
Table 5.5.2 gives some data on the rates of interest paid 
by different classes showing the breakdown of total loans 
in terms of the amount taken at different rates of interest. 
It seems that the average rate of interest varies from 
class to class and from village to village. The rich and 
the surplus classes pay a lower rate of interest compared 
to other classes as can be seen clearly from the figures 
for Bajua and Jamira (col.4)* All the loans taken by 
these two classes in Bajua are obtained at the official 
rate of interest which is 11 per cent. Similarly in 
Jamira most of the loans taken by these two classes are 
obtained at 11 per cent. In Biddya, of course, there are 
no indebted households among these two classes.
It is obvious from this that the rich and the surplus 
classes borrow almost exclusively from institutional 
sources. In Jamira it seems that the share of these two 
classes, which number 4 out of 33 (col.l) or about 12 
per cent of the indebted households in the village, 
exceeds that of the share of the rest of the population 
in the institutional credit market. In Bajua they 
are only 9 out of 83 or 10.8 per cent of the indebted 
households but their loan share almost equals that of the 
rest of the population (col.4).
Turning to the other end of the class hierarchy, in Bajua 
the landless class, although dependent exclusively on 
traditional sources of credit market, do not pay a very 
high interest rate. In fact, almost half their loans 
come from friends and relatives and is interest free 
(col.3)* Almost all of the loans are for consumption 
and this is corroborated by Table 5.5.3 (col.l) showing
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the reasons for getting into debt. It is obvious that 
most of the landless, unless they have some other capital 
assets or production means sueh as a shop or cattle, 
do not normally qualify for loans either from institut­
ional or traditional sources- The poor and the subsistence 
classes, on the other hand, pay on an average the highest 
interests rates at respectively 49.8 per cent and 75.5 
per cent (col.11), Clearly, these two marginal classes 
are the most vulnerable to the traditional money lending 
market. Their capacity to pay back loans is limited 
and therefore from the lender *s point of view, they are 
better targets for dispossession if not eviction from 
their land.
Average rates of interest paid by different classes seem 
to be similar in Jamira but the vulnerable groups are a 
little extended in that the self-sufficient farmers also 
pay a relatively high rate of interest at 35.5 per cent.
In Biddya, on the other hand, although the pattern seems 
to be distinctly different, it is not so if it is taken 
into account that in both the landless and the self- 
sufficient classes, both of which show average interest 
rates of 50 percent, there is only one case (col.l) 
which has distorted the pattern of average interest 
rates,^
Table 5.5*3 as noted earlier, shows the reasons for 
getting into debt. It seems that although consumption 
is the most important reason for getting into debt in
1. It should be noted that these average rates of interest 
are lower than those generally reported by word of 
mouth. Average rates of interest well exceeding
100 per cent for the country as a whole are more usually 
spoken of.
2, Table 5.5.3 does not show the amount of loan taken for 
different purposes but only Reports the number of times 
respondents reported a certain reason for getting into 
debt.
Bajua, for the three villages taken together, it is not 
overwhelmingly important although relatively so. Borrowing 
for consumption is lowest in Jamira with 16 incidents.
In Jamira, most households reported petty business as 
their reason for getting into debt, incidence of this 
reason is very much lower in the other two villages 
where it is 19 and 24 per cent respectively. The category 
’others' includes such things as ceremonial expenditure 
(col.6) and this is very much higher in Biddya than in 
the other two villages. The figures are 43 per cent in 
Biddya and 14 and 17 per cent respectively for Bajua and 
Jamira.
On the basis of columns 1 and 3, it can be said that 
Jamira is more commercialised and is more likely to 
display certain capitalistic elements. While Bajua, 
although showing a lower degree of commercialisation also 
shows an important characteristic of capitalism in that 
24 per cent of the respondents reported investment in 
production as their reason for getting into debt, Biddya, 
on the other hand, seems to be the more traditional, 
backward and less commercialised of the three villages.
Wow we can establish whether the above suggestions based 
on data for reasons for getting into debt, are corroborated 
by the data on other indicators of capitalism such as 
wage labour and marketing for instance.
Table 5.2.1 shows that at an aggregate level both 
Bajua and Biddya depend on wage labour for more than 50 
per cent of their total labour use and the figure is 
considerably lower in Jamira at only 37.7 per cent (col.2). 
As regards marketing, Table 5.3.1 showing marketed produce 
(paddy), especially as a percentage of disposable paddy
(col.5) indicates that of the three villages, Jamira 
markets proportionately more paddy but at the aggregate 
level in none of the villages does this exceed 50 per 
cent of the disposable produce. However, when class 
level data are looked at separately, it seems that whether 
marketed surplus is seen as a percentage of disposable 
produce or in terms of cash value as a percentage of 
total cash earnings, the rich market well over 50 per 
cent. Table 5.3.2 showing non-agricultural marketed 
produce and Table 5.3*3 giving forms of payment (cash 
and kind) confirm Jamira as the most commercialized 
village.
Having given some quantitative data in terms of indebted 
haousholds, rates of interest paid by different classes 
and reasons for getting into debt, we can now move into 
an area that will have a direct bearing on the Bhaduri 
hypothesis. Table 5.5*4- compares self-managed debtors 
and share-cropper debtors and it can be seen that in two 
of the three villages more share-croppers are indebted.
In Bajua, 69.5 per cent of the share-croppers are 
indebted (col.4-) compared to 37.2 per cent among the 
self-managed (col.l); and in Biddya 60 per cent of the 
share-croppers are indebted as opposed to 28.3 per cent 
of the self-managed. In Jamira, however, the situation 
is reversed in that while 27 per cent of the share-croppers 
are indebted, as much as 4-2.7 per cent of the self-managed 
cultivators are indebted. The most likely reason for 
this is that as has been seen earlier in Jamira (Table 5.5.3 
col.3)» most of the loans are taken for petty business 
purposes rather than for consumption. Therefore, it 
appears that it is in fact the same group of people who 
are in petty commodity production and are trying to sell
1. Self-managed includes those who own land and may rent- 
out part of it but do not rent-in.
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whatever they have to sell (mainly coir) directly in the 
market without having to go through any trading inter­
mediaries and are gradually trying to branch out into 
other forms of small business.
Although the details of participation by different classes 
do not emerge as a clear pattern, in so far as more of 
the share-croppers borrow in two of the villages one 
could say that Bhaduri’s thesis is substantiated. On 
the other hand, in the third village, Jamira, the sit­
uation is reversed, and in addition in terms of average 
loan taken none of the villages indicate that share-croppers 
are in fact more deeply indebted than others. Besides, 
in order to see whether or not Bhaduri's hypothesis holds 
for these villages, it is also necessary to establish 
whether the indebted share-croppers tend to borrow more 
from their own landowners than from other sources.
Before doing this, let us make an attempt to estimate 
the importance of usury in terms of the burden it puts 
on the peasantry (Table 5.5.5). Here various different 
measures are used, all of which are related to total 
income not just from agriculture but from all other 
sources for every class. These are all different possible 
measures of the extent to which usury weighs on peasants 
and indeed interest is the most direct form of burden, 
since the farmer must pay if he does not want to risk 
losing his land.
Total debt burden consisting of total principal and interest 
paid and unpaid at the beginning of the year when the loan 
is actually taken is the largest sum, but still it does
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1not appear to be very severe (col.l). Here, in none 
of the villages does the total debt-burden exceed even 
100 percent of income. In fact, on an average, it is 
19.4. per cent for Bajua, 15 per cent for Biddya and only
12.8 per cent for Jamira. Of course, it varies from
class to class and in Bajua the class bearing the heaviest 
debt-burden is the subsistence class with 57.7 per cent 
of total income, followed by the self-sufficient class 
at 4-1*7 per cent and in Jamira on the subsistence class 
with 33 per cent.
In order to see the drain of surplus from the peasantry 
to the money lenders who may also of course be very 
much a part of the peasantry, as will be seen later, it 
is necessary to look at what has been paid during the 
year both in terms of principal and interest and to see 
in what relation this stands to peasant income. Here 
of course (col,6) the overall burden is lower than the 
debt burden as it has been defined. For the village as
a whole it is 17 per cent for Bajua, 9.7 per cent for
Biddya and 11.8 per cent for Jamira. These figures are 
not very much lower than the total debt burden which 
would imply a rather rapid rate of turnover of debt.
People do not appear to want to stay in debt and to let 
the debt accumulate, since they appear to pay off their 
debts at a fairly rapid rate. This can be seen even more 
clearly by comparing total principal paid (col,2) with 
total principal due (col,3) and also total interest paid 
(col.4-) with total interest due (col,5). Total principal
1. The Bengal Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee investi­
gated rural indebtedness around 1935. In computing total 
outstanding debt as a percentage of income, they found 
many households with a total debt burden in this sense 
exceeding double their income.
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paid is in almost every case substantially higher than 
total principal due, and the same is the case for interest 
paid and due. The landless, in particular in all three 
villages seem to bave paid off almost their entire debt 
together with interest. The only principal they owe is 
.3, .7 and .2 per cent of their incomes (col.3) respectively 
for Bajua, Biddya and Jamira. This is clearly due to the 
fact that the money lender has no interest in the land­
less peasant, who has qualified for the loan by virtue 
of having income or assets other than land, other than 
getting his money back as quickly as possible.
So the drain of surplus to the money lender which could 
be measured by the principal and interest paid (col.6), 
is quite high for some of the classes especially the 
subsistence class in Bajua at 4-4*3 per cent, the self- 
sufficient class in Biddya at 35.3 per cent and again 
the subsistence class in Jamira at 30 per cent of their 
incomes. Clearly for such poor people, these are quite 
substantial payments and in that sense one could say 
that if they were not indebted they would be that much 
better off. The point is, if this form of surplus 
extraction goes on year after year then clearly, given 
their limited incomes it must have an expropriating effect 
on the peasantry.
In this sense, usury obviously plays an important role 
in the process of differentiation. For instance, if 
those in the subsistence category have to pay 30 per cent 
of their income to the money lender, then they will not 
subsequently be able to maintain that (subsistence) 
level. They will therefore, then have to borrow again 
and will progress deeper into debt, sooner or later they 
are likely to lose their land.
So usury certainly would seem to have fairly drastic, 
dynamic consequences, but whether this qualifies it as 
a relation of production will depend on whether it 
prevents any expansion of the forces of production that 
might otherwise be possible for these families. Given the 
poor base of these families, one would assume that the 
surplus drain paid in terms of interest must absolutely 
inhibit any chance whatsoever of improved agriculture.
One might therefore say that usury does, for these 
particular groups i.e. self-sufficient and subsistence 
groups, inhibit the growth of the forces of production.
On the other hand, one might argue that (a) even without 
the interest payments they are already at the subsistence 
level so that they would never in any case, manage to 
change or improve their forces of production to any 
significant extent. They certainly would eat better and 
live better, all of which is of course highly desirable, 
but possibly this would not be accompanied by a significant 
difference in production technology or marketing behhviour 
by these peasants.
The other point is (b) that usury is an on-going process. 
The households which have to pay between 30 per cent 
(Jamira) and almost 45 per cent (Bajua) of their income 
(col.6) towards repayment of their loans are likely to 
have to borrow again. What we do not know is whether 
the process terminates at some stage with the land or 
some of the land belonging to the borrower, passing into 
the hands of the money lender or whether it perpetuates 
itself. The latter seems rather improbable because 
then it would represent a net transfer of funds from 
the money lender to the poor or subsistence farmer, but 
this is something on which I do not have data.
It can be argued that there are times when the avail­
ability of money even at very high rates of interest 
keeps the peasant economy going in the sense that if the 
peasant were not able to get a loan he would have to 
dissolve his economy much faster. He might have, for 
instance, to sell off his land, or at least a part of 
his land or he might have to just abandon cultivation 
because he cannot reproduce his own labour or replace 
his cattle without a loan.
So the effect of usury on the peasant economy, I would 
argue, is contradictory. On the one hand, it dissolves 
and on the other, it preserves the peasant mode of 
production. The net result probably varies from area 
to area and could only be seen in a particular area by 
collecting data over a period of time.^
The next table (5.5.6) as indicated earlier, broadly 
explains the production and marketing behaviour of 
indebted households and how this compares with that 
of unindebted ones. The columns relate to the marketing 
behaviour of indebted versus unindebted households and 
here we simply have the extent of their participation in 
the market in terms of the number and the percentage of 
households.
The table shows that in Bajua whereas 31.3 per cent of 
the indebted households do some marketing (col,2)
1. Lenin thought that usury tended to preserve the old 
patriarchal forms of production and to slow down the 
advent of capitalism in the country side and that 
it did so precisely by keeping the peasant going 
at a point where he would otherwise have been ready 
to give up.(Lenin;The Development of Gapitalism in 
Russia, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964:186-189).
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per cent of the unindebted households are involved 
in marketing (col.5) at an aggregate village level.
The pattern holds for Biddya. In Jamira, although it is 
reversed in that the percentage of indebted marketing 
households exceeds that of the unindebted marketing 
households, the two figures are fairly similar at 36.4- 
per cent for indebted marketing and 34-*8 per cent for 
unindebted marketing households.
As far as class variation is concerned, it seems that the 
unindebted poorer classes, especially the unindebted 
poor, the subsistence and the self-sufficient strata in 
Bajua and the unindebted poor and the subsistence strata 
in Biddya market significantly more than their indebted 
counterparts. Therefore, at least in terms of numbers, 
the relation between marketing and indebtedness seems 
to indicate that marketing is not, even for poorer classes, 
something which is forced by indebtedness.
In Jamira, on the other hand, it appears that the indebted 
households are numerically more involved in the market. 
However, it has already been established that most of 
these loans are taken for business purposes (Table 5.5.3). 
Therefore, I would suggest that these do not constitute 
usury capital in the form of consumption loans. We have 
also tentatively suggested that Jamira, because it markets 
proportionately more paddy (Table 5.3.1) as well as non- 
agricultural products (Table 5.3.2) and pays a substantially 
higher percentage of labour costs in cash rather than in 
kind compared to the other two villages, is more capitalist. 
So although the indebted households appear to market 
more in Jamira, it is important to point out that marketing 
is caused not only by indebtedness but also by the availa­
bility of surplus produce itself. Therefore just by
341
looking at these figures it is difficult to say anything 
definite about the importance of indebtedness as such.
In the context of Bhaduri's hypothesis, as elaborated 
earlier (Table 5*5*4-)» in comparing self-managed and 
share-cropper debtors, it was seen that numerically in 
the first two villages at least, Bhaduri1s hypothesis 
holds, but in terms of average loan taken, in none of the 
villages does the data indicate share-croppers as being 
more deeply indebted. The second part of his hypothesis 
was that tenants borrowed more from their landlords.
This is tested in Table 5,5.7 which elaborates the sources 
of loans for share-croppers. The table shows that at 
least in the two villages, Bajua and Biddya, tenants 
borrow quite substantially from their landlords but not 
overwhelmingly so. In Bajua, for instance, at the aggregate 
level, only 23.4- per cent of loans are taken from land­
owners (col.7) and the average size of loan is Tk.336 
(col,8). Corresponding figures against other loan sources 
are much higher (cols. 9-14)- In Biddya, on the other 
hand, both in terms of percentage of loans taken and 
average loan size (col.7 and 8) tenants appear to borrow 
predominantly from their landowners, but then the inci­
dence of borrowing is very low in Biddya. Finally, in 
Jamira, none of the share-cropping households appear 
to borrow from their landowners.
So this also corroborates the impression that if borrowing 
from one's own landlord is a sign of 'semi-feudalism' 
then Jamira is not semi-feudal. Biddya, on the other 
hand, and in this sense, is 'semi-feudal'. As regards
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Bajua, indebtedness is fairly evenly distributed between 
different sources, except for the self-sufficient whose 
average debt size is Tk.4-80 from landowners as against 
Tk.200 from other sources and subsistence farmers with 
Tk*310 from landowners as against Tk,200 from other 
sources. Therefore, the indebted households in the 
self-sufficient class and to a lesser extent in the 
subsistence class could be said to meet Bhaduri's cri­
teria of semi-feudalism.
Table 5.5.8 is an attempt to see to what extent households 
are compelled to sell their produce immediately after 
the harvest when prices are low because they are indebted. 
This has been done by classifying households in terms 
of their total debt-burden as a percentage of income, into 
nine groups (cols. 4-~12) broken down into strata, for 
example, landless, poor etc. In each group the percentage 
of sales made in the first post-harvest period at the 
lowest price are presented. This has been called ’forced 
s ale 1 ,
The table shows that in every village, the households 
marketing in the two poorest classes i.e. the landless 
and the poor, sell whatever they have to sell in the 
period immediately following the harvest when the price 
is lowest irrespective of their debt burden. In Bajua 
of course, this is also true for the subsistence class 
where out of the 27 households who are debt-free (col.4.)
22 market and whatever they market is sold immediately 
after the harvest. This has been indentified as 'forced 
sale’. Of the indebted households in this category,
1 household has a debt burden of between 30 and 4.0 per 
cent of its income (col.9) but markets none of its produce
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2 have debt burdens of between 4-0 and 50 percent of their 
income, 1 of which carries out all his sales at this 
time (col,10); 5 with debt burdens between 50 and 60
per cent of income , 4- of which market in this period 
and in fact, sell all they have to sell (col.ll); and
3 households with a debt burden of between 60 and 70 per 
cent of income of which 1 is forced to sell his 'depressed 
surplus1 at the lowest price (col.12), So it seems that 
for the really poor it does not matter at all whether 
they are indebted or not. They sell whatever they have
to sell in the period immediately following the harvest.
For the classes who are a little better off than the 
landless, poor and subsistence, there seems to be some 
relation between the degree of indebtedness and the 
extent to which they sell at the lowest price. But even 
here it is not as clear a relation as expected. For 
instance, in Bajua, all of the three surplus farmers 
who are debt free, market surplus, 66,6 per cent of which 
is marketed in the period immediately following the harvest 
(col.4-)t This has been called 'forced sale' except that 
in this instance the farmers are not indebted and being 
surplus farmers, not poor either. Column 7 shows that 
4- of these surplus households with a debt burden of 
between 10 and 20 per cent of their income sell a much 
smaller proportion - 29,2 per cent - in this period. 
Finally, there are 2 households marketing who are indebted 
to the extent of between 20 and 30 percent of their 
income and sell 4-1*5 per cent of their marketed surplus 
in this period. So it is difficult to establish any 
discernible pattern on the basis of this data.
But in this instance, the surplus farmers appear to be 
the exception to the rule since it can be seen that for 
both the class below i.e. the self-sufficient class, and 
the class above i.e. the rich farmers, the indebted mar­
keting households market proportionately a much higher 
percentage of their marketed produce in the period 
immediately following the harvest, than the unindebted 
households. And in so far as these classes are concerned, 
the correlation between the degree of indebtedness and 
the extent to which farmers are forced to sell at the 
lowest price holds for the two remaining villages as 
well.
However, the point to note, as already explained, is 
that the poorest classes are forced to sell whatever they 
have to sell in the period when market prices are lowest 
and it makes very little difference whether or not they 
are indebted. This may be partly because they have very 
little to sell and so naturally there is less point in 
holding on to it. Of course they have cash needs but 
these are probably not significantly related to indebt­
edness; they have cash needs anyway,,
With regard to the better-off classes, i.e. the self- 
sufficient and the classes above, where some relation 
does seem to exist between the degree of indebtedness 
and the extent to which surplus is marketed at the lowest 
price, it is difficult to argue that this marketing is 
forced by debt burden. Thus on the basis of this data 
it is difficult to confirm a hypothesis such as Bhadurifs 
especially in such strong terms.
1* See earlier discussion on p.4.7 ; also see Bhaduri, A.
nA Study in Agricultural Backwardness Under Semi­
feudalism11, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.83 
(March 1973).
One important point so far not considered is usury as 
a factor in the process of differentiation. In other 
words, the extent of loss of land as a result of indebted­
ness. This is attempted in Table 5.5-9- Clearly, one 
is year is too short a time from which to draw any concl­
usions about the long term results of indebtedness but we 
can still see whether the data indicates a positive or 
a negative correlation with differentiation.
This table shows that in each village there is some land 
which has been lost and mostly this has been due to 
mortgaging rather than direct sales. So clearly at least 
for the period of this study mortgaging, that is losing 
land through not being able to pay off a debt, was more 
important as a mechanism of differentiation than sale 
(cols. 3 and 4-K This of course, in itself does not 
tell us very much because we do not know how important 
sales are over a length of time compared to, say, demo­
graphic differentiation leading to families splitting 
land holdings until they become so small that it Is no 
longer worthwhile keeping them.
It is clear in any case, that not many people lost their 
land in the year of this survey. The figures are 10 
out of 218 households or per cent for Bajua; 4- out 
of 80 or 5 per cent for Biddya and 3 out of 171 or 1.7 per 
cent for Jamira (col.l). However, in point of fact 
these percentages are misleading. In order to obtain 
the real picture it is necessary to base these percentages 
not on the entire number of households in the village 
but only on the vulnerable landowning groups. Thus, if 
these percentages are revised on the basis of the subsistence 
and the poor households only, without taking account of 
the landless who do not own any land or the self-sufficient
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and the classes upwards who are in fact, net buyers as 
can be seen from the table (cols. 5 and 6), we find that 
the percentage of households losing land stands at 10 per 
cent, 9.5 per cent and 3.6 per cent respectively for 
Bajua, Biddya and Jamira.
Although these figures do not seem to be very high, the 
percentage of their land lost as reported by the losers 
seems to be quite high in Bajua at 34-.3 per cent, and 
moderately high at 22.1 per cent in Biddya. It is only 
12 per cent in Jamira (col.2).
Clearly land is being transferred from the poor to the 
rich and an important mechanism for this transfer 
is mortgaging, in other words, indebtedness. How impor­
tant it is can only be seen when this is compared with 
other mechanisms accomplishing the same result i.e. diff­
erentiation. In a way an act of sale is always involved since 
even when sale of land is not due to debt but simply 
because the holding is too small, the most likely person 
to buy it is a richer farmer.
It would be interesting to establish how many sales are 
due to fragmentation caused by inheritance and now many 
to indebtedness etc. but in the absence of such data 
it is only possible to see that indebtedness causes some 
land transfer but not how significant this is in relation 
to other processes of differentiation
To summarize the findings from this analysis of the 
various aspects of rural indebtedness in the context 
of these three villages, we see that Bhadurirs somewhat 
neat and inter-locked system of semi-feudalism in which 
•share-cropping1 and the 'perpetual indebtedness of the
small peasants’ as manifestations of the 1 concentration 
of two modes of exploitation, namely usury and landowner- 
ship in the hands of the same economic class’ (Bhaduri:1973: 
120-121) persists, does not seem to hold for these villages. 
Except, of course that share-croppers numerically if not 
by average loan size, are more indebted in two of the 
villages (Table 5.5,4-); but otherwise they are not 
overwhelmingly dependent on their landlords for loans 
(Table 5.5,7). In terms of marketing, again numerically, 
unindebted households seem to be more involved in the 
market than indebted ones (Table 5.5.6) at least in two 
villages. In terms of forced sales it appears that no 
systematic relation exists between the degree of indebt­
edness and the extent of sale in the period immediately 
following the harvest when market prices are lowest.
In fact such a relation if it exists, seems to hold for 
the richer classes (Table 5.5.8).
That indebtedness is an important phenomenon in the life 
of the rural people is, admittedly, undeniable and it is 
quite possible that some of the poorer households especially 
the subsistence and the poor may be pushed down below 
subsistence through the mechanism of usury. But on the 
other hand, as argued earlier, usury also maintains certain 
people at subsistence level who would otherwise have 
permanently lost their land immediately. It may be that 
although usury works more slowly in the beginning, it 
ends up by transferring more land for a smaller amount 
of money than an outright sale would have involved.
This data, however, does not permit, and no data refering 
only to a specific point in time would permit any definite 
conclusions on this. As far as calling usury a relation 
of production is concerned, I think that by most definitions 
it cannot be identified as such.
Conclusion
On the basis of my analysis of the various structures
of relations of production in the three villages, I
would submit that the southern village, Bajua and the
northern village, Jamira are respectively characterized
by an articulation of a capitalist mode and a peasant
mode of production. So far as these villages are concerned
I do not think there is any justification for considering
share-cropping as a relation of production with specific
effects at either the economic, the political or the
ideological level as distinct from those of a peasant 
1economy•
In Biddya, on the other hand, some signs of feudal depen­
dence are noted in the sense that a number of poor peasants 
are critically dependent on share-cropping as a means of 
livelihood and to that extent share-cropping plays an 
important role in the reproduction of their domestic 
economy.
In the context of a capitalist mode there are two principal 
classes, the capitalists and the wage labourers! in a 
dependent Tfeudal1 mode - landlords and share-croppers; 
and in the peasant mode - a differentiated peasantry.
On the basis of this analysis I have In the next chapter 
constucted a table showing the relative sizes of the 
different classes in the three different villages. In 
this, however, I have amalgamated the capitalist farmers 
and the landlords into one class as there is no clear 
division between the two classes in terms of their wage- 
labour use and land renting (out). And then I have 
tried to tie this new breakdown into classes to the 
ecological factors.
1. I have in any case presented data on the breakdown of 
landlords and share-croppers, although I consider this 
as more of a relation within a peasant mode than a 
relation that is in any sense feudal.
CHAPTER 6
ECOLOGY AMD RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION 
Section I
The Class Structure of the Three Villages
On the basis of the analysis in the last chapter of the 
indicators of different modes of production, it is now 
possible to work out a table of comparative class structure 
using data from the three villages.
In Table 6,1.1 therefore, four classes are identified :
(i) the rich peasants, which includes both Isindlords and 
capitalist farmers; (ii) the share-croppers who are
1. I have earlier suggested, while expounding the theoretical 
basis of class structure, a five class model separating 
the landlords and the capitalist classes (Chapter p* ^ 4 9  
and later in broadening the framework, advanced a 
structure of as many a^ngyen classes including merchants 
and money lenders (p. ** ® ** However, it is now clear 
that the rich peasants do not fall into well defined 
categories of landlord farmers or capitalist farmers.
Almost all of them in the three villages rent out much 
of their land and at the same time use wage labour on 
their self-managed land and market most of their produce,
I have, therefore, decided to lump the two categories 
together and have called them capitalist or feudal, 
depending on the overall structure.
With reference to the merchants and the money lenders, 
the two additional classes identified in the theoretical 
exposition (p. ji* & 3 ^  should point out that although 
in none of the villages do the money lenders form a 
class distinct from the class of capitalist farmers or 
the landlords, at least in two of them - in Jamira and 
to a lesser extent in Bajua - the merchants can be identi­
fied as a separate class. There are some households who 
live off trading and in so far as the means of reproduction 
of the peasant household is dependent on the market, they 
do in a broader sense, control this means of production. 
However, the data does not permit an intensive analysis 
of this class independent of the four classes identified.
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critically dependent for their subsistence on rented-in 
land; (iii) the wage-labourers who must depend on selling 
their labour in order to subsist; and finally, (iv) the 
peasants who are predominantly owner farmers producing 
primarily with family labour and for consumption rather 
than for the market.
Originally, the population of the sample villages was 
divided into six groups according to their differential 
access to the means of production, translated into pro- 
duction per head of population. In Table 6.1.1 the six 
preliminary categories have been readjusted on the basis 
of the class analysis in the two preceding chapters, as 
follows :
Rich peasants includes all 'rich peasants1 plus those 
'surplus' peasants who depend predominantly on wage labour 
for production and market more than they consume; 
Share-croppers includes all the 'subsistence* and 'below 
subsistence' classes ('poor' and 'landless') who share- 
crop; Wage labourers are those 'subsistence' and 'below 
subsistence' classes doing wage labour but not share- 
cropping; and finally Peasants incorporates those 'poor' 
and 'subsistence' classes not doing wage labour or share- 
cropping, plus all 'self-sufficient' and those 'surplus' 
farmers neither predominantly employing wage labour nor 
marketing a greater portion of their produce.
On the basis of this four class model the data can now be 
re-allocated in order to see whether the dominant mode 
of production is the same in all three villages or whether 
it differs.
In order to do this I have, in Table 6.1.1, incorporated 
all the major indices of production relations i.e., wage 
labour, share-cropping and marketing. The following points
1. See methodology, p. » 3 1
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emerge from the table
1. The three villages are characterised by the predomin­
ance of three different classes* In numerical terms, 
Bajua has a predominantly wage labour population at 
almost 50$ of total households; in Biddya, as much
as 51*2$ of households depend for their livelihood on 
share-cropping and finally, Jamira is dominated by a 
peasant population at just over 50% of total households 
in the village (eol.l),
2. In terms of land ownership, it is clear that the rich 
farmers dominate all three villages* In Bajua 3.7$ 
of the households own 37.7$ of the land; in Biddya 
6,2$ of these households own 29*3$ of the land in 
Jamira, 4*7$ of the rich households own 26.6$ of the 
land (cols. 1 and 2). Thus, it is clear that in all 
three villages, social formation is dominated by a 
contradiction between those who have land and those who 
do not. As has been shown in Chapters 4 and 5,- this 
domination characterises the ways in which the union
of land and labour is accomplished in the production 
process.
3. On restructuring wage labour and rent relations on the 
basis of the re-allocation of data and the new class 
formation, in terms of wage labour as a percentage of 
total labour use in production (col.3), the rich peasants 
in Bajua show an overwhelming dependence on wage labour. 
At 97.4$ this is much higher than the figures for 
Biddya and Jamira where dependence on wage labour is 
also quite significant at 84.1$ and 78.6$ respectively.
4. In terms of net-share received (or paid) as a percentage 
of disposable paddy, the 'rich peasants' in Biddya 
receive more than a quarter (col,6) of their gross
produce as share-rent compared to their counterparts 
in Bajua and Jamira who receive respectively 9*2$ 
and 5.6$ of gross produce as share-rent.
5. In terras of marketed surplus (col.7), th© rich farmers
in all the three villages market between just below
50$ (Bajua) and about 60$ (Biddya). In point of fact
marketed surplus dropped substantially^ following the
rapid fall in production in Bajua as a result of the
construction of the embankment in 1972. This would
indicate the existence of a small but strong capitalist
class in Bajua. This is further substantiated by the
figures for 'expenditure as a percentage of income1
(Table 5.2.6; col.l). Here re-investment in production
at 22.1$ and 25*6$ of income for the 'surplus' and the
'rich' class categories respectively, well exceed the
figures for the corresponding classes in Biddya and 
2
Jamira. Although the rich landowners in Biddya 
market well over 50$ of their produce (Table 6.1,1; col.7), 
they lack the entrepreneurial spirit of the capitalist 
farmers of Bajua. This is indicated not only by the 
fact that they spend only between 11$ and 14$ of their 
income of production (Table 5.2,6; col.l) but also by 
the fact that, unlike their counterparts in Bajua or 
in Jamira, a very high proportion of the proceeds from 
their marketed surplus is spent on conspicuous consumption 
and festivities (Table 5.2.6; col,8).
6. Jamira, on the other hand, is a distinctly petty commodity 
production village. This is indicated not only by the
1. Villagers suggest that production in Bajua fell by up 
to 60$ after 1973 following the building of the embank­
ment. The embankment has also affected production in 
Biddya but to a lesser extent (see Chapter 3)*
2. These are not strictly re-investment figures since 
they include the cost of production for subsistence 
paddy.
preponderance of the peasant class at over 50$ of the population 
(Table 6.1.1; col .1 )„ but also by their greater dependence 
on self-exploitation rather than on wage labour use.
66.1$ of the total labour use of these peasant farmers is 
family labour (col.5) as against their wage labour use 
of only 33*9$ (col.3). As regards their market involvement, 
that they produce primarily for family consumption rather 
than for marketing is indicated by the low marketing figure 
at only 27.9$ of their disposable produce (col.7)*
Thus, having measured these findings against the various 
indices for different modes of production, broadly we may 
now call the modes; capitalist in Bajua,; in Biddya - feudal^" 
and in Jamira - petty commodity production. The social 
formation, therefore in Bajua is characterised by a contra­
diction between the capitalist farmers and the wage labourers 
in which the latter is forced to sell their labour to the 
former. In Biddya, this contradiction is not so much 
between the capitalist farmers and their wage labourers 
as between the rich landowners and their tenants (share­
croppers). In Jamira, the social formation is structured 
by the dominance of a peasant class who depend on self- 
exploitation; in other words, the exploitation of family 
labour.
It is important to point out, however, that rent-relation, 
which is the dominant mode in Biddya, is also the second 
most important production relation in both Bajua and 
Jamira. It should also be noted that in Bajua and Biddya 
these share-croppers not only rent-in land from the local 
landowners but also from absentee landowners. In fact, 
since absentee landowners own over 30$ and 40$ of the land
1. Not to be confused with European Feudalism nor is this 
a vestige of European Feudalism (see Chapter 4)•
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for Biddya and Bajua respectively (Table 3*1*4-)» we may 
conclude that the share-croppers are substantially depen­
dent on these absentee owners for their land. In Jamira 
on the other hand, as shown in Chapter 3, absentee owner­
ship is almost non-existent. The importance of absentee 
ownership has already been considered in the last chapter 
and will be further examined later in a summary of the 
empirical evidence in support of the hypotheses suggesting 
the influence of ecology on the way class relations are 
structured.
Section II
The Interrelation : some a priori assumptions
Now that the three villages have been identified in terms 
of their modes of production, in this section these modes 
will be linked to ecology. In other words, I shall examine 
the extent to which these differences in production modes 
are due to differences in the ecology of the three villages, 
the indices of which have been explained earlier (Chapter 3). 
These four indices, or ecological variables, are related 
to a set of five class relation variables, which may be 
called the social variables, in order to see if, and how 
the ecological variables explain the difference in overall 
class structure between the three villages.
Initially, I have attempted to depict graphically the inter­
relation between the variables of interest. In all there 
are nine variables, four independent and five dependent.
The independent variables are the ecological variables 
and my objective is to explore their influence on the 
dependent variables.
The ecological variables are (l) Land per Household in 
Efficiency Units (LEU); (2) Labour Productivity (LRP);
(3) Accessibility to the market (ACC); and (l) Ecologically 
Based Diversity (EBD), The dependent social variables 
are (i) the degree of Differentiation (DIF); (ii) the 
degree of Share-cropping (SHC); (iii) Wage Labour use (WL);
(iv) the degree of Market involvement (MKT); and (v) the 
extent of Usury (USI).
The ecological variables have been explained earlier,
As regards the dependent variables, these are self-
explanatory but I should perhaps make it clear that by 
differentiation I do not mean a dynamic process of 
differentiation but a degree of differentiation at a 
given moment in time. This is important since it deter­
mines the nature of some of the causal connections that 
are being established.
It is now possible to proceed to formulate certain 
a priori assumptions based on existing literature, intuition 
and logic, that might be expected to hold, first of all 
between the dependent variables themselves, i,e, differ­
entiation, share-cropping, wage labour, market and usury. 
Although no hypotheses will be formulated on the relation­
ship between the dependent variables themselves, in order 
to understand how these variables interact or effect one 
another corresponding to the impact of a given independent 
variable on any of these variables, it is necessary to 
explain and demonstrate the postulated relationships between 
the dependent variables.
In the next step I would like to explore a similar set of 
postulated relationships by drawing directed or undirected 
arrows between the independent variables taken one at a 
time, and the dependent variables.^
1, To help in deducing the signs of some of these paths 
between variables I have drawn some very elementary 
demand and supply curves. In Figure 6.2,1 for instance,
L LAND RENTED (LR)
Figure 6.2.1.
$  (3 Z
It is assumed here that the independent variables are not 
themselves inter-connected and that, in principal, land 
in efficiency units, labour productivity and accessibility
1. Continued from previous page,
I am trying to predict the direction of change corres­
ponding to variation in what I have called Land in 
Efficiency Units (LEU), Other things being equal, if 
in a village land in efficiency units is high then 
would one expect more or less share-cropping ? I have 
therefore drawn a demand schedule and a supply schedule 
for land to rent. Here the price is taken as the crop 
share, and it is assumed, as is usual, that the higher 
the price, that is the higher the crop-share which the 
landlord can get, the greater the amount of land he 
is willing to give out on a share-cropping basis whereas 
the less will be the demand to take in land on a share- 
cropping basis. So we have the conventional demand and 
supply schedules which intersect at a certain point 
determining an equilibrium price (crop-share) and an 
equilibrium value for the amount of land that will be 
share-cropped. Here we may, however, make one supple­
mentary assumption which is that, in the context of 
Bangladesh the crop-share is usually, in fact invariably 
fixed by custom. There is some scope for variation by 
using other methods such as charging an extra sum of 
money - a deposit or salami - from the share-cropper, 
or the landlord sharing some of the input costs which 
could cause the actual effective rate to deviate from 
the apparent customary rate but these are usually not 
significant so that for all practical purposes we can 
say that the crop-share is, in fact, conventionally 
fixed,
I have made a second assumption which is that, within 
the realistic range of availability of land in efficiency 
units and the existing crop-share there is always an 
excess demand for land to rent-in on the part of the 
poor farmers so that our demand and supply curves 
intersect above the equilibrium price line which is 
marked p. From this it follows, in fact, that demand 
has virtually no effect on determining how much land 
will be share-cropped. In effect since there is always 
an excess demand, if the landlords want to give out 
more land for share-cropping they can always do so 
at the going price. So that in situation 1 with the 
supply curve being and demand curve being D^f the
£5 6 3
can differ with no necessary connections between them,"^ * 
It will then be possible to work out the total effect 
of a postulated change in any of these independent
1. The independent variables, although not strictly 
independent, are sufficiently independent to make 
independent analysis possible. For instance, although 
there may be a strong relationship between Accessibi­
lity and Land in Efficiency Units in that more Land 
in Efficiency Units may not necessarily lead to higher 
production if market Accessibility is poor, areas 
with uniform Accessibility may have varied Land in 
Efficiency Units.
1. Continued from previous page.
actual amount of land share-cropped is L-^ . Whereas 
in situation 2, where there is more Land in Efficiency 
Units available, other things being equal (the degree 
of differentiation and so on) every household in the 
village has a little more Land in Efficiency Units,
This will mean that the rich farmers have more land to 
give out on a share-cropping basis at any given price.
So the supply curve will shift to the right to S^, At 
the same time, the poor farmers will also have a little 
more Land in Efficiency Units and therefore will need 
more of their domestic labour to work on their own land. 
Consequently they will have less labour to allocate to 
other users and therefore, less need for land to share- 
crop. In this situation, the demand curve for land 
to share-crop will shift to the left from D-, to D2*
So that if it were in fact a completely free market 
with prices being competitively determined, then the 
net result would be an unambiguous drop in the crop- 
share (price) but with the direction of change in 
the amount of land being share-cropped, that is, 
whether it will be more or less than the previous 
amount, not being determinate. However, since we have 
assumed that there is always an excess demand, we can 
in fact look at the intersection of the conventional 
price line with the supply curve and we see that in 
this case because the supply curve has shifted to the 
right, unless the demand curve has in fact shifted 
so far that the new intersection will be below the 
conventional price line, which we assume is not the 
case, the new amount of land rented-in (LR) will be larger 
than the old amount and will go up to L^, Therefore,
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variables taking each of them in turn and tracing all 
possible paths from the independent to the dependent 
variables. The objective is to establish unambiguous 
predictions as to the direction of the net impact. I
1. Continued from previous page.
in the flow chart a positive relationship has been 
indicated between LEU and SHC.
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Figure 6.2.2 predicts the variation in share-cropping if, 
other things being equal, the amount of differentiation 
in land increases. Again I have drawn the traditional 
demand and supply curves.
Here in situation 1, and Dq are respectively the 
supply and the demand curves and P, as before, is the 
conventionally fixed price level, that is, crop-share.
In situation 2, the degree of differentiation increases. 
With a rise in the degree of differentiation, at any 
given price, more land will be demanded by the poor 
households because they will then have less land than
shall of course, explain the reasoning for the signs 
put on the arrows which embody the partial hypotheses. 
In other words, the network of. lines, connecting all 
the variables indicates the direction and the kind of 
causality involved.
The Dependent Variables
Let us start with the dependent variables and within 
them let us begin by considering the influence of diff­
erentiation on each of the variables in turn.^*
(i) DIF. SHC and WL
If there is for instance, more differentiation, can 
we expect more or less share-cropping; or neither ?
By more differentiation I mean that the richer peasants 
have more surplus land which they cannot cultivate
1. It must be noted that this is a partial analysis*
1. Continued from previous page.
before; since it will have been transferred to the 
richer people. So the poor people will have a greater 
excess of family labour, less land for themselves, 
and naturally they will need land to cultivate on some 
terms. They could, of course, cultivate as wage labourers 
or on other terms, but we are assuming every thing else 
is the same, therefore they will in fact, demand more 
land at any given price. So the demand curve shifts 
to the right to D^.
At the same time, because the rich people now have more 
land than before, they will also be willing to rent 
out at any given price and therefore, the supply curve 
will also shift to the right to Sg* Therefore, in 
situation 2 the only difference from the previous 
situation is that,__even if there was not a convention­
ally fixed price (P), there would be an unambiguous 
increase in the amount of land being cultivated under 
the share-cropping arrangement. Since both curves 
have shifted to the right, the new intersection point 
will surely lie to the right of the old one at Q^.
DIF -  Differentiation 
SHC -  Share-cropping 
W L ~ Wage Labour 
MKT -  Market 
USY Usury
Fig. 6 .2 .3  POSTULATED RELATIONSHIPS 
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3 6 7
with their family labour while the poorer peasants 
have surplus labour* Therefore, there is both a 
greater demand for, and a greater supply of, non­
family labour which can be utilized either through 
a share-cropping arrangement or through a wage 
labour arrangement. The choice between these two 
will be decided by factors other than the fact of 
differentiation as such. So in a partial analysis, 
it is safe to say that the direct impact of diff­
erentiation on both share-cropping and wage.labour 
would be positive and in Figure 6.2*3 is marked as such.
Both share-cropping and wage labour, on the other 
hand, presuppose a certain degree of differentia­
tion although neither of-them actually causes diff­
erentiation except that indirectly, share-cropping 
could, through a different mechanism, usury 
for instance (Bhaduri:1973) * accelerate the process 
of differentiation. It is in fact the degree of 
differentiation that largely determines the level 
of share-cropping and/or wage labour. Therefore, 
neither SHC nor WL, other things being equal, 
necessarily has any effect on DIF.
(ii) DIF and MKT
The impact of differentiation on market is marked 
as positive mainly because, in a more differentiated 
situation, more of the surplus will accrue to the 
rich peasants who will have hardly any use for 
it except to market it. Some ceremonial distri­
bution within the village is possible if the rich 
peasants give feasts on festive or religious occa­
sions, or they may lend part of it but still, by
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and large, they can be expected to market most of 
it. This relation, of course, can work both ways.
While marketing is one of the factors working 
towards greater differentiation, it can also work 
towards greater equity when market penetration 
leads to what has earlier been termed 1 blanket 
commercialisation1•
(iii) DIF and USY
This is one of the more complex of the interrela­
tionships and therefore it is harder to make assum­
ptions. Ordinarily it would seem that more differ­
entiation means a greater demand for loans. But, 
of course, in a situation where there is no diffe­
rentiation whatsoever, all peasants are in fact 
equal and there will be no usury. Then if some 
differentiation is introduced i.e. there are marginal 
and poor peasants as well as landless and rich farmers, 
then we will see that differentiation is indeed 
associated positively with usury. So in a way, it 
is partly a question of where we begin. One might 
even say that there is a curvilinear relationship 
between usury and differentiation. Starting with 
low differentiation, as it increases, usury also 
increases'but there may come a point where the 
dependent peasantry - the poor and the subsistence 
farmers - have been so expropriated that it is no 
longer in the interests of the rich peasants to 
lend them money. Beyond this point, therefore, the 
greater the differentiation, the less usury there 
will be. Thus, if for instance, differentiation 
is plotted on the horizontal axis and usury on the 
vertical axis, then there may be a degree of differ­
entiation at which usury is at a maximum and past
which usury declines. The question is therefore, 
whether the level of existing differentiation in 
Bangladesh is to the left or right of that maximum.
In view of this, this relationship is marked as 
both positive and negative.
The effect of USX on DIF on the other hand, must be 
positive. Although it has been argued earlier that 
usury may in fact have a decelerating effect on the 
process of differentiation in that it may prevent 
the borrower from selling his land immediately, it 
does not actually prevent the process. In other 
words, usury does not provide the same opportunity, 
for instance to go into business or some other enter­
prise which may ultimately help the borrower to stave 
off the pauperisation process, as an outright gift 
of capital might.
The second dependent variable i.e. share-cropping is exam-
mined below in relation to the other variables.
(iv) SHC and DIF
Share-cropping presupposes a degree of differentiation, 
but share-cropping itself does not cause differentiation 
although it could, through different mechanisms, usury 
for instance (Bhaduri:1973)* accelerate the process of 
differentiation. It is in fact the degree of differen­
tiation that determines the level of share-cropping. 
Therefore, we could say that SHC does not, other things 
being equal, necessarily have any effect on DIF,
(v) SHC and WL
Other things being equal, by definition if one increases, 
the other decreases. A surplus landowner who has more 
land than he can cultivate using family labour must 
choose between two forms of external labour. He can 
either cultivate his land by directly hiring labour or 
he can have cultivated indirectly with share-crop labour. 
Naturally the more of one form will imply the less of
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the other form* This interrelation is therefore 
marked as negative.
(vi) SHC and MKT
Other things being equal, the more share-cropping 
the less involvement there will be in the market 
at least by the direct producers. Firstly, because 
they will get a great deal of what they need in 
kind and secondly, on the one hand, the landowner 
will have less surplus in terms of produce than he 
would have otherwise i.e. if he cultivated with 
hired labour and on the other, the share-cropper, 
having been exploited of his surplus labour will 
not normally be left with any surplus to market. 
Therefore, here there is a negative relationship.
The effect of MKT on SHC, on the other hand, in 
accordance with the general trend in the literature 
(Lenin: 1964.; Shanin: 1972) is likely 
to be accompanied by increased wage labour use 
rather than share-cropping and is therefore negative.
(vii) SHC and USI
Even though in the literature (Bhaduri:1973) there 
does seem to be a presumption that share-cropping 
is associated with more usury, as I have indicated 
earlier (see p .34-3 ) there is no compelling argu­
ment for this. One of the standard arguments is 
that, because the share-cropper is more likely to 
have some land, he is a better credit risk and 
therefore he has greater access to credit. The 
problem with this argument is that there is nothing 
that says that the wage labourer also cannot have 
a little land. In fact, it has been found that in 
Bangladesh, a great deal of wage labour does come
1. See footnote 3, p. 4-23. ( H O 1?}
from poor peasant h o u s e h o l d s T h e  other argument
is that the landlord employs usury to further tie
2
down his share-cropper. However, as I have argued 
before, there is no reason why in a labour surplus 
economy it is at all necessary to tie labour down 
and therefore, I would argue that there really is 
no necessary connection between share-cropping 
and usury. Following the same argument, it is 
logical to suggest that there is no necessary 
relation between usury and wage labour either.
The third dependent variable (WL) is now examined in
relation to the other variables,
(viii)WL and MKT
As wage labourers are predominantly paid in cash, 
it is reasonable to assume that the more money there 
is in the village, the more involvement there will 
be in the market as the wage labourers will use 
their money not only to buy rice but also other 
industrial products. In addition, the more involve­
ment there is in the market, the more money there 
will be in the village and the more convenient it 
will be to pay labourers in money rather than in 
kind (Lenin:1964-» Shanim 1972) Therefore,, 
wage labour and market in fact have a two way 
positive relationship.
(ix) MKT and USX
I am sceptical of the existence of any necessary 
relationship between the two, but Bhaduri has 
suggested that there is a relationship and his
1. Bardhan,K.:1973; Rudra and Biswas:1973» Muktada:1975; 
Rudra and Mukhopdhyaya:1976.
2. Bhaduri,A.:1973 *
3. Lenin:1964.: 175-382; 54-2-606; Shanin:1972:chapters 5-7.
hypothesis is that for the relatively poor 
peasants a great deal of marketing is in fact, 
forced marketing caused by usury* I have, 
however, tested his hypothesis and found that the 
poorest classes are forced to sell whatever they 
have to sell in the period immediately after the 
harvest when market prices are lowest and it makes 
very little difference whether or not they are 
indebted. However, a correlation has been seen 
to exist between the degree of indebtedness and 
the amount marketed in the case of the better off 
farmers* So on balance the relationship between 
market and usury seems to be positive.
Now that the a priori connections between the dependent 
variables have been established, what remains is to 
justify the directions (positive or negative) assigned 
to the lines connecting the independent variables with 
the dependent variables.
1. See Chapter 5# pp.359-362.
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Postulated Relationships between the Independent and the 
Dependent Variables
(i) LEU and DIF ? On the one hand, it could be argued 
that if there is more land in efficiency units per head, 
the rich will be richer and therefore, they may be able to 
get even richer over time because they will have more of 
a surplus. So other things being equal, say for instance, 
the penetration of market being equal, the rich in a 
village with more land in efficiency units may have a 
chance to get rich faster compared with the poor. Whereas 
a village with less land in efficiency units is likely 
to stagnate and differentiation is likely to be arrested.
The problem is, however, that differentiation can be 
seen either as a static or a continuous process. While 
more land in efficiency units might indeed lead to 
greater differentiation over time, it is difficult to 
apply the same argument to the study of a static situation 
and say that at any given point in time one is likely to 
find that areas with more land in efficiency units ate 
more differentiated. More land in efficiency units in 
itself cannot mean that there must be a differentiated 
class structure. It seems in fact that to explain a 
process of differentiation over time one needs at least 
two pieces of information, land in efficiency units as 
well as the extent of differentiation at time zero. If 
there was differentiation to begin with, then it will 
increase with time. On the other hand, if there was no 
differentiation to begin with, then of course there is 
no obvious reason why this should increase over time just 
because there is more land in efficiency units in the 
village. Therefore, it is difficult to postulate a 
particular relationship between Land in Efficiency Units 
and Differentiation,
MKT
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(ii) LEU and WL, SHC
In Figure 6 02O4- the assumption, based on partial analysis 
is that the relationship between this independent variable 
(land in efficiency units) and the two dependent variables - 
share-cropping and wage labour - is a positive one. The 
more land in efficiency units there is available per head 
of the population (although here it is calculated according 
to farm size), other things being equal, the more will 
be the extent of share-cropping. This is because, if 
there is more land with the richer farmers then they will 
need extra labour to cultivate it either through share- 
cropping or through wage-labour, although at the same 
time the poorer peasants, because they would also have 
more land the distribution being the same, would have 
a lower demand for share~eropped land. The latter point 
is not significant since we are assuming that, in the 
context of Bangladesh, the demand for land is never the 
binding constraint, that in effect in all villages there 
is, at the existing price or share-rate, an excess demand 
for land so that the amount of land rented out depends 
essentially on the supply and not on the demand. Therefore, 
I am arguing that other things being equal, more land 
available per head will mean more share-cropping.
Actually it will mean more share-cropping, or more wage- 
labour or both. As has been argued in the case of diff-' 
erentiation, which predominates will depend not on the 
amount of land available but on other factors, such as 
market for instance. But this will be an indirect 
influence and will be traced later. The direct influence 
on both wage labour and share-cropping, however, is 
expected to be positive.
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(iii) LEU and MKT
If there is more land per head or household, other 
things being equal, then there will be more produce 
available for marketing and one presumes that much of 
the surplus produce will in fact be marketed* Therefore, 
the relation between LEU and MKT is shown in Figure 6.2*4- 
a positive one.
(iv) LEU and USY
The relation between land in efficiency units and usury 
is shown as negative. This is because the number of 
loans given or taken is by and large, demand determined, 
and if there is more land per head available, then fewer 
people will need to resort to userers.
Labour Productivity and the Dependent Variables
In Figure 6 e2 05 labour productivity is related to the 
dependent variables.
(i) LRP and DIF
For reasons explained earlier (see LEU and DIF) no 
definite relationship can be postulated between labour 
productivity and differentiation.
(ii) LRP and WL, SHC
The relationship between labour productivity and share- 
cropping, and labour productivity and wage labour is 
fairly straight forward. If labour is more productive 
in a certain area, then this means, other things being 
equal, that less labour is needed for a given level of 
production. For the rich farmers (a) whatever family
as
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labour they are willing to use, a more productive area 
will enable them to cultivate more of their land than 
in a low labour productive economy; and (b) even if they 
do not want to work and instead want either to hire wage 
labour or rent-out their land to share-croppers, they 
would need, in either case, fewer people. In Bangladesh, 
by and large, the number of families who supply no family 
labour at all is rather low. Even most of the rich 
farmers work in the fields occasionally. Therefore, it 
can be reasonably argued that where labour productivity 
is higher, more land will be cultivated by family labour 
so that there will be less share-cropping and similarly 
less wage labour.
(iii) LRP and MKT
As regards the relationship between labour productivity 
and market, I have postulated a positive relationship.
If nothing differs between two villages except that In 
one, labour is more productive, then this village is 
likely to market more. The extra productivity could, 
of course, be taken in the form of leisure and therefore 
less work would be done, but the chances are that the 
increase will be used to enjoy a little more leisure but 
also more income and this can be done by marketing. So 
on the whole, it is legitimate to postulate a positive 
relation between labour productivity and marketing*
(iv) LRP and USY
Between labour productivity and usury, however, I have 
postulated a negative relationship. Other things remaining 
the same, the more labour productive a village, the better 
off will be the poor and the less they will have to borrow.
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Accessibility and the Dependent Variables
In Figure 6.2,6 accessibility is related to the dependent vari­
ables - perhaps the simplest relation of all. By definition 
accessibility can only be referred to in terms of the market. 
Thus, the labour market and the commodity market are two 
important dimensions of accessibility. In the case of labour 
mobility, however, it is very unlikely that the kinds of 
differences that can be observed in Bangladesh will make a 
significant difference to the degree of labour mobility in 
itself or that distances or difficulties will prove insur­
mountable. If people want to travel and if they have a place 
and a job to go to, then by and large, the inaccessibility 
of the village itself is unlikely to prevent them from 
travelling. However, what percentage of goods are marketed 
and how, will be determined by accessibility to the market 
measured in terms of speed, cost and partly by convenience.
Therefore the only direct link between accessibility and 
any of the dependent variables is in fact the one between 
accessibility and the market. Here a positive relation is 
postulated because if a village is more accessible, it must 
lead to more involvement in the market.
In Bangladesh, however, market forces are powerful enough 
so that accessibility determines not so much the degree, as the 
kind of commercialization. If a village is close to a market 
small direct producers have direct access to the market and 
there is less opportunity for merchant capital to reap a 
profit. Hence this may eliminate one of the sources of accu­
mulation for the richer strata of the peasants and provide some 
stability to the small (petty commodity producing) peasants.
Diversification and the Dependent Variables
Finally, in Figure 6.2,7 ecologically based diversification 
(EBD) is linked to the dependent variables. By diversifi­
cation is meant, as explained earlier, agriculture-related 
non-agricultural activities which may be affected by eco­
logical factors.
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It may be argued that the more diversified the non- 
agricultural activities are, the more the poorer sections 
of the community are likely to benefit, as they are 
likely to respond more readily to diversified work opp­
ortunities especially during the off-peak periods when 
there is a surplus of labour and it is very difficult to 
find fixed employment. Thus, other things being equal, 
diversification is likely to cause reduced differentiation. 
In other words, here there is a negative relationship.
The relationship to both the share-cropping and wage 
labour variables will also be negative. Although there 
is a constant demand for share-cropping land in Bangladesh, 
other things remaining the same, the greater the extent 
of diversification the less will be this d©mand. Similarly, 
although the effect on wage labour will depend on the 
relative rates of return, given some degree of diversi­
fication the effect on wage labour is likely to be negative.
The relationship with market, will however, obviously be 
positive. Diversification will not only involve selling 
whatever produce they may want to sell in the market, but 
also buying certain of the raw materials needed for these 
products in addition to the peasants1 subsistence needs.
This will not only mean greater market involvement on 
their part but also, generally, greater market penetration.
Finally, as regards usury, in the sense that diversification 
reduces differentiation and brings stability to peasant 
societies, it will make them less dependent on usury.
Thus, in its relationship to the four dependent variables, 
ecologically based diversification will have a negative 
effect on differentiation, share-cropping, wage labour 
and usury but a positive one on market.
The above diagrams (Figures 6.2.3 - 6.2.7), based on 
a priori assumptions derived from existing literature, 
are an attempt to illustrate the sort of relationship 
which can be expected between the set of four, independent, 
ecological variables and a set of five dependent variables.
I have described above, however, only the one to one 
relationships between variables. It is obvious from the 
diagrams that indirect relationships also exist (i.e. one 
variable may affect another through any one of a number 
of pathways via other variables) and that the whole system 
of linkages is extremely complex. It is important to 
note this? but if indirect linkages were to be included 
in the process of postulating the impact of one variable 
on another, then the results would be uniformly indeterminate 
unless the positive impact significantly outweighed the 
negative ones or vice versa, This however, 
would depend on how sharply defined the ecological 
variables were from village to village.
I do not believe therefore, that it is necessary or, 
indeed, possible at this stage to investigate indirect 
relationships since the existence of a direct relationship 
must be proved before an indirect relationship can be 
postulated. Once direct relationships have been esta­
blished, and perhaps expressed in quantitative terms 
it may be possible to test indirect relationships, but 
at this stage the one to one impact of one variable 
on another has still to be proved. This is what has been 
attempted in the next section.
Section III
Testing the Hypotheses
In this section I have summarized the hypotheses which 
have been suggested in the preceding chapters as well 
as those that have emerged from the a priori assumptions 
based on logic and existing literature indicating the 
effects ecological variables have on the relations of 
production (the social variables). Table 6.3.2 is a 
tabular representation of these hypotheses.
The Hypotheses
Ao The more land in efficiency units there is other
things being equal, the more reliance on share-cropping; 
the more family labour use on owned and/or share-cropped 
land compared to hired labour; the less wage labour and 
possibly the more marketing there will be. Finally, 
to the extent that share-cropping leads to greater 
indebtedness, this will also increase indebtedness.
B. More labour productivity, other things being equal, 
should mean less need for outside labour and therefore 
more reliance on family labour. This will provide
opportunity for surplus and will lead to onore 
marketing. Greater labour productivity will mean 
less share-cropping and therefore, less usury and 
less differentiation.
C, In a village with easy and cheap accessibility to 
the market allowing small producers to sell their 
goods directly in the market without having to go 
through trading intermediaries, we expect less
differentiation (both as a state and a process),
less wage labour and therefore more family labour,
less share-cropping and therefore less usury. This
has earlier been termed *blanket commercialization*
i.e. where market penetration is made without the mediation
of merchant capital. Thus, in this, the traditional
hypothesis has been inverted.
D. The higher the level of ecologically based diversifi­
cation, the greater should be the income especially 
of the poorer sections of the village, and therefore 
the lower the level of differentiation. Other things 
being equal, this will also mean less need for share- 
cropping as well as wage labour, and therefore more 
family labour. In addition greater diversification 
will inevitably mean greater involvement in the market. 
Finally, in the sense that it will reduce the vulner­
ability of the weaker classes it will make them less 
dependent on usury.
The point is, do any of these sets of hypotheses indicate 
a particular mode of production ? In other words, is 
is possible to predict on the basis of these hypotheses that 
more or less of any of the ecological variables - land in 
efficiency units (LEU), labour productivity (LRP), accessi­
bility (ACC) or ecologically based diversification (EBD) - 
will lead to any particular mode of production and if so, 
what these are.
Let us examine the various patterns that have emerged from 
the four sets of hypotheses :
(i) From LEU it is hypothesized that (a) more of LEU 
means more SHC, FL, MKT and USY; on the other
hand (b) less LEU means more WL.
(ii) From LRP it is hypothesized that (a) more LRP 
means more FL and MKT; and (b) less LRP means more 
WL, SHC and USY.
(iii) From ACC it is predicted that (a) more ACC will mean
more FL and MKT and (b) less ACG will mean more WL,
SHC and USY; and finally
(iv) From EBD it is hypothesized that (a) the more EBD 
there is, the more FL and MKT there will be; and 
on the other hand (b) the less EBD there is, the 
more WL, SHC and USY there will be.
Is it now possible, on the basis of these various patterns
to say, for instance that ’(a)1 represents one mode of 
production and r(b)f another?
The critical indicators of the various modes of production, 
as has been explained in some detail earlier, are wage 
labour (WL) and marketing (MKT) for capitalist mode of 
production; rent relations or share-cropping (SHC) often 
accompanied by usury (USY) for feudal mode of production; 
family labour (FL) for peasant mode of production; and 
finally family labour (FL) and marketing (MKT) for petty 
commodity production.
On the basis of this neither of the alternatives in the 
first set of hypotheses can be said to fall clearly into 
any mode of production. In the second set however,
'(a)1 indicates a petty commodity mode (PCP) whereas 1(b)* 
could mean either a capitalist mode (CMP) or a feudal mode
(FMP) depending on the dominance of wage labour relation’ 
or share-cropping relation and this is likely to be 
determined by other factors which may include other 
ecological factors. In the third set of hypotheses 
’(a)1 indicates more of a petty commodity mode (PCP) with 
dominance of family labour use and marketing and ^b)1 
represents more of a feudal mode of production (FMP).
Lastly, in set four, '(a)’ again represents a petty commodity 
mode whereas '(b)1 a feudal mode.
Our purpose therefore, is now two fold. Firstly, to 
test the four sets of hypotheses that we have summarized 
on the basis of our earlier formulations in this study, 
against our actual findings in the three villages; and 
secondly, to see how far the various modes of production 
indicated by these hypotheses corresponding to the different 
ecological variables, hold for the villages.
Table 6.3*1 gives an ecological ranking for the three
villages. For our purposes at the moment, however the
most important columns are 3, 5, 6 and 7 showing respectively
labour productivity, accessibility, land in efficiency
unitsunits and ecologically based diversification. In
terms of labour productivity, Biddya appears to be more
productive. In terms of land in efficiency units, however,
although there seems to be more land in efficiency units
per household in Biddya compared to the other two villages,
the difference between Biddya and lamira is not statis-
1tically significant. Similarly, in terms of accessibility
and diversification although Jamira ranks first, both
Biddya and Bajua are more or less equally accessible from
2
the national market and ecologically equally diversified.
1. For details of the statistical significance of ecological 
ranking see Table 6.3,1 and Appendix IV.
2. By national market is meant the market centre which is 
directly connected to and from which goods are directly 
transported to different parts of the country.
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Thus in Table 6.3.2* following the hypotheses, the three 
villages are ranked in accordance with expectations in terras 
of the various social variables i.e., market (MKT), share- 
cropping (SHC), wage labour (WL), family labour (FL), 
usury (USY) and differentiation (DIF).
Here it is predicted that Biddya and Jamira, which have 
slightly more land in efficiency units will demonstrate 
more share-cropping, more family labour use, less wage 
labour, more marketing and more indebtedness and therefore 
greater differentiation. The positive predictions are 
indicated in Table 6.3*2 by the figure 1 (from Table 6.3.1. 
Col.6) for LEU and the negative prediction (WL) by 2.
The ranking of the three villages in terms of labour 
productivity is, however, more clearly defined and is 
indicated by the figures 1, 2, and 3 respectively for 
Biddya, Jamira and Bajua (Table 6,3,1; col.3). In the 
predictions, however, following Hypothesis B, it is 
suggested that the greater the labour productivity the 
lower the level of wage labour, share-cropping
(and therefore usury) and in turn differentiation there will 
be. Thus here we have indicated these negative predi­
ctions by reversing the LRP (Labour Producitvity) 
rankings for the three villages. However the positive 
relationship in the case of family labour (less wage 
labour must mean more family labour) is indicated by 
maintaining the LRP ranking of the villages.
In terms of accessibility, on the other hand, the three 
villages fall into two categories - Jamira having high 
accessibility and Bajua and Biddya low accessibility 
(Table 6.3.1; col.5). This has in fact, been more clearly 
demonstrated in Table 3.5.1. Therefore, following
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the hypothesis C, Jamira would be expected to have less 
wage labour, more family labour, less share-cropping and 
less usury. Here again, the positive predictions (more 
MKT and more FL use) are indicated by maintaining the 
ACC (Accessibility) ranking of the three villages and 
the negative predictions (less WL, less SHG and less USY) 
are indicated by reversing the accessibility rank order 
(from Table 6,3.1). In market (MKT) predictions, however, 
in addition to the ranking indicated by 1 and 2 (indi­
cating high and low accessibility), the kind of commer­
cialisation - whether 'blanket* or 'funnel1 - is also 
predicted as expected in the three villages, and these 
are indicated respectively by *B * and 'F1,
Similarly in the predictions from ecologically based 
diversification (EBD), the villages are grouped into 
two categories, Jamira being ecologically more diversi­
fied and Bajua and Biddya relatively less diversified. 
Hypothesis 1D 1 predicts that the higher the level of 
EBD the lower will be the level of differentiation, 
share-cropping as well as wage labour and therefore the 
higher the level of family labour. Higher EBD will 
also mean greater involvement in the market and less 
usury. Once again, in Table 6,3,2 the positive predictions 
have been indicated by maintaining the EBD ranking 
from Table 6 ,3,1 and the negative ones by reversing 
them.
Thus, Table 6,3.2 represents my hypotheses in terms of 
a series of predictions based on the relationships 
between four major ecological variables - land in 
efficiency units (LEU), labour productivity (LRP), 
accessibility (ACC) and ecologically based diversification 
(EBD) - and the social variables such as market, wage
labour, family labour, share-cropping, usury and diff­
erentiation .
In order to test these hypotheses, in other words, to 
see how far the predictions are valid, it is necessary 
to compare these predictions with the data for the above 
social variables.
Table 6.3.3 gives the actual figures for the different
1
social variables and their ranking in the three villages.
If these are compared with the predictions in Table 6.3.2 
we find that the predictions for land in efficiency units 
(LEU) on market (MKT) are borne out by the actual finding 
in that both Biddya and Jamira market more than Bajua as 
predicted. However, the actual difference in marketing 
between Biddya and Jamira could not be predicted as the 
LEU ranking (Table 6.3.1; the LEU ranking between Biddya 
and Jamira being insignificant) did not allow such pre­
dictions .
The predictions for LEU on wage labour also hold. Strictly 
speaking the predictions here are partially borne out by 
the actual ranking between the three villages in that 
although Jamira clearly demonstrates less wage labour use 
than Bajua as predicted the difference in the predicted 
ranking between Bajua and Biddya could not be substantiated 
as statistically (Table 6.3.3) this difference is insignificant. 
This, however, does not mean that Biddya does not in fact 
use less wage labour than Bajua as can be seen from the 
actual figures. So it can be concluded that the predictions 
for LEU on wage labour are largely, but not fully substantiated.
On share-cropping (SHG), usury (USY) and differentiation
1. Alth@Mgh th©s© figur©se which are based on aggregate data, 
show differences between the villages for each variable, 
the differences are not necessarily reflected in the 
ranking. The ranking is based on the statistical signi­
ficance of these differences. Where the differences 
are not statistically significant, no difference in 
ranking has been made between the villages.
(DIF), on the other hand., the predictions for land in 
efficiency units do not seem to hold.
The predictions for labour productivity (LRP) hold for 
Bajua in the case of share-cropping (SHC), wage labour 
(WL), and usury (USY). I n the cases of share-cropping 
and usury although the predicted rank order between the 
other two villages is not maintained in the actual 
findings, that both Biddya and Jamira have less share- 
cropping and less usury compared to Bajua is clearly 
recorded in the actual position. The predicted diff­
erence between Jamira and Bajua in wage as well as 
family labour use is also substantiated. The predictions 
can also be said to be partly valid on market (MKT) 
in that, although the order is not the same, the point 
that both Biddya and Jamira market more than Bajua seems 
to hold when compared with actual findings in Table 6.3.3. 
The predictions for labour productivity on differentiation 
(DIF) hold for all the three villages.
In the case of accessibility (ACC) - where we have one 
highly accessible (Jamira) and two less accessible 
villages (Bajua and Biddya) the latter two villages 
cannot be separated on the basis of accessibility and 
therefore cannot be ranked individually as regards 
predictions for share-cropping. Although the actual 
findings show that Biddya and Bajua have significantly 
different levels of share-cropping, since the individual 
values for both are more than that for Jamira, the 
predictions are valid. For the same reason the predictions 
for usury (USY) are valid when compared with the actual 
findings.
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Thus we find that all the predictions relating accessi­
bility and the social variables (MKT, SHC, WL, FL and 
USI) hold with the exception of differentiation (DIF). 
However, even here, although the position of Biddya has 
been reversed in the actual finding the predictions 
ranking Bajua and Jamira hold.
Similarly, in the case of the last of the ecological 
variables, ecologically based diversification (EBD) - 
where again there are only two categories of villages, 
Jamira being more and Bajua and Biddya being less 
diversified - all the predictions relating EBD and the 
social variables hold with the exception of different­
iation (DIF) where we observe only partial validity 
in that predictions for only two of the three villages 
(Bajua and Jamira) hold.
Thus it can be concluded that, so far as these villages 
are concerned, of the four ecological variables, accessi­
bility to market and ecologically based diversification 
directly affect relations of production.
In the case of accessibility, the predictions of Hypothesis 
'C1 are borne out by the findings. In other words, it 
can be said, on the basis of this study that in a country 
where market forces are strong, the accessibility of a 
region to market determines not so much the degree, as 
the kind, of commercialization. High accessibility in 
terms of time and cost which allows petty commodity 
producers to sell whatever agricultural or non-agricultural 
goods they may produce directly in the market without 
having to go through any trading intermediaries, will 
reduce opportunities for merchant capital and the result 
is likely to demonstrate more of a petty commodity mode
of production with mostly family labour based farms 
and therefore less wage labour, less share-cropping and 
less usury.
Similarly, with respect to ecologically based diversifi­
cation, on the basis of the findings in these three 
villages, it can be concluded that the higher the level 
of diversification, the greater will be the degree of 
family labour use, market involvement and commercialization 
and the lower will be the level of share-cropping, wage 
labour, usury and perhaps differentiation.
On the other hand, Hypotheses ’A 1 and 'B * cannot be said 
to have been so clearly substantiated by the actual 
findings. Although the predictions hold in the case of 
B§.jua, they are not borne out by the findings in the 
other two villages. Therefore, the results with regard 
to these two hypotheses, to my mind, are at best indet­
erminate .
As regards the second point of my analysis, that is to 
see how far the various modes of production indicated 
by the hypotheses, correspond to actual modes of pro­
duction in the villages; this has been seen to hold for 
at least two of the three villages and with respect to 
two of the four sets of hypotheses. In the third and 
the fourth sets of hypotheses it was predicted that 
(a) the more accessible the market is from the village 
(ACC) and ecologically the more diversified it is (EBB), 
the greater will be family labour use (FL) and market 
invlovement (MKT) which will demonstrate a petty commodity 
mode. This holds for the northern village Jamira. It 
was further hypothesized that (b) the less accessible 
(ACC) and the less ecologically diversified the village,
the more wage labour use, share-cropping and usury 
there would be and the village structure would be 
dominated by a feudal mode of production (FMP). This 
is seen to hold for Biddya.
Thus, it can be said that high accessibility and/or h£gh 
diversity demonsti’ates a petty commodity mode of pro­
duction whereas low accessibility and/or low diversity 
demonstrates a feudal mode of production (Table 6.3*4-) •
Table 6.3.4.* Ecology and Mode of Production
ACC EBD
High
High Low
PCM 9*
Low ? FMP
The other two sets of hypotheses linking the two ecolo­
gical variables - land in efficiency units (LEU) and 
labour productivity (LRP) - and the dependent social 
variables and indicating a peasant mode, a capitalist 
mode or a feudal mode**" do not seem to hold in the case 
of these villages at least. However, this is not to 
suggest that there is no relationship between land in 
efficiency units, labour productivity and production 
relations such as wage labour, share-cropping or market. 
Empirically many instances were observed in which such 
ecological factors have affected production relations, 
and this is summarized in the conclusion to this study.
It can, in fact, also be seen from the figures drawing 
postulated relationship between the ecological variables 
and the social variables, that a one to one correspondenc 
exists but because of the very complex nature of the
interrelationships it is difficult to derive any unam­
biguous predictions concerning the effect of these two 
ecological variables on the social variables when taken 
in the total context of a given social formation unless 
of course the (ecological) differences between the 
villages are much more sharply defined.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
The principal hypothesis of this study is that ecology 
has an effect on the way in which rural class 
relations are structured and evolve. As is explained in 
the introduction to this study, the problem has been 
approached broadly in two stages. In the first stage 
the empirical findings in the selected villages are 
described and their relationship to ecology discussed.
In the second stage, a theoretical formulation is offered 
with regard to some aspects of ecology and rural class 
relations. The results are both positive and negative.
In the first stage I have described how the ecology of 
the three villages has influenced some of the character­
istics of these villages for example cropping pattern, 
demographic structure, land distribution, rent relations 
and local occupations such as fishing and coir making 
and seems to have influenced other developments like the 
labour market and the structure of the politics of power. 
These are, however, merely logical assumptions based on 
observation and participation and not conclusions. In 
other words, they have neither been reached by reasoning 
from general laws nor has their validity been tested.
I have described for example, how the proximity of the 
two southern villages to the sea causing high salinity 
has limited their cropping potential and made them mono­
crop areas producing only transplanted aman in the monsoon 
months when the local rivers and canals are influenced 
by the Padma river flow, local rainfall and runoff.
It was also noted how in a shallowly flooded, tidal area, 
water pressure and over-sedimentation can reduce crop 
yields, how during the dry season, when salinity is
pronounced, artificial field bunds are necessary to 
protect crops and how this in turn affects the fishing 
rights in the enclosed area especially of the poorer 
sections of the people* Thus, one ecological constraint, 
salinity, reduces access to a different ecological 
advantage, fishing potential* This I have called 
ecologically based diversification. As a result of 
this salinity, the poorer sections of the population 
are unable to benefit from the fishing potential and 
thus to strengthen their position and the process of 
differentiation remains unabated.
Whereas in Biddya salinity has off-set the potential 
benefits of ecological diversification, in Jamira, the 
northern village, a different ecological factor, access­
ibility to the market has strengthened the advantages 
of diversification. Coconut and coconut products 
especially coir, chewing nuts, and date-palm products 
such as molasses are sold directly in the market by 
the producers themselves without having to go through 
middlemen. This not only prevents surplus drain from 
the village, but also stabilizes the position of the 
poorer sections of the peasantry and checks the process 
of polarisation. Thus, in this instance, accessibility 
to the market and ecologically based diversification are 
mutually reinforcing. I have called this situation in 
Jamira 'blanket commercialisation' as opposed to the 
situation in the south where, due to poor accessibility 
to the market, the poorer peasants are dependent on 
intermediary traders for marketing their produce. This 
process of 'funnelled commercialisation* not only 
deprives the weaker peasants of much of their surplus 
labour making them more vulnerable in the various 
unequal relations such as wage labour, share-cropping
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and usury they enter into and broadly, to the process 
of differentiation but also makes the village as a whole 
poorer in that the village is slowly drained of its surplus 
by traders who may be outsiders.
In terms of labour productivity it has been shown that 
the natural flooding and silting in Biddya, the village 
in the south, makes it almost twice as productive as 
the other villages. This is reflected in a lower labour 
use and therefore in lower production costs. This also 
affects the wage rates in that field work is less 
strenuous and therefore the wage rate is lower in Biddya 
compared to Bajua. However, the overall wage rate rises 
rapidly as the peak period approaches. Therefore it is 
partly determined by ecology, in that it is determined 
by the nature of agriculture, and partly by the laws 
of demand and supply. But then the labour supply itself 
is ^gain largely determined by ecological factors. As 
we have seen, the peak period demand is met by the influx 
of immigrant labourers from the northern regions which 
is made possible by the difference between the northern 
and the southern regions, in the timing of peak periods 
at different phases of production such as transplanting, 
weeding and harvesting. I have argued that traditional 
monsoon rice technology is dependent mainly on timing, 
depth and distribution of rainfall which in turn determine 
such operations of cultivation as sowing, transplanting, 
weeding and finally harvesting.
This is also the reason why it is quite common to find 
small farmers who would normally hire out, hiring in 
labour at peak periods. This explains why it is almost 
impossible to identify pure peasant or pure petty 
commodity producing families in the rural areas. Thus,
it would seem that in a predominantly agrarian structure, 
the whole spectrum of labour use especially wage labour 
relation is influenced if not determined by ecological 
factors•
With regard to rent relations, it has been shown that, 
while the inaccessibility of plots is in itself, often 
reason enough to want to rent them out, the extent of 
absentee ownership - which in the case of the two 
southern villages is due to ecology - also determines 
the conditions of access to land. In other words, it 
determines to a large extent how much land is share- 
cropped, how much owner-cultivated, and how much 
cultivated by wage labour.
As regards politics and power structure in the three 
villages, I have argued that, of the possible sources 
of power at least two - (a) land-based power and (b) 
state power - are directly affected by ecology. The 
big farmers, through the instruments of either land 
renting or wage labour use and also through a separate 
function of landownership, i.e., money-lending relation, 
make the poorer classes especially the share-croppers 
and the wage labourers dependent on them for their 
livelihood and thereby wield political power. As for 
state power, to the extent that this power base helps 
the big farmers to control the local council and with 
the help of other organs of power such as the police, 
command the order of the State, their authority can be 
said to be a direct function of their access to land.
The point is, however, that although differentiation 
has increased over the years, the basis of the diff­
erentiated structure of the peasantry in the southern
p
villages is to be found in the history of land reclama­
tion and settlement in the Sundarbans which was itself 
characterized by unequality. While the decision of 
the Government to reclaim land and encourage settlement 
was augmented by the interests of the empire, the schemes 
themselves and their terms and conditions were dictated 
to a large extent by the ecology of the Sundarbans.
These schemes and the terras and conditions of reclamation 
pre-supposed differential access to land. To that extent 
the land-based power structure and therefore state-power 
may be explained ecologically.
Thus, empirically there is enough evidence to suggest 
that there is a clear correspondence between ecology and 
the way in which rural societies are structured. These 
relationships however, are not well defined and therefore 
it is difficult to come to any clear conclusions on the 
basis of these observations. They do tell us that ecolo­
gical variables such as salinity, flooding, labour 
productivity, accessibility and ecological diversification 
affect such social variables as occupation, labour use, 
income, poverty and differentiation but they do not 
indicate a great deal about the precise nature of the 
relationship the various ecological variables may have 
with the social variables.
In order to clarify this, a set of four ecological 
variables were selected and the households in the 
villages were re-ordered along class lines according to 
the concept of relations of production. Based on the 
principal contradiction in the relations of production, 
the three villages were identified as capitalist, feudal, 
and peasant. On the basis of a priori reasoning, intuition 
and literature, I then formulated a series of hypotheses
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which in turn formed the basis of predictions as to how 
the ecological variables would affect the various indi­
cators of class relations such as wage labour, family 
labour, share-cropping, market, usury and differentia­
tion. These predictions were then tested against the 
actual findings in the villages. Lastly, on the basis 
of these tests I have offered a  f r a m e w o r k  identifying 
the possible linkages between some of the ecological 
variables and the class relation variables which I 
have called the social variables. This, in brief 
formed the outline of the theoretical framework of this 
study.
In the final analysis the two southern villages Bajua 
and Biddya are identified as capitalist and feudal 
respectively and the northern village, Jamira as a 
petty commodity producing village. The dominant 
5 contradiction^' in the three villages are seen as those 
between the capitalist farmers and their wage labourers 
in Ba j ua and between the landlords and their share-croppers 
in Biddya. In Jamira, on the other hand, the two confl­
icting classes, the labourer and the non-labouring 
owners of the means of production, merge into one class 
when identified on the basis of self-exploitation and 
therefore there is no dominant 'contradiction1 as such. 
This, however, is not to suggest that there is no 
'contradiction1 in Jamira. To the extent that there 
are conflicting classes such as landlords and share­
croppers, wage labourers and capitalist farmers, 
contradictions exist.
The source of these contradictions is the unequal relations 
which the direct producers and the owners of the means 
of production enter into in the process of production.
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By predicting the locus of these unequal relationships 
corresponding to the four ecological variables we have 
not only observed the complexity of such a relationship 
but also determined that the direction and the kind 
of relationship between an ecological variable . and a 
given social variable seen in the total context of a 
social formation must depend on the magnitude of the 
relationship between the variables. In other words, 
it might be difficult to deduce any definite relationship 
between the class structure of a village and its ecology 
unless the ecological settings are sharply defined from 
village to village.
Two positive results, however, emerged from the theore­
tical framework as the hypotheses were tested. The 
first relates to accessibility to the market and the 
second , to ecologically based diversification. The 
predictions made on the basis of these two ecological 
variables as to the extent and kind of social relations 
are borne out by the findings in the three villages.
It is usually assumed or claimed in the literature that 
the greater the degree of market penetration, the greater 
the degree of differentiation among the peasantry 
(Lenin:1956; Shanin:1972) This study suggests, 
however, that commercialisation does not necessarily 
mean greater differentiation and in fact it could well 
lead to the opposite. The kind and degree of differ­
entiation depends on the type of accessibility leading 
to what I have called a funnelled or a blanket type of 
commercialisation.
1. Lenin, V.I.s The Development of Capitalism in Russia; 
especially chapters II, III and IV.
Shanin, T : The Awkward Class, Political Sociology of 
Peasantry in A Developing Society: Russia 1910-1925; 
especially chapters 5 and 7.
This study concludes that, in a country such as Bangladesh 
where market forces are strong, accessibility of a 
region to market determines not so much the degree as 
the kind of commercialisation. If accessibility is such 
in terms of time and cost, that it allows small producers 
to sell their home grown produce or commodities directly 
in the market without having to go through any trading 
intermediaries then this will restrict opportunities 
for merchant capital. This I have called 1 blanket 
commercialisation1. Under this form, the accessibility 
confers income earning abilities on the poor and the 
landless by not only enabling them to sell their commo­
dities but also to diversify their income-earning 
activities. In this situation the market in fact serves 
not to further polarisation but to reduce the degree 
of differentiation as the reverse cash flow comes not 
only to the rich farmers, but also to the poor peasants.
Thus, under blanket commercialisation we are likely to 
observe not market penetration followed by capitalist 
forms of production but a strengthening of simple commodity 
production in that it is likely to vitalise the whole 
small commodity sector. This will help to stabilize 
the household economies of the small peasantry. In 
so far as it enables more producers to maintain their 
independence, this will make them less vulnerable to 
exploitation both through wage labour and through share- 
cropping. It would in turn also tend to reduce usury.
As regards ecological diversification, we can say that 
if the ecology of a region is so diversified as to 
allow'employment or income sources of some kind, especi­
ally to the poorer sections of the population, for most 
of the year, then this will not only benefit them directly
in terras of greater income, it will also improve their 
bargaining power in the course of selling their labour# 
Diversification into different activities and petty commodity 
production will substantially reduce their critical 
dependence on wage labour or share-cropping relations, 
for example, for the reproduction of their labour. In 
so far as this reduces the extent of these production
relations, it will mean more family labour based farms in 
the village. Diversification will tend to protect the 
purity of a petty commodity mode of production in that 
it will tend to stabilize the incomes of the poorer 
peasantry and the process of differentiation will be 
delayed.
In a way therefore, the effects of accessibility to 
market and ecological diversification are similar. Thus,
I have further argued that a region with high accessi­
bility as well as being ecologically highly diversified 
will clearly demonstrate a petty commodity mode of 
production.
Conversely, if the accessibility of a region to the 
market is such that it only allows ’funnelled commer­
cialisation1, in that the small producers are dependent 
on a class of traders in order to market their produce 
and therefore the conditions exist for merchant capital 
to reap a profit, then the market will serve as an 
agent for further polarization. In a less accessible 
village where the richer peasants may entirely or at 
least to a large extent, give up agricultural production 
and become full-time traders, the polarization between 
the peasantry and the rest is likely to increase and 
the small peasants are likely to be doubly dependent; 
firstly as tenants and secondly, as sellers of small 
quantities of produce.
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This is likely to demonstrate a feudal mode of production. 
Which, however, is not to suggest that there may not be 
significant wage labour use but that the social formation 
is dominated by share-cropping and usury relations.
Similarly, if the region is not sufficiently diversified 
as to allow the poorer peasants income generating 
employment for the major part of the year then this is 
also likely to demonstrate a feudal mode with a predomi­
nance of share-cropping relations and usury and a higher 
level of differentiation.
These are the positive findings of this study since they 
are seen to hold in the case of the three villages of 
this study. On the two remaining selected ecological 
variables, however, it was impossible to derive any 
unambiguous conclusion as to their effect on given 
social variables when seen in the total context of a 
social formation, although it is quite clear from the 
empirical data that broadly such relationships exist.
The findings are &g important in the discipline of 
ecological studies as they are in the study of rural 
class relations. However, further research into the 
precise nature of relationships involving more ecological 
variables and social variables will contribute towards 
better understanding of both areas within the broader 
discipline of man-nature relationship.
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APPENDIX I
Generalized Soil Classification
Bangladesh Soil Surveys Research Department have worked 
out a generalized soil classification termed as 'general 
soil types' which are given below i
Floodplain soils:
1. Non-calcareous alluvium
2. Calcareous alluvium
3. Acid sulphate soils
4- • Peat soils
5. Grey floodplain soils
6. Grey Piedmont soils
7. Acid basin clays
8. Non-calcareous dark grey floodplain soils
9. Calcareous floodplain soils
10, Calcareous brown floodplain soils
11. Non-calcerous brown floodplain soils
12. Black terai soils
Hill Soils
13. Brown hill soils
Terrace Soils
14. Shallow red-brown soils
15. Deep red-brown soils
*]« 6. Brown mottled terrece soils
17. Grey terrace and valley soils
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APPENDIX II
Cropping Pattern Based on Different Agro-Ecological 
Determinants in Various Parts of Bangladesh
Based on the different characters of determinants in 
different areas the following cropping pattern has evolved 
in Bangladesh. However, particular cropping sequences 
could he changed and are being changed in areas where 
the determinants have been altered through technology 
i.e. agricultural development work or soil management 
practices.
The major cropping patterns are :
1. Dryland crops throughout the year: sugarcane, banana etc
2. Broadcast aus - early rabi crops (tobacco, potato, 
mustard, raddish).
3. Broadcast aus or jute - long term rabi crops (wheat, 
potatoes, water melon, chillies).
4. Broadcast aus or jute - short term rabi crops (mustard, 
legumes, millet, sesaraum).
5. Broadcast aus or jute, followed by transplanted aman, 
followed by short term rabi crops
6. Broadcast aus or jute followed by transplanted aman
followed by fallow.
7. Mixed b adcast aus and deepwater aman - rabi crops
8. Broadcast deepwater aman followed by rabi crops
9. Broadcast deepwater aman followed by fallow
10. Transplanted a.man followed by fallow
11. Boro followed by fallow
12. Irrigated boro or aus (HYV) - transplanted aman
13. Irrigated boro or aus followed by fallow
APPENDIX III
THE MARXIST ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
In order to ensure the propagation of life man produces 
and this entails from the start a dual relationship : 
with nature and with other men. For Marx the dialectic 
of development started with nature and from man as 
initially an integrated part of nature. Human labour 
power and the resources of nature such as; soil fertility 
water power and day light which are used for production 
in conjunction with scientific and technical knowledge 
are identified in Marxist terms as the forces of production. 
In other words, this refers to the mode of appropriation 
of 'nature' that is, to the labour process in which a 
determinate raw material is transformed into a specific 
product. The elementary factors of the labour process 
are (1) work itself, (2) the subject of the work, and 
(3) the instruments (Capital 1:178). Forces of production 
differ according to the manner in which the forms of 
cooperation and coordination of the labour of several 
individuals, the forms of the articulation of the means 
(land, inputs, machines) and the object of labour take 
place (Hindness and Hirst:1977:11).
The relations of production are those socially structured 
relationships between men into which they must enter as 
a result of their participation in the process of social 
production such as relationships between master and 
slave, serf and lord, or proletariat and bourgeois.
They produce only by cooperating in a certain way and 
mutually exchanging their activities which gives rise 
to division of labour. But to speak of an individual 
doing only one kind of work is already to assume a 
society where man's activity is not his own. Thus
ownership of the means of production reflected in the 
relations of production form the basis of social division 
into classes with conflicting interests, such as slave­
owners and slaves, landlords and serfs, or bourgeois 
and proletariat (Melotti:1977:3). Relations of production
define a specific mode of appropriation of surplus 
labour and the specific form of social distribution 
of the means of production corresponding to that 
mode of appropriation of surplus labour (Hindness and 
Hirst:1977:3)
Capitalist relations of production are a mode of appro­
priation of surplus labour in the form of surplus value, 
and the social distribution of the means of production 
where these are owned by the non-labourers (capitalists) 
where the labour power takes the form of a commodity 
which the class of labourers are forced to sell to the 
class of non-labourers (Ibid).
Surplus labour is a necessary element in all possible 
modes of production differing not in its existence but 
only in the mode in which it is appropriated. It may be 
appropriated collectively as in the primitive communist 
and advanced communist socialist modes of production, 
or by a class of non-labourers as in capitalism or feud­
alism. In the second case the mode of appropriation
constitutes antagonistic relations of production and a 
social division of labour between the class of peasants 
and workers on the one hand and feudal lords and capi­
talists on the other.
The mode of appropriation of surplus labour governs
the mode in which the social product is distributed
among the agents of production (lbid:10)2.
1. See Hindness and Hirst: 1975:4-5-69 and 1977:63-75; 
Cutler, Hindness and Hussain:1977:135-1535 
Althusser :1977:174--181, 227-233 and 24.4-262.
2. Also see Hindness and Hirst:1977:23-44 and Balibar: 
1977:209-224.
The forces of production and. relations of production as 
a whole, constitute the mode of production, for instance 
the Asiatic, the Classical, the Feudal, the Capitalist, 
and other modes of production. The concept of a partic­
ular mode of production is one of a determinate articulated 
combination of relations and forces of production.
This means that there can be no definition of the 
relations or of the forces of production independently 
of the mode of production which they are combined 
(Hindness and Hirst;1977:11)
Each mode of production has, with two exceptions 
(primitive society with no private property and socialist 
society), a characteristic form of exploitation - so 
called general slavery in the Asiatic mode, slavery 
in the Classical mode, serfdom in the Feudal mode and 
wage-labour in the Capitalist mode - based on specific 
forms of appropriation by a class of non-labourers 
of the labour of others. For Instance, the appropri­
ation of the labour of the village community via the 
tributary system and the collective corvee under the 
Asiatic mode of production; the appropriation of the 
slave's actual body and thus of his labour, under the 
Classical mode; the private appropriation of the serf's 
surplus product under the Feudal mode; and finally the 
private appropriation of surplus value under the Capi­
talist mode (see Melotti:1977:3-5)•
The Marxist concept of social formation which corresponds 
to society as it is generally understood, has been left 
until last because to understand It involves the 
comprehension of the concepts analysed in the preceding 
paragraphs,
The Marxist concept of social formation is not that 
of a civil society.
The social formation is the site of a first 'contradiction' 
between the classes which Marx describes in terms of 
struggle, war and opposition, a 'contradiction' which 
can be 'now hidden, now open', and whose terms are 
'in a word, oppressor and oppressed'. Marx calls it 
'an antagonism', 'not in the sense of individual 
antagonism1, i.e., not a struggle between men but 
an antagonistic structure; it is inside the economic 
base, typical of a determinate mode of production 
and its terms are called 'the level of productive 
forces' and 'the relations of production'. The 
antagonism between the productive forces and the 
relations of production has the effect of a revolut­
ionary rupture, and it is this effect which determines 
the transition from one mode of production to another 
('progressive epochs in the economic formation of 
society'), and thereby the transformation of the whole 
social formation (Althusser and Balibar:1977:203).
The usually accepted notion of social formation is that 
a concrete society never displays one mode of production 
in its pure form, it is usually a combination of different 
modes of production with one being the dominant mode of 
production. It is a structure, the mode of production 
being itself a structure, whose elements are different 
modes of production of which as Althusserians would put 
it, it is the most dominant mode. In this the subsidiary 
modes are rudimentary and their laws of motion are governed 
by the laws of motion of the dominant one. Some of these 
rudimentary modes may be survivors of earlier modes of 
production and others may be precursors of later modes 
of production. Basically this is what is meant by a 
social formation. This corresponds most closely to the 
bourgeoisie concept of society which is made up of 
individual men acting together in certain ways; here the 
elements are men. In the Marxist conception the elements 
are modes of production, not individuals. So it is an 
entirely different structure. It is in some ways, an 
entirely new way of grasping the same reality but in 
some respect it is an entirely different reality.
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APPENDIX IV
STATISTICS
In Table 5.2.5 the difference between those marketing 
more or less paddy in terms of wage labour use is highly 
significant using standard chi-square test.
In Table 6.3.1 the ecological variables are ranked 
according to magnitude except where the difference in 
magnitude is insignificant.
For all tests;
Bajua is taken as x ^  n=135 
Biddya is taken as x^, n=6l 
Jamira is taken as x^, n=158
The results are as follows :
Average Farm Size
S .D.x2 = 1.27 
S.D,x2 = 2.89 
S.D.x^ = 0.97
2 (x1 ~ x 2 ) =0.77
V x 2 =
2<r(% - 5 3) = 0.► 27
Xx-X3 = 0.► 82
2 a"(x 2 - Z 3 ) = 0,.72
x2"x3 = 0,.76
Therefore the difference between the average farm sizes 
of Bajua and Biddya are not significant but between both 
these villages and Jamira they are significant at the 
95% level of confidence.
Labour Productivity 
S.D.x^ = 0.17 
S.D.x^ = 0.34- 
S.D.x^ = 0.31 
2 ^ ( x ^ x ^ )  = 0,11 
X2~x^ = 0.39 
2<r(x3-xx ) = 0.057
X 3 - X 1  =  0 . 0 6
2<r(x2~x^) = 0,09 
x2-*i = 0.4-5
Therefore the difference between mean values for labour 
productivity for all three villages are significant at 
the 9 5 % level of confidence.
Land Productivity
S.D.xx = 16.73 
S.D.x2 = 13.62 
S.D.x^ = 22.12
Therefore the difference between the mean values for land 
productivity for all three villages is significant at 
the 9 5% level of confidence.
Land in Efficiency Units 
S.D.x1 = 2.87 
S.D.x^ = 3*12 
S.D.x^ = 4*50
2^r(x2-x^) = 1.07 
x2-x3 = 0.01
2«ix -jp = 0.87
X3-X1 = 1.00
2t (x 2-x1 ) = 0.94
x2.*i =* 1.01
Therefore the difference between mean values for land in 
efficiency units for Biddya and Jamira is not significant, 
but between both these villages and Bajua the difference 
is significant.
In Table 6,2.3 the difference in magnitude of the 
social variables has been tested for statistical 
significant (except the Gini concentration ratio).
For all tests :
Bajua is taken as x^
Biddya is taken as 
Jamira is taken as x^
The results are as follows :
Market (MKT)
S . D . x 1 = 25.91 
nx = 135 
S.D.x2 = 11.95 
n2 - 61 
S.D.x^ = 19.73 
n^ = 158
Pi 4 i 8
2<rlx3-x2) = 4-*38 
x3-x2 = 5*60 
2<r(x3-x1 ) * 5*4-6 
x3-xx = 6.10 
^(x^-x-^) — 5*4-6 
X 2-Xi = 0.50
The difference between mean values for marketed produce 
as a percentage of gross produce for Bajua and Biddya 
is not significant but between both these villages and 
Jamira the difference is significant at the 95% level 
of confidence.
Share-Cropping (SHG) 
S.D.x^ = 13.90 
ni = 87 
S.D.x^ a 7.52
n2 = 34 
S.D.x 3 a 3.61
n3 = 50
2<T(x1 -x 2) = 3.95
X1"X2 = 5.5
2<r(x2-x3) = 2.78
x2-x3 = 2.80
2T( x^-x 3 ) = 3.16
xl”x3 = 8.3
The difference between mean values for net share of 
share-crop paid for all three villages is significant 
at the 9 5 % level of confidence
Wage Labour (WL)
S.D.x1 = 14.52
nl " 122 
S.D.x^ = 16.04
n2 = 34
S.D.x, = 13.30
n3 = 45
2<r(52-5 ) =6.77 
x2-x3 = 14.2
2q-(x^-x^) = 4.76 
xx-x3 = 18.70
2 ^ ( x ± - x 2 ) = 6.09
xl"x2 = ^*5
The difference between mean values for wage labour use 
as a percentage of total labour use for Bajua and Biddya 
is not significant but between both these villages and 
Jamira the difference is significant at the 9 5 % level 
of confidence.
Family Labour (FL)
S.D.x1 = 14.52 
n1 = 135
S.D.x 2 = 16,04
n2 = 61
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The difference between mean values for family labour use 
as a percentage of total labour use for Bajua and Biddya 
is not significant but between both these villages and 
Jamira the difference is significant at the 95% level 
of confidence.
Usury (USY)
difference between proportions
p i -p 2
cr
difference between proportions
p2-p3
^difference between proportions
P]_-P3 = 18.8
The difference between the percentage of indebted house­
holds in each village is significant at the 95 % level 
of confidence.
= .057 
= 14.4
= .056 
= 4-4
APPENDIX V
QUESTIONNAIRE (Translation)
Q. 1.Q1 Information on the Family
Name of respondent and other family members
Relationship of each of the other member to the head 
of the family
Age
Sex
Level of education 
Marital status 
Main occupation 
Religion
Q. 1.02 Information on those who are part of the family 
but do not live in the village
Names
Marital status
If married, whether his/her family lives with him/her or 
in the village
Year in which left the village 
Place of Present Residence 
Distance from the village 
Reason for leaving village 
Present occupation
Occupation when living in the village
Present monthly income
Property in the village (in acres)
Frequency of visits to the village
Whether living at the present place of residence alone 
or with any relative.
If anyone helped him/her to find a jbb there 
How much money is remitted to the village annually 
How much money it taken from the village annually 
How much crop is taken from the village annually.
'Vi
Q. 1*03
How frequently does the correspondent or any other member 
of the family go to town/city.
Q. 1.01
For what reasons normally
Q,« 1 o 0 5 Respondent and his family fs property and assets
Names of the owners and each owner’s property and assets
Land (in acres)
homestead
approximate value (in taka) 
orchard
approximate value
fallow land
approximate value
cultivating land
approximate value
No, of ponds
approximate value
No, of cattle
approximate value
No. of ploughs
approximate value
No. of grain stores
approximate value
No, of fruit trees
approximate value
No. of any other valuable
approximate value
No, of rickshaws/vans owned
approximate value
No, of bicycles owned
approximate value
No, of shops owned
approximate value
No, of coir making units owned
approximate value
Radios, if any and value 
watches/clocks : value 
jewellery if any, value 
Any other valuables : value
Total value of property and assets :
Q. 2.01 Account of Respondentrs landed property
Have you (respondent) or any member of your family lo 
any land ? If so, how ?
Name of the owner
Amount of land lost
Homestead
cultivating
Name of the recipient
Amount of land lost by sale
approximate date
if sold to local resident
if sold to absentee owner
total price received
cause of sale
economic condition of the buyer
Amount of land lost through mortgage
year of mortgage
year the land was lost
amount of original loan
amount received at the time land was handed over to 
the debtor
Amount of land lost in the river
Amount of land lost through charity
Amount of land taken by force
Amount taken by the Government
Compensation paid by the Government 
Amount lost in any other way
Q. 2.02 Account of cultivating land (owned)
Names of the owners 
No. of plots
relationship of the owner to the head of the family 
(respondent)
amount of land in each plot 
distance D'f each plot from homestead
How owned 
amount inherited 
amount bought
amount received from the Government 
amount taken by force
If purchased
amount purchased directly 
year purchased 
price paid
amount purchased directly
amount purchased by way of mortgage
sellers economic situation
Out of all cultivating land, how much is self-managed 
how much is rented-out.
If rented-out (applicable to those who rent-out any land) 
on what basis are the different plots cultivated
Share-cropping 
No. of plots
distance of each plot from homestead 
area of each plot
how long has each of these plots been share-cropped
time basis: crop season; yearly,/two-yearly, ~£©-r- 
indefinite period
Lease/Ekrat
Area of each plot
distance of plots from homestead
year in which leased-out
time basis : crop season; /yearly,/ two yearly, -for indefinite 
period /
advance received (in taka)
type of contract (written/verbal/other)
Mortgaged
Area of each plot
distance of plots from homestead
year in which mortgaged-out
loan received (in taka)
how much has been repaid (in taka)
the year by which the debt must be paid
type of contract (written/verbal/other)
any other arrangement
Land rented-in the year before and the basis of the rent 
Share-cropping 
No. of plots
distance of the plots from homestead
area of each plot
how long have you been renting-in
time basis; crop season,,j yearly, /two-yearly, -for indefinite 
period
per cent of crop to be given to the landlord 
amount of 'salami1 paid, if any 
amount of 'deposit' paid, if any 
free labour supplied for the landlord 
type of contract (written/Verbal/other)
Lease/Ekrat 
No of plots
distance of the plots from homestead 
area in each plot
how long have you been leasing-in 
advance given in taka
type of contract (written/verbal/other)
Mortgage 
No of plots
distance of the plots from homestead 
area in each plot 
year loan given 
amount given
the year by which the loan must be repaid 
type of contract (written/verbal/other)
Q. 2.05
Information on the Landlords whose land you cultivated 
last year.
Names of the landlords
Relationship with the respondent, if any 
Residence of the landlord - local/absentee 
Approximate land owned by the landlord 
Area rented-in by the respondent
Basis on which rented-in (Shareeropping/lease/ekrat/mortgage/ 
other)
How long have you been renting-in these plot(s)
Is the type of crop dictated by the landlord
Cash advance given by the landlord for cultivation,if any.
Any other help given by the landlord.
From share-cropper's point of view, who is preferred 
out of a local or absentee owner.
Q. 3,01 Production, Labour and Cost
Type of crops grown : 
on self-managed land 
total area under each crop 
total production of each crop
on share-cropped in land 
total area under each crop 
total production of each crop
A
on land rented-in on any other basis 
total area under each crop 
total production
on rented-out land
total area under each crop
total production
Cultivation and Labour
cost of ploughing hired, if any
cost of mechanical ploughing hired, if any
No. of family labour used
No. of days used
No. of hired labour used 
No. of days used
Cost of hired labour
Seed
total local seed used (in maunds) 
total cost (in taka) 
total HIV seed used 
total cost
reason for not using HIV seed
Labour used for transplanting 
No. of family labour 
No. of days used
No. of hired 
No. of days ysed 
total cost
Fertilizer
quantity of local fertilizer (in maunds) 
total cost
quantity of imported fertilizer (in maunds) 
total cost
Irrigation
renting cost of pump, if used 
fuel cost
renting cost of tubewell, if used
cost of conventional (indigenous) irrigation, if used 
basis of irrigation : cooperative/individual 
If no irrigation has been used, why not 
cost of insecticides, if used
labour used for weeding 
No. of family labour 
No. of days used
No. of hired labour 
No. of days used 
total cost
Labour used for harvesting 
No, of family labour 
No.»of days used
No. of hired labour 
No. of days used 
total cost
Labour used for threshing 
No. of family labour 
No. of days used
No. of hired labour 
No. of days used 
total cost
Of total wages paid, how much is paid in cash and how 
much in crop
Q. 1.01 Account of Family Labour 
Names of working members
relationship of each member to respondent 
No. of days worked at home or on own land 
No. of days worked as wage-labourer 
wages received (in taka)
No. of days worked as contract labour
P A o
wages received cash/crop annually 
No. of days work spent on coir-making 
profit made
No. od days spent fishing 
profit made
No. of days spent on petty business 
type of business 
profit made
No. of days in salaried work
type of work
annual salary received
No. of days spent in other work 
annual earnings
No. of days unemployed 
if unemployed, reason
would you have worked had job been available
Q,. 5*01 Account of Paddy
Paddy Paid (in maunds) 
paddy loan paid
interest (in paddy) of paddy loan 
paddy paid in wages
paddy paid in repayment of cash debt 
paddy paid for any other purpose 
total paddy paid
Paddv Received (in maunds) 
from borrower 
paddy interest on above 
from doing wage labour 
production
surplus left over from the year before 
total paddy
Annual Surplus/deficit 
If surplus, how much is loaned out
if surplus, how much is sold
if deficit, how do you meet this.
Q. 6.01 Market 
Grops marketed
amount of crop marketed at different times of the year:
immediately after harvest/later in the year/immediately 
before harvest
Sold to and rate
amount sold at the farm door to local traders 
rate
amount sold in the market 
rate
amount sold to the village money-lender 
rate
amount sold to the Government procurement agents 
rate
if not sold to the Government procurement agent, why not
if sold either in the market or to the Government agents, 
how is the produce carried.
Q. 7>01 Income (for the preceding year)
Sources and Income 
paddy sold 
other crops sold 
gur sold
chewing nuts sold
coconut/coconut husks/oil/other crops sold 
coir/bamboo/cane and other products sold 
vegetables sold 
fish sold
poultry/pets/cattle sold
profit made from shop-keeping 
profit made from other petty busines 
salary
income from wage labour 
cash received from horrowers 
loan taken 
remittance, if any 
any other source 
total income
Expenditure
paddy deficit
shopping (food)
cigarette, tobacco etc.
colthes/shoes etc
household goods
transport
medical expenses
children’s education
entertainment/ceremonial occasions
wage payments
other input costs
home repairs
cost of raw materials
litigation
debt paid
loan paid
wedding etc
pruchase of cattle
others
total surplus/deficit
Q.  7 . 0 2
If deficit how is this made up
Q. 7.03
If surplus, where is this money kept home/post office/ 
bank/other
Q. 8,01
Have you or any member of your family sued anybody in 
the past 5 years
If yes, how many times
reasons : land/cash/other
against whom : money lender/landlord/share-cropper/other 
defendentfs economic condition 
result of the judgement
appriximate cost incurred in the litigation 
Q. 8.02
Has anybody sued you or any member of your family in 
the past 5 years.
If yes, how many times
Is plaintiff the ; moneylender/landlord/share-cropper/other
reasons : land/cash/other
plaintiff*s economic eondition
result of the judgement
approximate cost incurred
Q. 9,01 Usury 
Names of the borrowers 
relationship with the respondent 
borrowed from money-lenders 
amount
y:ear borrowed 
year to be repaid 
amount to be repaid
collateral if any,
interest rate : haat ba;ar/week/month
borrowed from a business man 
amount
year borrowed 
year to be repaid 
amount to be repaid 
collateral, if any
interest rate : haat baar/week/month
Borrowed from a landowner 
amount
year borrowed 
amount to be repaid 
collateral, if any
interest rate : haat baar/week/month 
Borrowed from friends/relatives 
amount
year borrowed 
amount to be repaid 
collateral, if any
interest rate : week/month/any other arrangement
Borrowed from Agricultural Bank 
amount
year borrowed 
amount to be repaid 
collateral, if any 
interest rate ;
Borrowed from I.R.D.P./Agricultural co-operative 
amount
year borrowed 
amount to be repaid 
collateral, if any 
interest rate :
Borrowed from any other Bank 
amount
year borrowed 
amount to be repaid 
collateral, if any 
intere b rate :
Reason for borrowing (against each loan)
Present position of the loan : paid/partly paid/unpaid
Q. 9.02
Money owed to the respondent or any member of his 
family by others.
Name of borrower
relationship with the respondent 
sum loaned 
year loaned
Terms of interest
in crop (maunds)
in cash (rate of interest)
year when the loan is expected to be repaid 
why did the borrower borrow 
borrower's economic condition 
collateral
type of contract : written/verbal 
any other terras or conditions
0.. 10.01
Is the respondent a member of any cooperative, agricultural 
society, pump group, I.R.DoP. or any other society or 
association,
Q. 10.02
If there is such an organisation and respondent is not a 
member, why not.
Q. 10.03
If respondent is a member, what sort of benefit does 
he derive.
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GLOSSARY
abad jungle (Sundarbans) clearing
abwabs illegal (rent or tax) exactions
aman one of the two main rice-crops; usually transplanted
aratdar trader who hoards for super profits
aus one of the two main rice-crops; usually broadcast
baegar kishen the practice of swopping family labour
bagan orchard
baid narrow, winding valley
Baisakh approximately April 15 - May 15
bali-mati sandy soils
banya Hindu money lender/trader
bazaar shopping centre
beel flat, low-lying (paddy) fields or marshy land
bepari dealers in paddy, rice or other crops
bete a kind of long grass
bigfia approximately 1/3 of an acre
btmdh traditional embankment
bodly the practice of swopping family labour
boro the winter rice crop
Chaitra approximately March 15 - April 15
chala plateaulike hillocks
char sandy, flat island or beach
crore ten million
daab green coconut
dafadar assistant to the Tehsildar
dawal reapers
dhani where the rice crop is grown
doash
ekrat
f aria 
Gaj ari 
ganti
gantidar 
Gar an 
goal-pata 
gur 
haat
haat-bar
haoladari
haolardar
haor
J aistha
j ungalburi 
abadkari
kabla dalil
kalboyishakhi
kalo-mati
khal
loams
a form of fixed renting in which use of land 
is enjoyed by the creditor until the loan is 
paid back.
intermediary traders
a kind of tree grown in the Sundarbans
lease of property directly under independent 
talukdars
lessee of the above
kind of wood grown in the Sundarbans 
thatching leaves 
date-palm molasses
village market centre, sitting weekly or bi­
weekly
the day(s) the haat sits
lease of property with the power to sublet to 
cultivators though not to create under-tenures.
lessee of the above
major low-lying depressions
approximately May 15 - June 15
reclamation tenures granted for jungle clearance
written, official deed of transaction
early summer storm
muck soils
canals or creeks .
khas
khesari
lal-mati
mahaj an
marwari
matial
maund
Mukti
Bahini
munchi
narkel
nona-mati
paan/pan
paisa
palimati
Pari sad
patitabadi
patnidar
rabi
ryot
ryotwari
salami
seer
Government owned land 
low value lentils 
red and yellow soils 
money-lender
non-Bengali, Indian, Hindu businessman 
clays
approximately 82 pounds
freedom fighters during Bangladesh war of 
Independence
cane worker; (but normally refers to shoe-menders) 
coconut
alkaline or saline soils 
betel-ieaf
one hundredth of a taka 
silt loams 
(elected) assembly
reclamation tenures granted for jungle clearance 
one form of lease under independent talukdars 
winter crops
cultivating tenant with no power to sublet
land tenure system characterized by direct 
settlement between the Government and the 
cultivators without the intervention of the 
zamindars
money paid in gratitude 
approximately 2 lbs.
seths
shaheb
Sundarbans
Sundari
taka
taluk
talukdar
tehsildar
thana
til
tila
van
zamindar
non-Bengali, Indian, Hindu businessmen
gentleman or 'sir1 (refers to white foreigner)
mangrove swamp forests in the south of the 
district of Khulna
a kind of wood grown in the Sundarbans
Bangladesh currency; approximately 4.0 taka to 
the pound sterling
grants of land directly under zamindars
lessee of taluks
collector of rents or taxes
administrative area under a police station
lentil
small hills
a kind of flat-board cycle/rickshaw
intermediate collector of land revenue, commonly 
the landlord, during the British Period.
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